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I  INTRODUCTION 
Background  to  the  study 
1.1  This  study  for  the  Directorate General  for  Energy  (DG  XVII)  of the 
European  Commission  regarding  a  possible  "common  carrier'~  system for  the 
transport of natural  gas  within the  European  Community  is placed within the 
overall context of  the  Commission's  move  towards  cowpL~ting the  internal 
market by  1992. 
1.2  COM(85)  310,  the  Commission's  White  Paper  to  the  European Council  on 
completing  the  internal market,  provided the overall  framework  for  removing 
physical,  technical  and fiscal barriers to  trade within the  Community. 
Although  the proposals  envisaged in the  timetable  annexed  to  the White 
Paper  did not specifically address  the  energy sector in any  great detail,  a 
number  of more  general proposals  for  Council Directives are likely (if 
approved)  to have  a  significant impact  on  Europe~n energy markets.  These 
include proposal  COM(87)  321  on  the  approximation of VAT  rates and,  in 
particular,  COM(87)  327  on the  approximation of the  rates of excise duty on 
mineral oils.  Moreover,  and perhaps  most  importantly of all,  the White 
Paper  established a  general  strategy for harmonisation and  the  removal  of 
barriers  to  internal  trade,  including key  issues  such as  the application of 
Community  Law  in the  field of competition policy and state aids. 
1.3  More  recently,  a  Commission Working  Document  entitled "The  Internal 
Energy Market"  (COM(88)  238)  has been produced by  DG  XVII.  This  document 
focuses  specifically on  the  implementation of the  1985  White  Paper  and  the 
application of Community  Law  in the  energy sector.  It does  not,  at this 
stage,  attempt  to  prescribe solutions but presents  a  comprehensive 
inventory of possible barriers  to  trade  in each major  form  of energy, 
including natural gas,  and  identifies  the priority areas  for action to 
remove  the  most  significant barriers.  In the  case  of natural gas,  the 
priorities identified in COM(88)  238  include  the  following: 
(a)  greater price  transparency for non-tariff sales,  especially in the 
United Kingdom  and West  Germany; 
(b)  harmonisation of taxation on energy; 
5 (c)  increased interconnection and  integrated operation of the  European 
gas  pipeline network;  and 
(d)  the possibility of  "common  carrier"  third party access  to  the grid in 
return for  a  reasonable  carriage charge  - either for  other gas 
transmission and distribution undertakings  only or  for  industrial 
customers  as  well. 
1.4  The  present study  therefore  stems  from  one  of the  key priority areas 
identified in COM(88)  238.  Its principal objectives  are  to  identify the 
conditions under which  an effective  common  carriage  system for natural gas 
might be  introduced at the  Community  level and  to  identify the  advantages 
and  drawbacks  which  such  a  system could have  for  Community  gas  producers, 
utilities,  consumers  and  the  interests of the  Community  as  a  whole. 
Definition of common  carriage 
1.5  It may  be helpful at the outset  to  identify what  is meant  by  a  common 
carriage system for natural  gas.  By  "common  carriage",  we  understand some 
form  of statutory obligation on gas  pipeline  owners  to  transport gas  for 
third parties in return for  a  reasonable carriage charge.  At  present, 
there  is  some  third party use  of natural gas  pipelines within the  European 
Community,  but this  is almost entirely confined to use  by  agreement 
between gas utilities.  A common  carriage  system would differ  from  the 
present system  in that third parties  - whether other  gas  companies  or large 
industrial consumers  - would have  a  legal right,  under certain 
circumstances,  to have  their gas  carried through others'  pipelines.  In 
turn,  the pipeline  owners  would not  generally be  able  to  refuse  to  provide 
a  transportation service,  subject  to  the  pipeline capacity being available. 
1.6  In practice,  a  natural  gas  common  carriage  arrangement  may  well 
involve  a  number  of other elements besides  the  payment  of a  carriage charge 
in return for  transportation.  These  could  include: 
(a)  provision of a  storage  service  to convert  a  high  load factor bulk 
supply into  a  low  level  load factor  supply  to  the  consumer; 
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(b)  provisions  regarding the  construction of additional pipeline 
capacity,  where  required,  in return for  reasonable  payment; 
(c)  provision of a  "back-up"  supply service  to  cover  the  shipper against 
an  interruption to his  gas  supply; 
(d)  provision for  gas  transportation which  is either "firm"  or 
"interruptible"  (at the option of the pipeline owner),  as  the  case 
may  be;  and 
(e)  provisions  regarding priorities as between  the  shipper and  the 
pipeline owner's  own  customers,  in circumstances where  pipeline 
capacity is limited. 
1.7  Transportation of natural gas  for  third parties is now  well  developed 
in the United States,  though  in this  case  much  third party transportation 
takes  place under  Federal  Energy Regulatory  Commission  (FERC)  Order 436, 
which is voluntary on  the pipeline owners.  In other words,  there is no 
statutory obligation as  such to carry gas  for  third parties in the US.  A 
common  carriage obligation has  existed in the United Kingdom  since 1982  and 
was  modified in 1986,  though actual  third party use of the British Gas 
system has  yet  to  take place. 
Structure of the  study report 
1.8  Sections  II-IV of the  report are essentially concerned with the 
environment  into which  gas  common  carriage might be  introduced.  In Section 
II,  we  set out  the  context for  our evaluation of a  possible  gas  common 
carriage  system,  in terms  of the  European Community's  energy objectives as 
they relate to  the  gas  sector.  We  focus  particularly on  those objectives 
which might be  affected  - either positively or negatively  - by  the 
development of common  carriage.  Section III  then deals with  the  current 
gas  supply situation in the  Community,  with  a  focus  on  those  features  which 
either constitute barriers to  internal  trade  in natural  gas  or would 
influence  the  impact  of a  common  carriage system.  In Section IV,  we  review 
the  legislative,  regulatory and administrative situation within the 
Community  as  it affects  the  internal market  in natural  gas.  As  well  as 
identifying barriers  to  internal trade,  the  report also highlights  any existing legislation (in the  UK  and  elsewhere)  which provides  for  the 
possibility of common  carriage in natural gas.  In Section IV,  we  also  look 
at the  relevant provisions of the  Treaty of Rome,  the  existing powers  of 
the  European Commission  and its administrative procedures  as  these  apply  to 
internal trade  in natural  gas.  W'e  then discuss  the legislative and 
regulatory  framework  for  common  carriage in the United States,  which  is of 
interest because  of the uniquely widespread use  of third party gas 
transportation in that country. 
1.9  Having  examined  the policy,  gas  market  and legislative environment, 
we  then  turn  in Sections V and VI  of the  report to specific common  carriage 
issues.  Section V addres·ses  the  key conditions  for  the  effective 
implementation of a  common  carriage  system at the  Community  level, 
including  the  framework  of gas  carriage obligations  and  charges,  pipeline 
capacity issues  and  the  corresponding regulatory regime.  In Section VI,  we 
then turn to  the  impact of such  a  system on  gas  consumers,  the  gas  industry 
within the  Community  and  the  advantages  and  drawbacks  of common  carriage 
for  the  Community  as  a  whole. 
1.10  Although  the US  gas  supply situation is very different from  that 
prevailing in the  Community,  the  development  of third party gas 
transportation there is nevertheless  of considerable  interest and is 
summarised  in Appendix A  to  the  report.  Appendix  B contains  a  glossary of 
technical  and other gas  industry  terms  used elsewhere  in the  report  and  in 
Appendix  C we  acknowledge  the assistance of many  gas utilities,  oil 
companies,  energy consumer associations  and other bodies with whom  we  have 
had  the benefit of discussions  during  the  course of the  study.  For  ease  of 
reference,  the study  terms  of reference are  set out  in Appendix  D. 
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II  THE  COMMUNITY'S  ENERGY  OBJECTIVES 
Introduction 
2.1  The  assessment of possible  advantages  and drawbacks  of a  gas  common 
carriage  regime  for  the  Community  as  a  whole  must be  seen in the  context of 
the  Community's  energy policy objectives,  as  they relate to  the natural  gas 
sector.  On  16  September  1986,  the  European Council  adopted new  Community 
energy policy objectives  for  1995  and convergence  of the policies of the 
Member  States  (O.J.E.C.  No  C241).  The  Council Resolution highlights  the 
fact  that  "adequate  and secure availability of energy on  a  satisfactory 
economic basis  remains  a  prerequisite for  the pursuit of the  economic  and 
social objectives of the  Community  and of Member  States."  Perhaps  the 
central  theme  of this  document  is the need to  reduce  the vulnerability of 
the  Community  to  a  possible  tightening of the oil market  and sudden price 
hikes  of the kind experienced in 1973-4 and again in 1979-80.  Thus 
"priority should be  given .... to containing energy  consumption to  a  greater 
extent and  to restricting the  share of oil and ..... to  ensuring that the 
level of dependence  on  imported energy,  and in particular imported oil,  is 
not unreasonable."  The  Commission  therefore points out that "efforts must 
be  made  and,  if necessary,  reinforced ...  in order to reduce  to  a  minimum 
the  risk of tension at a  later date  on  the energy market  and  in particular 
on  the oil market." 
Energy diversification 
2.2  As  a  consequence,  diversification of energy  supplies  and the  further 
development of the  Community's  own  energy resources  are  of considerable 
importance  in meeting  these objectives.  Specific performance  targets  for 
1995  are  to  reduce  the  total oil share of energy consumed  in the  Community 
to  40%  and  to maintain the net oil import  share of total energy  consumption 
at less  than one-third.  The  latter objective was  already achieved in 1986, 
with  a  33%  oil  import  share  for  the  12  Member  States as  a  whole,  but  the 
total oil share was  still significantly above  the  target level at 47%. 
Apart  from  the  UK  (which  is a  net oil exporter),  the net oil  import  share 
varied from  39%  in Denmark  through  to  82%  in Portugal  and,  as  the UK's  net 
oil exports  are  likely to decline  in the  longer  term,  there is clearly 
9 going  to  have  to be  further significant diversification away  from oil use 
if the  Community's  targets  are  to  be  achieved. 
2.3  The  key  energy objectives with  a  direct bearing on  the natural gas 
sector must  therefore be  seen within this overall policy framework  of 
diversification in energy  supply.  A central Community  objective for  the 
sector is  thus  "to maintain  the  share  of natural  gas  in the  energy balance 
on  the basis of a  policy aimed at ensuring stable and diversified 
supplies."  The  current natural  gas  share of gross  energy consumption 
varies widely across  Member  States,  as  shown  in table  2.1 below:· 
Table  2.1  Share  of natural  gas  in gross  energy consumption(%).  1986 
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In  the  light of plans  to  develop  new  or considerably expand existing gas 
industries  in Greece,  Portugal,  Denmark  and Spain,  together with  a  growing 
gas  share of household and other small user markets  elsewhere  in the 
Community,  the  maintenance  of the  overall existing gas  share would  appear 
to be  a  very modest  target for  1995.  Nevertheless,  it is clear that  the 
Commission  envisages  a  continuing and  important role  for  gas  in a 
diversified mix  of energy supplies  for  the  Community. 
Indigenous  &as  production 
2.4  A further  important  element  in the  objectives  for maintaining secure 
and diversified energy supplies  is  the  development  of policies aimed at 
"continuing and,  if need be,  stepping up  natural  gas  exploration and 
production in the  Community."  Currently,  nearly  two-thirds  of total 
natural  gas  consumption in Member  States is covered by  indigenous  gas 
production from within the  Community.  Almost half of this  indigenous 
production takes  place  in the  Netherlands,  with a  further  30%  or so 
produced  in the United Kingdom.  Nearly half of Dutch  gas  production is 
exported,  principally to  West  Germany,  France,  Italy and  Belgium,  while  UK 
gas  output  is entirely devoted  to  consumption within  the  UK  itself. 
Smaller but nevertheless  significant  indigenous  production  takes  place  in 
• 
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West  Germany  (almost all onshore  in Niedersachsen),  Italy  (onshore  in the 
Po  Valley and  increasingly offshore  in the Adriatic)  and  France  (virtually 
all  from  the  Lacq  area  in South West  France).  The  pattern of indigenous 
gas  production in the  Community  in 1987  is shown  in table  2.2  below: 
Table  2.2  Indigenous  gas  production in the  Community.  1987 
L 
44%  30%  11%  10% 
fi 
3% 
Others 
3% 
EUR-12 
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Of  the  smaller  gas  consuming countries  in the  Community,  Denmark  and the 
Republic  of Ireland are currently a  net exporter  and self-sufficient 
respectively,  while  Belgium and Luxembourg  are entirely dependent on 
imported gas  supplies  and  Spain also relies mainly  on  gas  imports  to meet 
its needs. 
2.5  Projections made  by  the  European  Commission  late in 1986 
(COM(86)  518)  suggest that  the  total amount  of indigenous  gas  production in 
the  Community  is unlikely to  change  very much  between now  and  the  end of 
the  century.  A somewhat  lower  level of contracted gas  exports  is likely to 
mean  reduced production in the Netherlands  and output  from  Lacq  in France 
is expected  to  decline  significantly.  In Italy and West  G~rmany,  the 
amount  of indigenous  gas  production may  be little changed  from  today's 
levels while  increases  are  expected in Denmark  and Spain.  The  major 
uncertainty perhaps  lies in the  United Kingdom,  where  significant 
additional  supplies have still to be  contracted to meet  demand  through  to 
the  end of the  century.  While  there  are probably more  than adequate 
indigenous  gas  reserves  in place,  it is somewhat  less certain whether 
sufficient fields  can be  developed  economically  on  the  timescale  required 
to  meet  demand  at prices British Gas  or other potential buyers would be 
willing to pay.  Although  the  Commission's projections  show  the  UK  as 
entirely supplied by  indigenous  gas  in 2000,  it appears  to us at least as 
likely that there  could be  a  significant market  share for  imports,  of which 
Norway  is by  some  way  the  most  probable  source.  Overall,  the  growing 
demand  for  gas  in the  Community  is  likely to be  such that dependence  on 
II imports  from  non-member  states could rise  from  37%  in 1987  to  around  40%  in 
the  1990s  and yet higher  in  the  first decade  of the  next century. 
Gas  supply security 
2.6  One  of the principal policy concerns  of the  European Commission  in 
the natural  gas  sector is the security of the  Community's  supplies  and,  in 
particular,  its vulnerability to  the possibility of a  major  supply 
interruption.  Although  the  share  of overall Community  gas  use  accounted 
for by  imports  from  non-member  states is only around one-third,  the 
proportion of supplies  obtained from  outside  the  Community  is much  higher 
for  some  individual Member  States.  The  "third country"  share  of total 1987 
gas  consumption,  for  example,  was  around  45%  in West  Germany  and  in Italy, 
55%  in Belgium  and nearly  80%  in France  and  Spain.  These  non-Community  gas 
imports  typically account  for  some  5-10%  of total energy  consumption in 
those  countries.  Significant increases  in third country market  share are 
expected over  the  next  few  years  in Belgium,  Italy and France,  as  a  result 
of somewhat  reduced Dutch  gas  export volumes,  growing  gas  demand  and 
declining  indigenous  production in the  case of France.  Non-member  states' 
gas  exports will probably account  for  some  60-65%  of total gas  consumption 
in Belgium and Italy in the  1990s  and  for  over  80%  of gas  used  in France. 
Only  in Spain is a  significant decline  in the  non-EC  gas  share  of the 
market  expected  to  take  place,  as  indigenous  Spanish  gas  reserves  are 
further  developed. 
2.7  At  present,  there are  three  main  non-EC  exporters  of natural gas  to 
the  Community  - Algeria,  Norway  and  the USSR,  who  in 1987  accounted for 
10%,  12%  and  14%  respectively of total natural  gas  use  in Member  States. 
There have  recently been significant increases  in Soviet gas  exports  to 
West  Germany,  France  and Italy and  recent contractual arrangements  suggest 
further  changes  in the  1990s  and beyond.  For  example,  Norway  has  concluded 
large  new  export contracts  for  gas  from  the Troll and  East Sleipner fields 
with a  consortium of buyers  from  Belgium,  France,  the Netherlands  and West 
Germany  and has  signed a  smaller contact for  exports  to  Enagas  of Spain. 
In 1988,  Greece has  concluded an  LNG  import contract with Algeria  and  is 
also reported to have  agreed price  terms  for  supplies  of pipeline  gas  from 
the  USSR.  Portugal also has  plans  to  import  LNG  in the  1990s  and Algeria 
I~ 
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.. is  a  possible  source  of  these  supplies.  Although other potential exporters 
(such  as  Nigeria)  may  begin to  enter the picture  from  around  the  turn of 
century,  the  three exporting countries who  are currently the  Community's 
major  sources  of non-indigenous  supplies  are  likely to  continue  to  dominate 
the  third country share of the  EC  gas  market  for many  years  to  come.  In 
particular,  the  USSR  is projected to achieve  a  slightly higher market  share 
than  in the  mid  1980s  - perhaps  15%  of total Community  gas  consumption by 
around  the  turn of the  Century.  To  put this  in context,  the  largest non-EC 
supplier of gas  to  the  Community  is unlikely to account  for more  than about 
3-4%  of  total energy use. 
2.8  Most  Member  States also  seek  to ensure  a  balanced,  diversified 
portfolio of gas  supply sources,  in order not  to be  unduly reliant on any 
single non-EC  supplier.  Table  2.3  below  shows  all the projected supply 
sources  for  each Member  State which  are  expected to account  for more  than 
10%  or so  of total gas  supplies  around  the  turn of the  century. 
Table  2.3:  Projected major  sources  of  gas  supply by Member  State.  2000 
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Given  the  long-term nature of most  gas  trading within and  around Western 
Europe,  most  of these  supplies  are  already secured contractually,  though 
some  uncertainties  remain  in the  case  of Denmark,  Portugal,  the United 
Kingdom  and possibly also Italy,  where  national energy planning now 
\2> envisages  an even  more  significant role  for  gas  than previously expected. 
Although  few  Member  States will be  dependent  upon  a  single non-EC  source  of 
gas,  the  number  of major  gas  suppliers  is generally small.  Only  Gaz  de 
France  already has purchase  contacts with all three  major  non-Community 
suppliers while  six other Member  States have  existing arrangements  with  two 
of them. 
2.9  It would,  for  the  foreseeable  future,  be  unrealistic to  expect  a 
further major  increase  in the  geographical diversification of gas  supply 
sources  for  the  Community.  The  European Commission's  short and medium  term 
approach  to  the question of supply security is to stress  the  importance  for 
the  gas  industry and  its consumers  of measures  which would  allow  them  to 
handle  a  major  supply  interruption.  Historically,  it should be  noted,  the 
reliability of non-Community  supplies has  generally been quite high. 
Perhaps  the most  serious  interruptions  to  supply occurred with relatively 
small  scale  imports  from  Libya  and  more  significant under-deliveries of 
Algerian LNG  to  France  in 1980-81,  when  there was  a  major  dispute  over 
pricing.  Norwegian deliveries have  on  occasions been adversely affected by 
short-term strikes offshore  and by  recent production difficulties at the 
Ekofisk field.  There were  some  winter under-deliveries of Soviet gas  to 
Western  Europe  in the  mid  1980s  due  to  unexpectedly high offtakes  in 
Eastern Europe but  these  problems  now  appear  to have  been resolved.  Of  the 
three  major  producers  supplying Member  States  from  outside  the  Community, 
Norway  is the  only OECD  country and  therefore politically regarded as  the 
most reliable for'the  future.  In  terms  of past supply performance, 
however,  the USSR  has  proved at least as  reliable.  At  least in the  absence 
of very major  east-west tension,  it could be  argued that  the  USSR  has  every 
economic  incentive  to maintain this reputation for reliability. 
2.10  Notwithstanding  the fairly good historical experience with non-EC 
suppliers,  the Algerian difficulties and past experience  of supply 
interruptions  in the oil market  underline  the wisdom  of measures  to provide 
for  a  major disruption to  supplies.  Such  measures  essentially involve 
three principal elements: 
(a)  the availability of underground  gas  storage within the  Community; 
\4 
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(b)  interruptible  sales contracts with large  industrial or power  station 
users  who  have  alternative  fuels,  which  allow supplies  to be  cut off 
in periods  of peak  demand  or  supply shortage;  and 
(c)  the  flexibility to reroute  gas  flows  within the  interconnected 
European  transmission grid to  cope  with failure of  one  supply source 
by  redirecting additional  gas  from  other sources . 
In the  case  of both storage  and  interruptible sales,  it is  important  to 
recognise  that  these  can play a  key  role  in seasonal  supply/demand matching 
as  well  as  serving strategic supply security objectives. 
2.11  The  extent of gas  storage facilities varies considerably across 
Member  States,  depending on  the availability of partially-depleted onshore 
gas  fields,  salt strata suitable for salt cavity storage,  naturally 
occurring aquifers  or other potential gas  storage facilities  such as 
worked-out mines.  Exceptionally,  British Gas  has  developed an offshore 
storage facility,  its own  seasonally producing offshore  gas  field and  a  gas 
purchase  contract for very  low  load factor  supplies;  these  expensive 
measures  reflect the paucity of suitable onshore  storage possibilities. 
Drawing  on utility annual  reports  and other sources,  the  current 
availability of seasonal  gas  storage  in the  the various Member  States is 
estimated to be broadly as  follows:-
Table  2.4:  Availability of seasonal  gas  storage  in Member  States.  1986-87 
(working  storage volume  as  % of annual  sales) 
B 
illl 
6% 
D 
inl 
10% 
DK 
illl 
11% 
Esp 
il.ll 
F 
il§.l 
20% 
I 
~ 
27% 
Irl 
.!..ill. 
L  NL 
.!..ill.  .!..ill. 
UK 
.!..ill. 
6% 
EUR-12 
!tltl 
6% 
Thus  France  and  Italy,  each  of which has  a  relatively high degree  of 
dependence  on non-Community  supplies,  have both developed a  very large 
amount  of underground storage which  allows  them  to  manage  seasonal  demand 
fluctuations  and  enhance  their strategic supply security as well.  At  the 
other extreme,  the very considerable flexibility afforded by  the Groningen 
field has  meant  that the  Dutch  are  only now  beginning to plan the 
installation of other storage facilities.  Belgium has  also benefited from 
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the  flexibility provided by  Dutch  supplies  - which still account  for  nearly 
half the nation's  gas  supplies  - while  the  extent of  indigenous  gas 
production in countries  like  Denmark,  Ireland and  the  United Kingdom  means 
a  much  reduced strategic need  for  storage.  In the  UK,  the  figure  for 
storage  alone  is perhaps  a  little misleading because  of the  substantial 
peak production capacity of the  seasonal  gas  fields  Morecambe  and  Sean. 
2.12  Interruptible gas  sales  in  some  Member  States  - such as  the United 
Kingdom,  West  Germany  and Belgium  - are used primarily as  an  instrument of 
seasonal  supply/demand match  in severe winters  to release  gas  supplies  and 
pipeline capacity for  those  consumers  who  cannot be  interrupted.  In other 
cases,  such as  France  and  Italy,  interruptible customers  are  rarely 
interrupted in normal  circumstances  as  their extensive  gas  storage  is used 
for  seasonal  supply/demand match.  Thus  the  capacity to  interrupt remains  a 
strategic reserve  to  be  used in the  event of severe disruptions  to  gas 
supply.  In the Netherlands,  the  seasonal  flexibility of Groningen output 
is such  that there are  no  interruptible contacts,  other  than with  power 
stations and very  large  feedstock users,  and  there has  rarely been any 
actual  interruption by Gasunie.  The  extent  to which  gas  is actually sold 
on  an interruptible basis also varies  as  between Member  States,  as 
indicated by our estimates  in table  2.5 below. 
Table  2.5:  Interruptible sales  as  a  proportion of the  total.  1986-87 
B 
illl 
21% 
Note: 
D  DK  Esp  F  I  Irl  L  NL  UK  EUR-12 
illl  .Lru.  __(_ill  .!.Ml  .(_§_§J_  illl  .Lru.  illl  .Lru.  ~ 
15%  48%  44%  18%  29%  45%  nja  19%  21%  21% 
Some  uncertainty surrounds  these  figures,  particularly in West 
Germany  where  no  published  information is available.  For  other 
countries,  a  firm/interruptible split is frequently available  for 
industrial sales but no  breakdown  is given for  chemical  feedstock or 
power station sales.  In the  absence  of specific knowledge  (eg. 
mainly interruptible feedstock  sales  in the  UK),  we  have  assumed  that 
feedstock sales are  firm  and  power  station sales  interruptible. 
lb 
' • 
2.13  The  third main  factor which  contributes  to natural  gas  supply 
security is the  flexibility of operation of the  interconnected gas  grid 
itself.  Although  the  European Commission  recognises  that the  development 
and  integrated operation of the  pipeline network will essentially reflect 
the  commercial  objectives of the  companies  concerned,  it nevertheless 
monitors  the situation carefully and  seeks  to  encourage  further 
integration.  To  this  end,  the members  of  COMETEC-GAZ  (the association of 
major  European  gas  companies)  produced a  comprehensive July 1986  study for 
the attention of the  Commission entitled "The  contribution of the  European 
network  to security of supply".  In turn,  the  conclusions  of the  study were 
reflected in the  communication  COM(86)  518  already referred to  from  the 
Commission  to  the  European Council.  The  communication points out that 
integrated operation is facilitated by joint venture  ownership of key 
transmission pipelines  such as  TENP  (SNAM(Ruhrgas),  MEGAL  (Ruhrgas/GdF/OMV) 
or  SEGEO  (GdF/Distrigaz).  There  are often significant differences  in gas 
quality  (principally  CV  and Wobbe)  between Groningen gas,  Soviet exports, 
North  Sea  gas  from various  sources  and Algerian LNG.  Thus  separate L-gas 
and H-gas  grids  are  operated in Belgium,  the Netherlands,  the north of West 
Germany  and northern France  to  accommodate  low  CV  (Groningen quality)  and 
higher  CV  gas  respectively.  However,  the  use  of gas  mixing stations and 
processing plant allows  some  degree  of interchangeability of gas  from  the 
various different supply  sources  when  additional flexibility is required. 
2.14  In normal  circumstances,  integrated operation of the  interconnected 
grid allows  the  major  continental gas utilities to  reduce  transmission 
costs  through various  "gas  swap"  arrangements.  For  example,  it is unlikely 
that all the  Norwegian  gas  recently contracted for  sale  to  OMV  from  1993 
will physically be  delivered to Austria;  instead,  some  Soviet gas 
co~tractually destined for  West  Germany  might well be  delivered to Austrian 
consumers  while  West  Germany  receives  some  of  the  Norwegian  gas  purchased 
by  OMV.  Similarly,  north German  gas  companies  BEB  and Thyssengas  do  not 
normally  take  delivery of Soviet  gas  purchased under  the  USSR  IV  contract. 
This  gas  is usually delivered to Ruhrgas  customers  in south Germany,  while 
BEB  and Thyssengas  receive North  Sea or mixed  North  Sea  and Groningen  gas 
instead,  out of the  volumes  contractually deliverable  to Ruhrgas. 
Nevertheless,  the  transmission companies  provide  the additional pipeline 
capacity to  ensure  that all gas  could be  physically delivered to  the 
rt purchaser  in exceptional circumstances.  This  sort of flexibility is  then 
used  to  deal with  supply  interruptions.  For  example,  disruptions  in 1981 
and  1986  to  Norwegian deliveries  to  Emden  (West  Germany)  were  overcome  by 
transporting additional gas  (originating in the  USSR)  from  the  south  to  the 
north of West  Germany.  Similarly,  Distrigaz  adjusted to  the  interruption 
of Algerian  LNG  deliveries  through  France  in late 1986/early 1987  (due  to 
labour difficulties in France)  by  stepping up  Dutch  and Norwegian  imports. 
In  turn,  additional  LNG  offtakes  from Algeria were  used to  compensate  for 
under-deliveries  from  Norway  due  to major works  at the  Ekofisk field in the 
summer  of 1987.  In general,  there  is no  technical  impediment  to  the 
re-routing of gas  within an acceptable  time  period.  Thus  the  normal 
east-west  flow of Soviet gas  to  France  through  the  MEGAL  line could,  for 
example,  be  reversed to  a  west-east  flow  in the  event of disruptions  to 
West  German  supplies  from  the USSR. 
2.15  Taking all the possible measures  for dealing with  a  major  supply 
interruption into account,  the  European  Commission  drew  the  conclusion in 
COM(86)  518  that "for the period 1986-1990 existing and planned security 
measures,  when  applied on  a  Community-wide basis  to  those  countries  on  the 
European continent which  are  interconnected,  should be  sufficient to  deal 
effectively with an  interruption of supply  from  any  individual  import 
source  for  at least nine  months".  It should,  however,  be  recalled that 
five  Member  States  - Greece,  Ireland,  Portugal,  Spain and  the United 
Kingdom  - are  not  as  yet connected  to  the  integrated European grid,  though 
there are proposals  in Spain for  a  link to  the  French  network  in the  1990s. 
In future,  the  availability of  two  pipelines  from  the  Norwegian North  Sea 
to  continental  Europe  (Zeepipe  to  Zeebrugge  as well  as  the  Statpipe/Norpipe 
system  for  deliveries  to  Emden)  will  add  to  the  flexibility of the pipeline 
system.  Similarly,  a  connection between  the  UK  and mainland Europe  could 
make  an  important contribution to  supply security,  especially at times  when 
UK  gas  fields  have  considerable excess  production capacity outside  the  peak 
winter period.  Such  a  link is,  however,  only likely to be built if there 
is  a  sufficient commercial  opportunity for  UK  gas  exports  to  the  continent 
or if gas  exported or re-exported  from  the  continent can find  a  place  in 
the  UK  supply/demand match. 
• • 
The  internal  gas  market 
2.16  Not  only  for  reasons  of increased supply security,  but also  in order 
to  promote  greater competition and efficiency in gas  supply,  the  European 
Commission has  identified as  a  further objective  the  need  to  achieve  a  more 
open  internal market  in natural  gas.  Specifically,  the  Council Resolution 
of September  1986  on new  Community  energy policy objectives referred to 
.. greater integration,  free  from barriers to trade,  of  the  internal energy 
market with  a  view  to  improving security of supply,  reducing costs and 
improving  economic  competitiveness".  This  theme  was  subsequently developed 
in the  Commission Working  Document  COM(88)  238  enti~led "The  Internal 
Energy Market",  which  provided an  inventory of  exi£~ing obstacles  to  the 
achievement of the  integration objective. 
2.17  The  Commission's  Working  Document  recognised  the  fact  that natural 
gas  supply within the  Community  is characterised by  a  series of national, 
regional or local monopolies.  Although  gas  competes  with other fuels  in 
most  of its end-markets  - such as  HFO  for  industrial steam-raising and 
electricity or gas  oil for  space heating in the household sector  - there  is 
for practical purposes  no  competition between  gas  suppliers for  sales  to 
end-consumers  anywhere  in the  Community.  In cases where  competition from 
other fuels  is not particularly intense,  as with many  small-medium 
industrial or  commercial  users  who  could not easily install oil storage 
tanks,  for  example,  there  is arguably  a  lack of competitive pressure  on gas 
suppliers  to  operate efficiently and minimise  costs.  In general  terms, 
therefore,  COM(88)  238  concludes  that a  more  open and competitive market 
could lead to  reduced energy costs  and  a  rationalisation of energy  industry 
structures within the  Community. 
2.18  There  is an  important link here  to  the  Community's  more  general 
objectives  for  an  internal market  in goods  and services.  Considerable 
emphasis,  in the  1985  White  Book  and elsewhere,  is laid on developing 
conditions  in which  industrial and other enterprises across  the  Community 
can compete  on  an equitable basis.  Particularly in energy-intensive 
sectors of manufacturing  industry  such  as  steel,  glass,  building materials 
and basic chemicals,  gas  and other energy costs comprise  a  significant 
proportion of total production costs  - exceeding  25%  for  some  basic 
chemicals  (like  PVC)  and other very energy-intensive products.  Some manufacturing processes with high  power  requirements  may  in fact give  rise 
to  a  high  demand  for  gas  because  of gas-fired power  generation on site. 
Where  natural  gas  is used as  a  feedstock  for  ammonia  and methanol 
production,  gas  alone  can account  for  over  80%  of total costs.  Distortions 
away  from  a  competitive  level of gas  and other energy prices can therefore 
have  a  very considerable  impact  on  the pattern of production,  competition 
and  trade within  the  Community  in a  number  of key  industrial sectors.  ·A 
move  towards  a  more  open  internal  gas  market  could therefore make  an 
important contribution towards  the  completion of an  internal market  in the 
output of these  industries as well. 
Natural  gas pricing 
2.19  In April  1983,  the  European Council  issued a  Recommendation 
(O.J.E.C.  No  Ll23)  on methods  of forming natural  gas  prices  and tariffs in 
the  Community.  It is perhaps worth recalling that this Recommendation was 
made  at a  time  when  the  "comparative  scarcity of natural  gas"  was  perceived 
to be  a  more  significant constraint than it might be  today.  Nevertheless, 
the  Council  attempted to  confront a  major difficulty in natural  gas pricing 
which  remains  an  important  issue  - namely  the  possible conflict between the 
competitive market position of natural  gas,  which  may  require 
market-related pricing in line with competing  fuel  prices,  and  the 
perceived need  for  a  rational  gas  pricing structure which reflects  the 
supply  and distribution costs  for  the various  categories of gas  supply. 
The  Recommendation effectively concluded that gas  prices  should reflect 
market value but at least cover  costs;  by  implication this suggests  a 
cost-related floor  to market-related prices,  below which  gas utilities 
should not  seek  to  sell.  Specifically,  "natural gas  prices  should be  as 
close  as  possible  to  the  market value  of natural gas  in relation to  the 
price of substitute forms  of energy  and  guarantee  sufficient proceeds  to 
cover  the cost of supply to consumers". 
2.20  The  Recommendation  appears  to have  considered both tariff and 
non-tariff  (contract)  sales  to  large  gas  consumers,  though  in the latter 
case  its guidance  is extremely general,  referring only  to prices 
"calculated in the  light of cost  and market  conditions".  However,  it is 
unlikely that the  European Council  envisaged that market  conditions  should 
be  assessed on  an  individual  consumer basis,  since  the  Recommendation also 
called for  "the  greatest possible degree  of  transparency"  and  recommended 
• that "these prices  and  the  cost  to  the  consumer  are made  public  as  far as 
possible".  The  arguments  for  transparency are  essentially twofold: 
(a)  that consumers  should have  a  clear basis  for  making  rational 
decisions  on  fuel  choice  and  industrial location,  for  example;  and 
(b)  particularly in the light of  the  objectives relating to  the  internal 
gas  market,  that potential competitors  should face  a  clear 
"yardstick"  against which  to  gauge  their market entry strategy. 
2.21  In a  significant number  of instances  - particularly in West  Germany 
and  the United Kingdom  - natural  gas  pricing to  larg~ users  is not at all 
transparent and  could potentially constitute  a  con~Lraint on the 
development of a  more  open  and competitive  internal gas  market.  An 
important question is the  extent to which  such pricing patterns represent a 
legitimate  response  to competition  from  other  fuels  (especially oil 
products),  rather than anti-competitive  gas  pricing of a  discriminatory 
kind,  and  these  issues will be  discussed at greater  length in Section III 
below. 
Issues  for  common  carriage 
2.22  A number  of important  implications  for  a  possible  common  carriage 
system  emerge  from  our discussion of the  Community's  energy objectives, 
including: 
(a)  any  impact  of common  carriage  on  the  competitive position of 
Community  gas  producers  and  the  further  development  of indigenous  gas 
reserves; 
(b)  its impact  on  the bargaining position as between non-Community  gas 
suppliers  (Algeria,  Norway,  USSR  etc)  and  gas  purchasers within the 
Community; 
(c)  any effects on  long  term  gas  supply security,  via the  incentives  to 
develop  and extend gas  transmission,  storage  and distribution systems 
within the  Community  and  to operate  them  in a  more  integrated manner; 
(d)  any effects on  long  term gas  supply security via the  incentives  to 
develop  new  sources  of gas  supply,  both within and outside  the 
Community; 
(e)  the  likely effect of common  carriage  in terms  of increased 
competition,  reduced gas  supply costs  and rationalisation in the  gas 
supply sector;  and (f)  its impact  on  gas  pricing systems,  especially for  larger gas 
consumers. 
Each  of these  implications will be  discussed at greater  length when  the 
possible  advantages  and  drawbacks  of common  carriage  are  considered in 
Section VI. III  THE  GAS  SUPPLY  SITUATION  IN  THE  COMMUNITY 
3.1  A realistic assessment of  the  possible  advantages  and drawbacks  of a 
gas  common  carriage  systems  at  the  Community  level  requires  a  focused 
analysis of the  gas  supply situation in Member  States  as  it currently 
exists or may  develop  in the  future.  Of  particular relevance  to  the 
present study are  those  features  of the  gas  supply situation which: 
(a)  currently constitute a  barrier to free  internal trade  in natural  gas; 
(b)  would play a  role  in determining  the  conditions  under which  a  common 
carrier system could be effective;  or 
(c)  would  influence  the way  in which  an effective  common  carrier system 
would  impact  on consumers,  the  gas  industry or the  Community  as  a 
whole. 
3.2  The  key  features  of the  Community's  gas  supply position when  seen 
from  this perspective  include: 
(a)  the  organisational structure of the  gas  industry,  degree  of vertical· 
integration and  commonality of ownership  as  between transmission and 
distribution companies; 
(b)  the  ownership  of the  gas  transmission grid and  the extent to which it 
is already utilised by  contracted gas  supplies; 
(c)  the  cost structure of the  organisations  involved in gas production, 
supply and distribution; 
(d)  pricing policies  for  gas  sales,  particularly to  larger consumers  and 
distribution companies  who  might be  able  to  take  advantage  of common 
carriage; 
(e)  developments  in the market  for  gas,  especially the possible 
generation of electricity from  gas  in efficient,  combined cycle 
plant; 
(f)  developments  on  the  supply side of the  industry,  the  extent of any 
unsold production potential  in producing countries  and  the  degree  to 
which  supplies  are  already contracted to  meet projected future  gas 
demand;  and 
(g)  the  important differences  that exist between  the  current gas  supply 
situation in the  Community  and  the  circumstances which have  given rise  to widespread use  of third party gas  transportation in the 
United States. 
In this section of the  report,  we  discuss  each of these key  features  in 
turn and  then draw  out  the  main  implications  for  gas  common  carriage. 
Gas  industry organisation 
3.3  The  way  in which  the  gas  industry is structured and  organised varies 
quite widely across  Member  States,  although certain common  features  emerge 
in a  number  of cases.  For  reference,  the situation in each Member  State is 
presented in a  highly  summarised  form  in table  3.1 overleaf,  which 
distinguishes between gas  production,  transmission and distribution 
activities.  Typically,  gas  production  (where it takes place)  tends  to be 
organisationally separate  from  transmission and distribution.  Frequently, 
exploration and production activities  involve  a  wider  range of 
international oil and  gas  company  interests  than do  the  "downstream" 
operations of the  gas  industry.  Gas  production in most Member  States is 
not,  therefore,  a  state monopoly  or near-monopoly activity.  Nevertheless, 
there  is very considerable state  involvement  in the upstream gas  industry 
in maj o.r  gas-consuming  countries  such  as  France  and Italy,  for  example.  In 
the Netherlands,  the state is  involved in the  financial  rather  than 
operational aspects  of NAM's  gas  production business  - effectively 
extracting economic  rents when  gas  prices are high  in relation to 
production costs  and  taking a  high proportion of the  income  reduction when 
selling pr-ices  are relatively low.  It is also worth noting that,  among  the 
international oil companies,  Shell  and  Esso  are  important  gas  producers  in 
number  of Member  States  including  the  Netherlands,  West  Germany  and  the 
United Kingdom. 
3.4  :Bulk  gas  importing and  transmission,  in contrast to production,  is an 
activity carried out by  a  single national organisation in the vast majority 
of Community  Member  States.  In a  good  many  cases,  that organisation is 
also  100%  owned  by  the  state  (in Denmark,  Italy,  Spain and the Republic  of 
Ireland,  for  example)  while  in other cases  (Belgium  and  the  Netherlands) 
there  is mixed ownership with considerable state involvement  and control. 
Although  GdF  does  not have  a  complete  geographical  monopoly  of gas 
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 transmission  in France,  it actually operates  the  CeFeM  network  in the 
centre of the  country and  does  not  in any way  compete  with  SNGSO,  which  is 
responsible  for  supplying Lacq  area  gas  in the  south west  of France. 
British Gas  now  provides  an  interesting exception to  the  general pattern, 
in that  (pending  the  emergence  of competitors)  it is  a  privately owned 
monopoly  seller and is likely to  remain the  dominant bulk transporter of 
natural  gas  in the United Kingdom.  Only  in West  Germany  are  there  several 
major  importing  transmission companies,  but  in practice they  tend to 
co-operate rather than compete  for bulk purchases  and Ruhrgas  is very much 
dominant  in terms  of size and  importance,  as  over  70%  of gas  sold in West 
Germany  passes  through its hands. 
3.5  Only  in France  and  the United Kingdom  are  gas  transmission and 
distribution activities vertically integrated within a  single  company, 
though  the Republic  of Ireland is also moving  in this direction as  BGE 
absorbs  financial-troubled city distribution companies.  In other cases,  a 
single national  transmission company  is complemented by  a  number  of 
regional or  local  gas  distribution companies,  many  of which are municipally  • 
owned.  The  West  German  situation is  somewhat  exceptional,  in that  there is 
a  third industry tier of regional  transmission companies  between the main 
importing utilities  (Ruhrgas,  Thyssengas  and  BEB)  and  the distributors. 
Belgium  is also  interesting in that  there  is an unusually high proportion 
of private  ownership  in the distribution sector,  where  Intercom is  a 
particularly important player.  Where  transmission and distribution 
activities are  separate,  the  usual  arrangement  is for  the national 
transmission company  to  sell gas  direct to  larger consumers  as well  as  to 
the distributors,  who  then on-sell  to households  and other smaller  gas 
users. 
3.6  As  mentioned above,  the structure of the West  German  gas  industry is 
particularly complex  and may  merit  some  separate discussion;  given the  size 
of the West  German  market  and its central  importance  to  the  integrated gas 
grid in Western Europe.  The  ownership pattern is  a  complicated web  of 
cross-holdings  and  sub-holdings  which  involves  a  number  of major  Wes~ 
German  industrial and mining concerns  as  well  as  some  of the major 
international oil companies  or  their West  German  subsidiaries.  The 
ownership  of the  three principal  gas  importing  transmission companies (Ruhrgas,  BEB  and Thyssengas)  is set out  for  reference  in figure  3A 
overleaf.  This  also  shows  and  the  widespread interests which  Ruhrgas  holds 
in major  international trunklines,  joint venture  transmission lines within 
West  Germany  and  a  number  of regional  transmission companies.  Although 
there  is  some  indirect public sector interest in both Ruhrgas  and 
Thyssengas,  the  degree  of private ownership  in the  main West  German  gas 
transmission companies  is significantly higher  than  in most  other Member 
States.  In comparison to  the more  diversified mix  of gas  supplies obtained 
by Ruhrgas,  Thyssengas  and  BEB  are  much  more  dependent  on  supplies  from  the 
Netherlands  (still over  60%  of Thyssengas'  supplies)  and  indigenous  gas 
supplies  (nearly two-thirds  of BEB's  gas  supplies)  respectively. 
Thyssengas  has  a  relatively small  supply area in  th~ western part of the 
country while  BEB,  which  supplies  a  part of northern Germany,  also sells a 
significant portion of its supplies  on  to Ruhrgas  and other transmission 
companies.  In addition,  BEB  is by  some  margin  the  leading gas  producer in 
West  Germany.  A very substantial proportion of Ruhrgas'  gas  supplies  is 
sold on  to  regional  transmission companies,  although sales are also  made  to 
distributors  and larger final  consumers.  In 1987,  for  example,  over  60%  of 
the  company's  sales were  made  to other pipelines,  almost  25%  to local 
utilities and  only  15%  direct to  industrial users.  As  a  whole,  importing 
and regional  transmission companies between  them  provide  about half of all 
gas  sold to  end  consumers.  The  five  regional  transmission companies  shown 
in figure  3A  in which  Ruhrgas  has  a  stake  alone  account  for over  25%  of 
total gas  use  in West  Germany.  Apart  from  the  Ruhrgas  holdings, 
significant interests  in these  companies  are also held by local 
municipalities  and  sometimes  by steel or mining  companies.  In addition, 
there are other regional  transmission companies  which  are entirely owned  by 
provincial  (Laender)  and municipal  governments.  An  important  example  is 
Bayerische  Ferngas  (Bayerngas),  one  of  the  largest regional  transmission 
countries,  which  supplies over 4  bcm/a  of gas  to  the  southern part of 
Bavaria.  It is also  involved,  with Ruhrgas,  in supplying gas  to  the  local 
utility in the Austrian Tyrol. 
3.7  The  commonality of ownership  as  between  some  (regional)  transmission 
companies  and local distributors  observed in West  Germany  is also  a  feature 
of several other Member  States'  gas  industries.  This  is  true of Italy, 
where  SNAM  subsidiaries  owned  wholly or in part  through Italgas are O
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J
 involved in gas  distribution in a  number  of major cities and account  for 
some  25-30%  of all gas  distributed in Italy.  In Belgium,  Intercom are  a 
major  energy distributor and also hold a  significant minority stake  in 
Distrigaz.  This  commonality of ownership  may  or may  not have  an  impact  on 
the  commercial  relationships between  the parties concerned,  depending  on 
the  nature of the  sub-holding and  the  other ownership  stakes  involved. 
Tbe  gas  transmission network 
3.8  The  integrated European gas  grid currently covers  France,  Belgium, 
Netherlands,  Luxembourg,  West  Germany,  Denmark  and  Italy (i.e.  seven out of 
the  twelve  EC  Member  States)  together with Austria  and Switzerland.  The 
major  pipelines which  comprise  the grid are  shown  in the  map  overleaf.  In 
comparison to  the  complex  system of interstate pipelines under diversified 
ownership  in the United States,  for  example,  there are relatively few  gas 
trunklines  in Western  Europe  and their ownership  is concentrated  in the 
hands  of a  small  number  of major  gas utilities and  (to  a  lesser extent) 
international oil companies.  Details of the  main joint venture 
transmission pipelines are set out  in table 3.2 overleaf,  which also 
illustrates the key role which  is played by Ruhrgas  in this respect. 
Located at the  centre of the  integrated gas  grid,  they are  responsible  for 
operating several key pipelines  including TENP,  the  major north-south link 
across  central  Europe  and MEGAL,  the  major  link in an east-west direction. 
As  discussed in Section II above,  these  arrangements  facilitate flexible 
system operation in the  event of disruptions  to  supply or gas 
transportation.  However,  they also put  the major  transmission companies  in 
a  very strong bargaining position vis-a-vis their customers  and other gas 
utilities.  This  was  illustrated,  for  example,  by Ruhrgas  opposition to 
proposals  made  by Bayerngas  for direct purchases  of Algerian gas,  a  dispute 
which was  eventually resolved by  the offer of more  favourable  terms  for 
Ruhrgas'  sales  to  Bayerngas.  Similarly,  Ruhrgas  expressed strong views  on 
Norwegian plans  to  transport gas  across  West  Germany  to Austrian utility 
OeMV  on  a  tariffed basis,  preferring instead a  purchase  and resale 
arrangement.  Ruhrgas'  concerns  in this case  appear  to have  included the 
possible  implications  of a  common  carriage precedent if Norwegian plans had 
been allowed  to  reach fruition,  especially as  the  sellers proposed  to 
retain title to  the  gas  through West  Germany  to  the Austrian border. European Natural Gas Transmission System 
natural gas 
transmission system 
-existing 
·--- under 
construction 
or under design 
national 
pipelines 
operational 
or under study 
'~:» 
., Table  3.2  :  Major  joint-venture qas  trunklines  in  Western  Europe 
Name  of  pi eel ine 
NETG 
METG 
SETG 
SEGEO 
DEUOAN 
TENP 
TAG 
TMPC 
ME GAL 
WAG 
,Nordrheinische  Erdgas· 
transport  Gnt>H 
Mittelrheinische Erdgas· 
transport  Gnt>H 
Suddeutsche  Erdgas 
Transport  Gnt>H 
Societe Europeeme  de 
Gazoduc  Est-Ouest 
Deutsch/Danische  Erdgas· 
transport·Gesellschaft 
nbH 
Trans  Europa  Naturgas 
Pipeline GmbH 
Trans-Austrian Gasline 
Transmediterranean 
P  i pel i ne  Con-pany 
Hittel·Europaische· 
Gasleitungsgesellschaft 
West  Austrian Gasline 
Shareholders 
(%  interest> 
Ruhrgas  AG(50) 
Thyssengas  GmbH(50) 
Ruhrgas  AG(66) 
Exxon  (17) 
Shell  Petroleum(17) 
Ruhrgas  AG(50) 
Exxon(25) 
Shell  Petroleum<24> 
Nederlandse 
Haatschappij(1) 
Distrigaz  <Belgium)(75) 
Gaz  de  FranceC25> 
Deudan·Holding 
GnbH(51) 
=Rlilrgas/BEB 
Dangas  Gnt>H(49) 
Ruhrgas  AG(51) 
SNAH(49) 
SNAH  (Italy)  OMV 
(Austria) 
644km 
SOOkm 
383km 
SNAM(50)  2500km* 
Sonatrach  (Algeria)  <50) 
Ruhrgas  AG(50)  629km 
Gaz  de  France(43) 
OMV  AG  (Austria)(5) 
Stichting Megal 
Verwaltungsstiftung 
Heer len/N l. ( 2) 
Ruhrgas  AG 
OMV  AG 
Gaz  de  France 
245km 
Principal  role 
Transmission within West 
Germany,  principally of 
Dutch  'L'  gas  exports 
Norwegian  gas  to Belgium  and 
France 
Danish  gas  through  West 
Germany  to  BEB  and  Ruhrgas 
Dutch  1H 1  gas  from 
Netherlands  border  to West 
Germany/Switzerland/Italy 
Soviet  gas  from  Czech/ 
Austrian border  to Austrian/ 
Ita  l ian border 
Algerian gas  to  Italy 
Soviet  gas  from  Czech/West 
German  border  to south  of 
Germany  and  France 
Soviet  gas  from  Czech/ 
Austrian border  to HEGAL 
(Austrian/W.German  border) 
*  Hassi  R'Mel  (Algeria)  to  Minerbio  in  the  Po  Valley  (Northern  Italy). 
Some  370km  in  Tunisia  are  jointly owned  by  the  Government  and  SNAM, 
155km  are  underwater  to  cross  the  Mediterranean  and  15km  cross  the 
Strait  of  Messina. 3.9  Again  in contrast to  the  situation in the  United States,  the 
utilisation of the  main  transmission lines  in Western  Europe  is generally 
fairly high.  This  reflects  the  continued growth of total  gas  demand  in 
many  Member  States and  the  increasing market  share of non-Community 
supplies,  which has  necessitated the  expansion of long-distance pipeline 
capacity.  Thus  the general  tendency is in fact  for pipeline capacities to 
be  increased over  time  (by  "looping"  of lines or additional compression, 
for  example)  in order to meet  growing  transmission requirements.  Increases 
in MEGAL,  Mittelrheinische Erdgastransport  and Nordrheinesche 
Erdgastransport pipeline capacities are  reported by Ruhrgas  to have  taken 
place  in 1987,  while  the  Trans-Austria Gasline  (TAG)  has  recently been 
looped  in order  to  provide  the  18  bcmja of capacity required to carry 
additional Soviet gas  to Italy and Yugoslavia.  TENP  capacity has  also been 
progressively expanded over  the years,  primarily to cater for  increased 
demand  for  gas  transported by  Ruhrgas  and then sold to other  transmission 
companies  such as  Thyssengas,  Gas  Versorgung Suddeutschland and Swissgas. 
SNAM  has  not  expanded its share of TENP,  however,  and  the volumes  of gas it 
imports  into Italy from  the Netherlands have  tended  to  decline  somewhat  in 
recent years.  Nevertheless,  SNAM  now  appears  to be  taking Dutch  gas  on  a 
somewhat  lower  load factor  than  in previous years,  so  that it continues  to 
use  its subscribed capacity fairly fully at times  of peak  demand. 
3.10  In general,  therefore,  we  have  formed  the view  that  the  integrated 
pipeline grid is quite highly utilised.  There  are,  however,  a  number  of 
provisos  to be  made  to  this conclusion: 
(a)  where  gas  demand  is projected to  increase  rapidly,  there will 
inevitably be  some  short  term  spare capacity,  since it is most 
economical  to build lines  large  enough  to cater for  the  levels of use 
expected some  years  into  the  future.  This  is currently the  case  in 
Denmark,  Ireland and parts of the  Italian pipeline system,  for 
example; 
(b)  in certain instances where  gas  demand  has  failed to achieve  the 
projected level,  there may  be  spare capacity or potential spare 
capacity in the  system.  This  may  be  the  case  in parts of Belgium, 
for  example; 
(c)  gas  swap  arrangements  may  leave parts of  the  system underutilised. 
However,  this  is not  truly  "free"  capacity since it would be  neded  to 
preserve  supply security in the  event of disruptions  to  supply; • 
(d)  the  commissioning of Zeepipe  in the mid  1990s  may  ease pressure  on 
transmission capacity in north Germany  and  the Netherlands; 
(e)  pipeline capacity can often be  increased through  looping lines or 
adding compressor  stations;  and 
(f)  a  distinction must be  made  between year-round spare capacity and 
spare  capacity outside periods  of peak  demand. 
3.11  It may  perhaps  be helpful  to  enlarge  somewhat  vn  the  last of these 
points.  Since overall  gas  demand  is considerably higher  in summer  than in 
winter,  it might be  argued that  the  available pipeline capacity is 
under-utilised outside  the period of peak  demand  and  that direct 
supplies/common carriage which are  interruptible in the winter months  at 
the pipeline owner's  option could help make  better use of both production 
and transportation facilities.  An  interruptible gas  supply of this sort 
could perhaps be  accommodated  by large  industrial users with dual-firing 
facilities  and  the carriage charge  ought  to be  low since no  additional 
capacity costs are  imposed  on  the  system by  such  an arrangement.  In 
practice,  the situation is somewhat  more  complex  than this.  The  main 
producers  of  "H"  (high calorific value)  gas  supplied into Western Europe 
are  Norway  and  the USSR  and  they have  had  to build high cost facilities  -
offshore platforms  and pipelines  in the  case of Norway,  very long distance 
onshore  transmission lines  in the  case of Soviet exports  to the west.  They 
therefore  supply  on high  load factor  in order to utilise them at a  high 
level  throughout  the year and  thus  keep  down  unit fixed costs.  These 
supplies  are  used by purchasing gas  transmission companies  to meet 
year-round gas  demands  and  to fill up  seasonal  storage  and  there  is thus 
little or no  spare  summer  capacity in the  major pipelines  such as  MEGAL  or 
SEGEO  which are used to carry such high load factor  "H"  gas  supplies.  LNG 
supplies  from  Algeria are generally also high load factor  in principle, 
although  in practice  somewhat  more  flexibility may  be  available  in the 
scheduling of shipments.  This  leaves  lower  load factor  supplies  from  the 
Netherlands  (mainly  "L"  gas  of lower  calorific value)  or  from  certain 
indigenous  sources  such  as West  German  sweet  gas  production.  In such cases 
there will be  spare pipeline capacity outside  the winter peak,  but 
indigenous  gas  producers  outside  the  UK  generally have little additional 
gas  to offer for direct sale  and  the  Dutch have  a  policy of conserving 
Groningen  gas  which makes  them  unlikely to want  to offer additional  summer 
volumes,  even if there were  a  market  for  such  gas via common  carriage. 3.12  Before  leaving  the  subject of the  gas  transmission system within the 
Community,  it is worth noting  the  extent  to which  gas  already circulates 
within the  integrated grid through  arrangements  between pipeline  owners. 
We  have  already referred to  a  number  of joint venture pipelines,  which 
carry gas  on behalf of  the  partners  in the joint venture.  There  is 
sometimes  a  small  initial capital contribution,  but much  of the  capital 
cost is normally raised on  international capital markets.  Each partner in 
the venture  subscribes  to  a  given proportion of the  total capacity of the 
line and  then pays  a  tariff (often divided into capacity and  commodity 
charges)  to  the joint venture  company  for  the use  of the  line.  Where  there 
is greater flexibility to  use  a  number  of different pipelines,  gas  is often 
transported on  a  tariffed rather than a  joint venture basis.  Examples  of 
gas  transportation on this basis  include: 
(a)  Dutch  gas  transported through  Belgium by Distrigaz for  Gaz  de  France; 
(b)  Norwegian  gas  transported across  France  by  GdF  for  Elf/CeFeM; 
(c)  the  recently agreed deal whereby  GdF  will transport Norwegian  gas 
across  France  on behalf of the  sellers for  sale  to  Enagas  at the 
Spanish border; 
(d)  arrangements  between Thyssengas  and other  transmission companies  such 
as  Ruhrgas  and  VEW  in West  Germany;  and 
(e)  transportation of gas  by  SNAM  for  independent  indigenous  producers, 
such as Montedison,  from  their own  fields  to their chemical plants  on 
the  SNAM  grid. 
Such  arrangements  typically  involve  a  "ship-or-pay"  (use-or-pay)  commitment 
from  the  shipper as well  as  a  tariff payment  to  the  pipeline  owner.  It is 
important  to  emphasise  that these  arrangements  are  almost all made  on  a 
long  term basis between gas utilities and  there  is  no  short  term  "spot" 
market  in gas  transportation or pipeline capacity. 
The  structure of  gas  supply costs 
3.13  An  important element  in the  assessment  of a  possible  gas  common 
carriage  system is  the  extent  to  which  a  more  open,  competitive  environment 
might  stimulate greater efficiency in gas utilities and  thus  lower unit  gas 
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supply costs  to  consumers.  In order  to  gain a  realistic understanding of 
the potential  for  such cost reductions,  it is  important  to  take  into full 
account  the current and  likely future  structure of gas  supply costs  in 
Western  Europe.  The  cost of gas  supply typically consists of four  main 
cost components: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
the cost of bulk gas  purchase; 
the cost of transmitting gas  from  the point of  ~upply to  the  offtake 
point for  the  local distribution grid; 
storage  and other seasonal  supply/demand matching costs  (eg 
peak-shaving plant);  and 
(d)  the cost of distributing gas  from  the  offtake  from  the  transmission 
grid to  the  consumer. 
For  large  industrial customers  located on  the  transmission grid,  however, 
there  is no  distribution cost and  the  main cost elements  are  thus bulk gas 
purchase  and  transmission. 
3.14  The  cost of gas  purchase  accounts  typically for  a  very high 
percentage  of total supply costs.  Pricing clauses  in bulk purchase 
contracts  typically comprise  a  base price and an indexation mechanism  for 
adjusting that price over  time.  Many  contracts also envisage  a  periodic 
review of the base price itself in the  light of changing market conditions. 
The  base price at which  gas  is purchased at the  supply point from  producer 
to buyer generally reflects  the price of alternative fuels  at the burner 
tip,  less  the non-gas  costs  of supply  from  the bulk supply point to  the 
consumer.  This  is called the  "netback"  pricing principle and  the  producer 
of the  gas will normally  seek to  receive  the maximum  price at which  gas 
will continue  to be  competitive with alternative fuels  in the market.  It 
is in the  interest of both  the producer  and  the  transmission company  that 
gas  stays competitive with other fuels  over  time  and  the price at which  gas 
is sold is therefore  typically linked to  an  index of a  basket of 
alternative  fuels.  In the  most  cases,  the  link is largely to  changes  in 
oil prices,  but  there  are variations  in some  instances  depending on  the 
market  situation into which  the  gas  is sold.  For  example,  British Gas  now 
seeks  to link purchase prices  in  new  contracts  to oil when  oil prices  are 
low,  while  moving  to  a 
11mixed basket"  (inflation,  electricity prices,  oil) 
to protect its competitive position against coal  and  (especially) 
electricity when  oil prices  are high.  For  similar reasons,  some  of the continental buyers  (such  as  Gaz  de  France)  secured  the  introduction of a 
partial link to  general  inflation in the  Troll contract when  oil prices  are 
high.  For  gas  sales  to  power stations,  coal  is often the  most  direct 
alternative  fuel  and  the  gas  price  indexation in recent deals  such as 
Miller-Peterhead in the  UK  and  Norway-SEP  in the  Netherlands  reflect this 
with  a  coal price or coal  proxy  (inflation rate)  link. 
3.15  The  purchase prices which  the different transmission companies  pay 
for  gas  tend to lie mainly within a  fairly narrow price range,  since  in 
most  cases  the  gas  price is based on similar market  realisations  in 
competition with alternative fuels.  There  are,  however,  some  differences 
in price which  may  reflect perceived security of supply  (eg Netherlands  or 
Norway,  as  compared  to  the  USSR)  or else perhaps  the non-price  terms  of the 
contract concerned.  In general,  the  more  flexibility there is in the sales 
contract,  the higher  the  price  the  supplier is likely to be  seeking.  The 
flexibility can relate to  the  total annual  quantity or else  to  seasonal 
offtake variations  (load factor of supply).  If the  contract provides  a  lot 
of annual  flexibility (i.e.  the  range  between the  minimum  and maximum 
amount  supplied as outlined in the  contract is large),  then the 
transmission company  is better able  to match  contracted suppliers  to  total 
demand,  without  incurring take-or-pay penalties.  This  is obviously 
beneficial to  the  transmission company,  which  might  therefore be willing to 
pay  a  premium  in order to obtain this flexibility in the contract.  If the 
gas  contract is flexible with  regard  to  the  load factor  of supply  (i.e.  the 
transmission company  can take  more  gas  in winter  than in summer,  within the 
agreed range  of total annual  quantities),  then the buyer might be willing 
to  pay  a  premium,  reflecting a  consequent  reduction in his  own  storage 
costs.  Seasonal  flexibility is  typically provided by  fields  (such as 
Groningen)  with  low unit capacity costs.  Some  low  load factor  gas  supplies 
are explicity priced on  a  commodity  charge/capacity charge basis,  as  in the 
case  of Dutch  gas  exports  and  supplies  of indigenous  West  German  gas.  The 
Dutch  capacity charge  is currently understood to be  DM80/m3jhour of 
capacity required  - equivalent  to  around  Pf 1.8;m3  (ECU  O.Ol/m3)  at 50% 
annual  load factor,  for  example.  In  the United Kingdom,  on  the  other hand, 
there  is no  explicit capacity charge  except  for very  low  load factor 
"winter only"  fields. 3.16  Basic  transmission costs  can be  divided into  a  fixed and  a  variable 
cost  component.  The  fixed  (or capacity)  cost component  consists mainly of 
the capital costs of building the  transmission pipeline  and  the  subsequent 
fixed maintenance  cost.  Both will  go  up  with  the  length of  the pipeline, 
but  there are  economies  of scale  for  larger diameter pipes which  reduce 
unit transmission costs,  provided that high capacity utilisation can be 
maintained.  The  higher  the utilisation of the pipeline,  the  lower  the 
capital cost per unit of gas.  The  variable costs  of transmission are 
substantially lower  than the  fixed cost component.  The  main variable costs 
are  incurred when  running compressors  to maintain high pipeline pressures 
and ensure  a  higher level of gas  throughput.  Increased compression will 
lead to higher  gas  losses  and consequently higher  transmission costs. 
3.17  There  is to  some  extent a  trade-off between  fixed and variable 
transmission costs.  For  example,  a  transmission company  can either build a 
large sized pipeline which will have  sufficient capacity to  transmit all 
the  gas  needed for  the  foreseeable  future,  or it can decide  to build a 
smaller pipeline and  to meet  increases  in demand  through the use  of 
additional compressors.  The  first alternative will lead to an  increase  in 
fixed costs,  the  second  to  an  increase  in variable costs,  with the 
trade-off depending largely on  the  price of gas. 
3.18  From  the  foregoing,  it will be  apparent  that there is no  such  thing 
as  the  cost of gas  transmission,  since  the  costs  depend  on many  factors 
such as  pipeline diameter,  load factor of supply and distance.  To  give 
some  idea of the magnitudes  involved,  however,  we  may  note  that British Gas 
3  have  quoted carriage  charges  of 3.5  - 4.0 p/therm  (around  ECU  0.02/m  )  for 
transportation at 60-90%  load factor  over distances  of rather less  than 200 
km.  These  charges  reflect transmission through regional  (medium-pressure) 
as  well  as national  (high-pressure)  pipelines  and  the  charge  for purely 
high-pressure  transmission could well  be  significantly lower.  The  non-gas 
costs of Gasunie  in the  Netherlands  primarily reflect the costs of 
high-pressure  transmission and  these  are  a  little less  than  ECU  0.005/m3. 
This  low  figure  may  reflect the  small  size of the Netherlands,  as well  as 
depreciation at historic pipeline costs,  rather  than at rates required to 
cover  the  replacement cost of the  assets.  There has  been a  tendency,  with 
the  fall  in gas  prices  since  1986,  for  transmission costs  to become relatively more  important  than before.  The  Gasunie  costs are still only  5% 
of selling prices  to  medium  sized industrial users,  while  the  proposed 
British Gas  charges  might be  10-15%  of selling prices  to  a  large  firm  gas 
customer.  Neither  the  British Gas  nor  the  Gasunie  figures,  however, 
include  any  significant cost element  for  supply/demand matching by  the 
transmission company.  They  therefore relate to  "pure"  transmission costs 
and  considerably underestimate  the  total non-gas  costs of most  gas 
transmission companies. 
3.19  A further  important element  in most  transmission companies'  total 
costs  is  the cost of continuously matching  gas  supply to  the  fluctuating 
level of gas  demand.  These  can be  described as  the  costs  of supply/demand 
match.  Seasonal  storage  and other facilities  for matching  supply and 
demarid  (such as  peak-shaving LPG/air plant)  are often required,  since 
demand  in winter  is generally much  higher  than that in summer,  while  gas 
producers  are  seldom able  to provide  gas  supplies  on a  sufficiently low 
load factor  to match  the pattern of gas  demand.  The  annual  load factor of 
total gas  consumption is often around  50%  (peak daily demand  about  double 
the  average  daily demand  over  the year)  while  some  gas  producers  - such  as 
Norway  and the  Soviet Union  - offer very little seasonal flexibility at 
all.  The  cost of seasonal  storage will depend  on  the availability of 
natural acquifers,  suitable  rock strata for salt caverns,  or partially 
depleted gas  fields.  In the  case  of British Gas,  offshore storage has  had 
to be built  (the  Rough  field)  and  this is particularly expensive  capacity. 
As  compared  to  seasonal  storage,  which  is typically high fixed,  low 
variable cost,  some  "peak-shaving"  plant has  relatively low capital costs 
and high operating costs.  This  is particularly true of  LNG  tanks,  which 
have high regasificiation costs  and are  used  to  produce  gas  at high rates 
for  short periods  in order  to  meet  the very  "needle  peak"  of winter gas 
demand. 
3.20  Distribution costs  consist of  the  installation and maintenance  of the 
distribution grid,  and consumer-specific costs  such as  gas  connections, 
meter reading,  billing etc.  There  are  four  main factors  which will 
influence  the unit cost of distribution:-
(a)  population density; 
(b)  connection density; 
(c)  average  consumption per gas  connection;  and 
(d)  consumer  mix. • 
• 
Population density can actually work both ways,  as  regards  the  level of 
cost.  On  the  one  hand,  sparsely populated rural areas vill always  be 
expensive  to provide with  gas.  However,  large densely populated cities can 
also have  relatively high costs because  the  density  of underground pipes 
and cables  makes  it expensive  to work  on  the  gas  distribution grid. 
A high connection density on  the  grid will mean  that the costs of 
installation and maintenance  of the distribution grid  t:o  the population 
centers will be  divided over  a  large number  of  (po~en~ial)  consumers,  and 
therefore  the cost per gas  unit will usually be  low.  High  consumption per 
gas  connection,  for  instance because  of intensive use  of gas  for  space 
heating,  will mean  that the relatively high  consum~t-specific costs  and 
capital costs will be  divided over  a  high number  of gas units  and  therefore 
the unit cost will be  low.  Turning to  the distribution companies'  consumer 
mix,  overall unit costs will clearly tend to be  lower where  the 
distributors are selling to  industrial customers  as well  as  smaller 
residential/commercial users  (as  in Denmark  and,  to  a  lesser extent,  in 
West  Germany)  than when  the  local market  comprises  predominantly small 
consumers. 
3.21  Typical  gas  distribution margins  in a  number  of different Member 
States  appear  to be broadly as  follows: 
3  Belgium  - about  BF  100/GJ  on average  (ECU  0.08/m  ) 
3  3  3  Italy  - from  around LlOO/m  to L300/m  (ECU  0.07  - 0.20/m  ) 
3  3  Netherlands  - less  than Gc  10/m  (ECU  0.04/m  )  on  average 
United Kingdom- around  7.5  pence/therm  (ECU  0.04/m3) 
West  Germany  - typically Pf 1.0-1.5/kWh  (ECU  0.05  - 0.08jm3) 
Thus  the  lowest costs  tend to arise  in those Member  States or areas,  such 
as  the  Netherlands,  the  UK  and  the West  German  Ruhrgebiet,  where  gas 
penetration of domestic  energy markets  and  average  consumption per consumer 
are both high.  The  highest costs  are  found  in parts of Italy where  gas has 
yet to  achieve  a  high market  share  and  consumption of gas  for  space heating 
is often lower  than in North West  Europe. 
3.22  In table  3.3  overleaf,  we  have  estimated the  average  gas  costs. 
non-gas  costs  and profits per cubic metre  for  a  number  of major  European 
gas utilities.  As  expected,  the variance  in non-gas  costs  is significantly 
higher  than that in gas  costs.  An  important  reason for  this is that some T
a
b
l
e
 
3
.
 
3
:
 
C
o
s
t
 
S
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
M
a
j
o
r
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
G
a
s
 
u
t
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
,
 
1
9
8
7
 
E
C
1
J
j
m
3
 
(
x
l
O
O
)
 
(
%
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
i
s
)
 
D
i
s
t
r
i
g
a
z
 
G
a
s
u
n
i
e
*
1
 
R
u
h
r
g
a
s
 
S
N
A
M
 
G
d
F
 
E
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
:
 
G
a
s
 
9
.
3
6
 
(
8
2
)
 
8
.
3
3
(
9
5
)
 
6
.
3
3
(
7
4
)
 
6
.
6
3
(
5
5
)
 
9
.
6
3
(
5
5
)
 
N
o
n
-
g
a
s
 
1
.
7
3
 
(
1
5
)
 
0
.
4
2
(
5
)
 
1
.
6
3
(
1
9
)
 
4
.
0
2
(
3
6
)
 
7
.
9
1
(
4
5
)
 
P
r
o
f
i
t
 
0
.
3
8
 
(
3
)
 
0
.
0
1
(
0
)
 
0
.
5
7
(
7
)
 
0
.
6
0
(
5
)
 
0
.
0
3
(
0
)
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
1
1
.
4
7
 
8
.
7
7
 
8
.
5
3
 
1
1
.
2
5
 
1
7
.
5
7
 
*
1
 
u
s
i
n
}
,
 
i
n
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
o
 
G
l
:
'
o
r
l
i
n
J
e
n
 
g
a
s
 
s
u
p
p
l
i
e
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
"
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
 
p
r
i
c
e
"
 
f
o
r
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
f
r
a
n
 
N
A
M
 
t
o
 
G
a
s
u
n
i
e
 
*
2
 
1
9
8
7
/
8
8
,
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l
 
o
o
s
t
 
a
c
x
:
x
:
:
m
l
t
s
,
 
g
a
s
 
s
u
w
l
y
 
b
.
l
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
o
n
l
y
 
a
:
;
 
*
2
 
9
.
4
3
(
4
8
)
 
6
.
7
3
(
3
4
)
 
3
.
6
1
(
1
8
)
 
1
9
.
7
7
 
.
.
s
.
=
 
0
 of  these utilities are  involved in both  transmission and distribution. 
Vertically integrated utilities like GdF  and  BG  have  significantly higher 
non-gas  costs  than  "pure"  transmission companies  suc.h  a;~  Gasunie  or 
Ruhrgas.  Gasunie  appears  to have  particularly low  n·)n-gas  costs because it 
only  incurs  transmission costs;  the  capacity cost of seasonal flexibility 
is largely reflected in the  "transfer price"  which  it pays  to  NAM  for 
Groningen supplies.  It is significant to note  that  f,·p·  all utilities the 
gas  costs  are higher  than the  non-gas  costs.  This  giv·~s  some  indication of 
the  extent to which  increased competition and  the  possible  subsequent 
improvements  in operating efficiency might  lead to  reductions  in overall 
costs.  For  the  "pure"  transmission companies,  any  rP-ductions  in non-gas 
costs  due  to greater efficiency would  lead to  only  a  marginal  reduction in 
total costs.  If,  for  instance,  Gasunie  were  to achieve  a  20%  reduction in 
its non-gas  costs,  then this would  lead to  a  reduction of only  1%  in 
overall costs.  Efficiency  improvements  by  the vertically integrated 
companies  or by local  gas  distributors might have  a  somewhat bigger  impact 
on  total cost,  though  gas  distribution costs  are also dominated by  the cost 
of gas  purchases.  In 1986,  for  example,  gas  costs accounted for  an average 
76%  of total expenses  for  Belgium gas  distributors,  which compares  to  91% 
for  transmission company  Distrigaz  in the  same  year.  Taking  the  two  levels 
in combination,  the border price of gas  purchased by Distrigaz was  55%  of 
the  average price of sales  to distributors'  customers.  There  is  thus 
rather more  room  for efficiency improvements  to  impact  on sales prices  to 
small users,  but is doubtful whether  the  introduction of common  carrier 
would  introduce competitive pressure on  the distribution sector to  the  same 
extent as it would  do  on  the  transmission sector. 
Gas  selling prices 
3.23  The  way  in which natural gas  is priced for  sales  to distributors, 
large  industrial users  and power  stations is a  matter of considerable 
importance  for  the  common  carriage issue.  First,  gas buyers  who  take  the 
view  that they  face  gas  prices  of a  discriminatory or monopolistic kind are 
perhaps  most  likely to  seek the  opportunity  to deal direct with producers 
via common  carriage.  Conversely,  the  gas utilities who  might be  most 
affected by  common  carriage are  those  who  might be  considered to earn 
"above  normal"  profit margins  on sales  to  some  consumers  or classes of consumers.  An  effective  common  carriage system might be  expected to  reduce 
existing price differentials between comparable  gas  users,  both within and 
between Member  States,  and this  further underlines  the  need  to understand 
the  present pricing systems.  In this  sub-section,  an  introduction to  gas 
pricing systems  in Member  States  is  followed by  a  brief discussion of 
policies  in the main gas  consuming  countries  and  a  comparison of prevailing 
price levels  as  between Member  States. 
3.24  Depending  on  the  organisational structure of the  gas  industry,  we  can 
distinguish three main categories of gas  selling prices,  as  follows:-
(a)  prices  for sales  from distributors  (or,  in the  case  of France  and  the 
UK,  from  the  integrated national utility)  to households  and other 
small  gas  customers; 
(b)  prices  for  sales  from  transmission companies  direct to  large 
industrial or power  plant consumers;  and 
(c)  prices for  sales  from  transmission companies  to distributors  (widely 
applicable  in all member  states except France  and  the UK). 
Since it is almost  inconceivable  that individual  small  consumers  could 
avail  themselves  of common  carriage rights,  it is categories  (b)  and  (c) 
above  which  are of particular relevance  to  the present study.  To  put  large 
user  selling prices  in context,  however,  it may  be  worth  commenting briefly 
on arrangements  for  smaller consumers. 
3.25  As  mentioned above,  sales  to households  and other small  customers  are 
generally made  by distributors or,  in the  case  of France  and  the  UK,  by  the 
vertically integrated transmission and distribution utility.  Such  sales 
are  almost universally made  on  the basis of standard,  published tariffs, 
though  in some  countries  (such as  Italy and West  Germany)  there are 
considerable differences  in the  level of gas  tariffs charged by different 
local  gas  distributors.  Small user tariff arrangements  frequently apply up 
to  a  certain threshold level of consumption,  which varies  from just 69,000 
m3;a in the  UK,  through  to  880,000  m3;a in Belgium,  for  example.  In West 
Germany,  there  is no  threshold as  such  and  standard tariffs appear  to  apply 
only  to very small  (household size)  consumers.  Typically,  tariffs for 
small users  often tend  to bear  some  relationship  to  the price of the • 
nearest competing  fuel,  often light heating oil.  Household  gas  prices  in 
West  Germany  have  recently reflected a  small  premium  above  those  of gas 
oil,  for  example,  while  the  Dutch  "A"  tariff for  small users has  reflected 
parity with  gas  oil since  the oil price collapse  in 1986.  The  level of 
distributors'  costs  may  also be  an  important pricing consideration, 
especially where  a  "cost plus"  approach  is adopted for  small users  tariffs 
as  in Belgium and Italy.  Since distributors'  gas  purchase costs are often 
linked partly to  alternative fuel prices,  however,  the  total cost of 
supplying  gas  to  small users may  itself be broadly related to  the price of 
competing fuels.  In Belgium,  the use  of the border price of imported  gas 
(the  "G  factor")  as  a  key  element  in the tariff structure is a  good 
illustration of this point.  Where  domestic/commercial  gas  markets  are 
still expanding,  however,  gas prices may  be  set well below  the alternative 
fuel  to  promote  sales.  In Italy,  for  example,  taxes  on heating oil are 
very high and small user  gas prices have  generally been substantially below 
gas  oil prices  in order  to  encourage  changeover  to  gas.  In general, 
Governments  (national or local)  often have  an  important  say in the  level at 
which tariffs are set,  though  in West  Germany  the authorities are not 
heavily  involved in price setting.  In the case of the  UK,  British Gas  is 
subject to  a  formal  regulatory price  formula which  is broadly based on 
costs  of supply,  but sets a  target for  improved efficiency in operations. 
Since  the  fixed costs per unit of supply  (connection costs,  meter  reading 
and billing)  are usually significant for  smaller consumers,  two·part 
tariffs  (standing charge plus  commodity  rate)  are very common  for  such 
users. 
3.26  Gas  sales  to  larger industrial or power  station users  are  typically 
made  direct by  transmission utilities and  the pattern of pricing systems  is 
quite diverse.  Among  the main gas-consuming Member  States,  Belgium, 
France,  Italy and  the  Netherlands  have  large user  gas  prices which  are 
based to  a  large extent  on published tariffs,  while  in the United Kingdom 
and West  Germany  these prices are based on  the  outcome  of sales contract 
negotiations between  the  gas  supplier and  the  individual  large user. Within  the  category of large users  as  a  whole,  it is often helpful  to 
distinguish three  sub-groups  of large scale  gas  consumption,  viz: 
(a)  "premium"  industrial applications  such  as  process  uses  for which  a 
high quality,  controllable  fuel  (gas oil,  electricity,  natural  gas  or 
LPG)  is  typically required; 
(b)  "non-premium"  industrial applications  such as  steam-raising under 
boilers or auto-generation of electricity,  for which natural  gas 
typically faces  competition  from  low  value  fuels  such as heavy  fuel 
oil  (HFO)  or coal;  and 
(c)  very  large volume  uses  of a  specific nature  such  as  gas  feedstocks 
(for ammonia  or methanol production)  and  gas  use  in power  stations. 
3.27  In many  Member  States,  gas  tends  to be  supplied on a  firm basis to 
"premium"  and  smaller  "non-premium"  industrial customers.  Large, 
non-premium  industrial consumers  are often supplied on interruptible terms 
and receive prices which are  somewhat  lower as  a  result.  West  Germany 
appears  to be  an  exception in this regard,  in that a  significant number  of 
large,  non-premium  customers  are  supplied with firm  gas  at prices which 
reflect the  low-value  competing fuel  (HFO).  Whether by tariff arrangements 
or as  a  result of  individual contract negotiations,  most  large  industrial 
user  gas prices  are  linked in some  way  to  the prices of competing  fuels, 
usually oil products.  In Italy and  the  Netherlands,  for  example,  very 
little gas oil is now  used in industry and all industrial gas  prices  tend 
to be  tied in some  way  to  HFO.  Gas  oil continues  to play a  more  important 
role  in "premium"  industrial energy markets  in the  UK  and West  Germany  and 
there  tends  to be  a  more  pronounced distinction between prices  for  gas 
sales  in competition with high  and  low  value oil products  (gas oil and 
HFO).  In some  cases,  very large  gas  users  such as  power  plants,  ammonia  or 
methanol  manufacturers,  may  receive  special  terms,  even where  the other 
industrial users  are  subject to  more  transparent tariff arrangements.  For 
feedstock sales,  in particular,  the  lowest Dutch  gas  tariff  (known  as  "F" 
tariff)  is widely  regarded as  a  marker  for prices elsewhere  in Western 
Europe.  Sales  to  power  stations  take  place  on  a  very  large  scale only  in 
Italy,  West  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  (typically 6-7  hem/a  in each case), 
although  power  plants  account  for  a  significant proportion of much  smaller 
markets  in Denmark  and  Ireland,  for  example.  Much  smaller volumes  are  also sold to  the  power  sector  in Belgium  and  no  significant sales  to public 
power  stations at present  in either France or  the  UK.  Pricing systems  for 
gas  sales  to  large users vary considerably as  between Member  States  and we 
therefore  summarise  the position in each case below,  beginning with the  six 
largest gas-consuming countries. 
3.28  In Belgium,  there  are  three  categories  of industrial gas  supplies  -
firm  sales,  sales which  are  interruptible  ("effacabl~~·) at the  supplier's 
option only and supplies which are  fully interruptible by either buyer or 
seller  (known  elsewhere  as  "mutual  option"  arrangements).  "Effacable" 
contracts apply mainly  to  "premium"  industrial customers  who  can 
nevertheless  switch  to  an alternative fuel,  althoug~ they have rarely been 
interrupted in recent years.  The  fully interruptible contracts are unusual 
in Europe  in that they give  the buyer  an explicit contractual right to 
switch to other fuels  at any  time.  The  prices for all three categories of 
sales are based on  a  complex tariff system of which  the  most  important 
element  is the  "G  factor",  the  average  Belgian border price of natural gas 
imported by Distrigaz.  Other price elements  are  intended to reflect the 
non-gas  costs  of supply.  Both  the  "G  factor"  and  a  non-gas  element enter 
into  the  commodity  rate and  there are also  indexed standing charges  (for 
firm supplies  only)  and connection charges.  Prices  are progressively 
reduced at higher offtake levels and are effectively discounted for 
interruptibility.  Tariffs are  recalculated monthly but,  as  far as  the  "G 
factor"  is concerned,  reflect the escalation lags  in Distrigaz purchase 
contracts between oil price movements  and changes  in the  gas  contract 
price. 
3.29  When  oil prices fell rapidly  in 1986,  the  fully  interruptible tariff 
then  in force  became  uncompetitive with  HFO  (largely because of lags  in the 
G factor  and  the  fact  that HFO  prices  tended  to fall faster  than those  of 
oil in general)  and Distrigaz lost a  substantial portion of its 
interruptible load.  The  supervisory Control  Committee  (which  includes 
trades union and  industrial federation representatives as well as officials and  gas  industry executives)  gave  its consent  for  interruptible 
selling prices  to  fall below  the  G factor,  so  long as  the variable element 
of the border price was  covered.  This  was  defined to be  the  commodity 
price of gas  purchases at the point of supply  (eg  Emden,  in the  case  of 
Norwegian  gas),  plus  the  commodity  element of the  tariffs paid by Distrigaz 
for  the  transportation of gas  to  the  Belgian border.  Capacity 
costs/charges  - in the  Dutch export contract or the  transportation 
arrangements with other utilities  - were  excluded and this has  enabled 
Distrigaz  to recover  a  certain amount  of the  load lost in 1986. 
3.30  From  1986,  Gaz  de  France has  been free  to set prices for  large 
industrial users  in France,  independent of explicit Government  control.  In 
principle,  however,  the  charges  are still published,  non-discriminatory and 
consistent between different consumers.  There  are  two  uniform  large user 
tariff bases  known  as  ST,  for  customers  located on  the  GdF  transmission 
system,  and higher  SR  rates for  those  located on  the distribution grid. 
3  These  apply  to  consumers  taking more  than  Sm  kWh  (some  470,000  m )  per 
year.  Again,  there is an annual  fixed charge  and  there  is also  a  maximum 
subscribed winter offtake charge.  In the  case of interruptible sales, 
there was  a  modification to  the  tariff system  in response  to  lower oil 
prices  and more  intensive competition from  HFO  in 1986.  GdF  appears  to 
have  charged a  gas  price equivalent  to  the  HFO  price  (plus  a  quality 
premium)  to  interruptible users  over  the  last couple  of years. 
3.31  In~'  large user prices are closely monitored by  Government but 
the  tariff bases  are actually renegotiated periodically between  SNAM  and 
the  industrial federations,  Confindustria and Confapi.  There  are  three 
tariffs for  large users  - high usage,  low  usage  and flat rate  - but  the 
vast majority of  SNAM  industrial sales  are  covered by  the high usage 
tariff.  For  firm customers,  there  is  a  maximum  offtake charge  and  a 
commodity  charge which  is linked to Italian ex-refinery/coastal depot 
prices of high sulphur fuel oil and is progressively reduced on a  sliding 
scale as  consumption  increases.  Interruptible tariffs are  linked to  the 
same  HSFO  price but effectively discounted  to bring  them  out  somewhat  below 
the  lowest  firm  gas price.  In view of its supply/demand balance  and  the 
need  to  promote  additional  gas  use,  SNAM  has  also offered a  system of price I 
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discounts  to  new  consumers  and existing users  who  increase  their 
consumption.  These vary  from  around  3-4%  for very large users up  to  around 
20%  or  so  for  new  firm  consumers  using less  than  3  mcmja.  Sales  to power 
stations have  not  generally been  interrupted by  SNAM  and their price is 
linked contractually to  HSFO  prices,  less  a  discount  to make  gas  attractive 
to  ENEL.  Chemical  feedstock sales are  generally made  on  a  firm basis but 
these  consumers  effectively get  a  lower  (interruptible)  price. 
3.32  Gas  tariffs in the  Netherlands  are  among  the simplest and most 
transparent  in the  Community.  There  are six "zones",  or tariff blocks,  at 
different consumption levels of which  zone  A (less  than 170,000 m3/a) 
relates  to  small users.  Zones  B to  F  relate to direct Gasunie  sales  to 
larger customers  and are  each related in some  way  to  the  "P  factor",  which 
is the Rotterdam spot market price of low  sulphur fuel oil plus  a  transport 
cost element  and fuel oil duty applicable  in the Netherlands.  The  tariff 
formula  in each case  is such as  to  produce  a  progressively lower price as 
consumption increases  through  the  zones,  from  B  (170,000-1,000,000 m3/a) 
through toE (over  50  mcm/a)  and  F  (over  600  mcm/a).  There  is no  load 
factor  adjustment  to  the tariff rates,  reflecting a  'market value'  pricing 
philosophy in relation to  fuel oil prices,  which  tend not to be very 
sensitive to  the  seasonal pattern of use.  Gasunie's  "F"  tariff in fact 
applies  only to  ammonia  and methanol  producers  and sets a  marker price for 
feedstock sales  to  ammonia  producers  elsewhere  in the  Community,  such as 
France,  West  Germany  and  the  UK.  It is understood that power  stations in 
the Netherlands  used to be  charged at a  special rate but that they are  now 
encompassed within the  general  "E"  tariff.  Since  there  are  scarcely any 
interruptible sales  (other  than for  power  stations),  the  same  uniform 
tariff system is generally applied  to all types  of industrial gas  consumer. 
3.33  In the United Kingdom,  the  system is very different in that prices 
3  for  sales  to  customers  using more  than  69,000 m /a  (25,000  therms)  are 
individually negotiated on  a  contract basis between British Gas  and  the 
customer.  Broadly speaking,  prices  tend to reflect the price of the 
competing fuel  to  the  individual user,  usually gas oil for  premium 
consumers  and  HFO  for  non-premium  industrial users,  adjusted for the 
relative  in-use value of gas  and  the  alternative.  In most  cases,  this 
means  that British Gas  seek to obtain a  price higher  than that of the alternative fuel,  especially where  the  consumer has  no  oil-burning 
facilities.  Premium  users  are  generally supplied on  a  firm basis,  while 
large non-premium customers  are  typically sold gas  on  interruptible  terms. 
Whereas  tariffs for  small users  (below  69,000  m3/a)  are explicitly 
regulated,  contract sales are subject only to  maximum  prices published by 
British Gas  itself and  the  general  competition law applicable  in the  UK. 
Recently,  competition from  HFO  has  exerted downward  pressure  on 
interruptible gas  prices,  as all interruptible consumers  have  dual  fuel 
facilities  and can quickly switch between gas  and oil.  Firm  gas  prices,  on 
the  other hand,  vary more  widely  as  the majority of premium  industrial gas 
users have  no  installed capability to burn oil and many  of the  smaller ones 
pay prices at or near  the published maximum.  This pricing system has 
recently been investigated by  the Monopolies  & Mergers  Commission  (MMC). 
Reporting  in October  1988,  the  MMC  has  now  recommended  that  BG  should no 
longer be permitted to  discriminate  in pricing or supply as  between 
comparable  industrial users,  other than for  feedstock sales.  This  is 
clearly a  very significant change,  which would make  it easier for new 
entrants  to  compete  with  BG  via common  carriage,  but it is rather too early 
to  draw precise conclusions  as  to  its practical implications  for  the  UK 
market. 
3.34  The  situation in West  Germany  is highly  complex  as  industrial gas 
sales  are  made  by distributors as  well  as  transmission companies.  Prices 
are  again determined by  individual contract negotiation and  there are 
considerable variations  in the price levels  and  the  structure of 
contractual price adjustment clauses  from  case  to  case.  There  appear  to be 
four broad categories  of industrial gas  prices,  in descending price order:-
(a)  sales  (generally on  a  firm basis)  to  premium  customers with  a  gas  oil 
alternative; 
(b)  firm sales  to  non-premium  customers with an  HFO  alternative; 
(c)  interruptible sales  to non-premium customers  with an  HFO  alternative; 
and 
(d)  interruptible sales  to very  large users with  a  coal alternative 
(often power  stations). 
\ In general,  all the  gas  sellers in West  Germany  adopt  a  market-related 
approach which  sets  the  gas  price  in relation to  the price of the  competing 
fuel,  plus  a  premium  in the  case of lower quality fuels  such as  HFO  and 
(particularly)  coal.  This  approach  therefore  leads  to  a  wide  range  of 
industrial gas  prices,  especially for  firm gas  which is sold to both 
premium  and non-premium users.  Market-related pricing navertheless  appears 
to  command  a  wide  measure  of support  from bodies  such  a3  VtK,  the 
association of large  energy users,  and  the  Bundeskartelam~ (competition 
office),  who  take  the view that inter-fuel competition is generally 
sufficiently strong to prevent an abuse  of monopoly  position by  the  gas 
utilities. 
3.35  In Denmark,  there  are relatively few  large  industrial gas  consumers 
(just over  200  in 1987)  and  these are  supplied on  the basis of a  published 
tariff which  links  the  gas  price  to  a  net-of-tax fuel oil price,  since 
industrial users  are not subject to  the oil taxes  paid by smaller 
consumers. 
3.36  In the Republic  of Ireland,  smaller industrial consumers  taking up  to 
3  150,000  thermsja  (around 420,000m ja)  pay  a  relatively high published 
tariff which  falls  somewhat  as  consumption levels  increase.  Above  150,000 
therms,  prices are  individually negotiated rather than published tariffs. 
Negotiations  appear  to  take place  on  the basis of a  relationship to  the 
heavy  fuel  oil price,  usually within the  range  87.5%  to  120%  of fuel oil 
depending  on  the use  of gas  and  the bargaining position.  Although  the 
number  of large  consumers  is very small,  electricity generation and 
fertilizer production alone  accounted for nearly  90%  of total gas  demand  in 
1985. 
3.37  In Luxembourg,  many  small  and medium  sized industrial consumers  are 
supplied under  a  simple  2  part  "THP"  tariff (monthly delivery charge plus  a 
3  commodity  charge perm).  Larger consumers  (over  41860GJ  or around  1 
mcmja)  with a  fuel oil stand-by can decide whether  to be  supplied under  the 
newly  introduced  'spot'  tariff (related to  fuel oil prices)  rather than  the 
THP  tariff. 
3.38  In Spain the  situation is complicated by  the  fact  that a  distinction 
must  be  made  between  the  tariffs of distribution companies  and  those  of ENAGAS  who  supply  industrial consumers  (in the  north and east)  directly 
from  the  gas  pipeline.  The  former  are  simple  two  part tariffs with  three 
levels of consumption.  For  larger industrial consumers  supplied by  ENAGAS, 
there  are  a  number  of different  firm  gas  tariffs  (depending on  the  end-use 
sector)  and  a  single interruptible supply tariff (applied only  to  consumers 
over  41860  GJ  or around  lmcmja)  which  is somewhat  below  the  average  firm 
tariff level. 
3.39  A summary  of estimated gas  prices  to medium  sized firm  and 
interruptible gas  consumers  in the  six main  gas-consuming Member  States 
over  the last two  years  is set out overleaf in table  3.4.  In some  cases, 
precise  information is not readily available but it is believed that the 
overall pattern of gas  price estimates  is broadly correct.  The  table shows 
that prices  in Italy and  the Netherlands  have  recently tended to be  among 
the  lowest  in the  Community,  with relatively high prices  (at least for  firm 
sales  to  premium  consumers)  in Great Britain and West  Germany. 
Significantly,  the  range  of prices  across  Member  States  is generally much 
wider  for  firm sales  (where  competition from  other fuels  may  be  less 
intense)  than for  interruptible gas  which  generally competes  quite closely 
with HFO  at prices which,  apart  from  differences  in duty,  do  not vary all 
that widely  from  country  to country.  The  very wide  range  of firm  gas 
prices within West  Germany  reflects  the  fact  that some  large non-premium 
users  are  supplied with  firm  gas  at HFO  related prices,  while  premium users 
pay much  higher prices related to  gas oil.  In other Member  States,  large 
non-premium  customers  would  typically be  supplied with interruptible gas. 
Another  important point is that firm/interruptible price differentials  tend 
to be  lower  in Member  States  (such  as  France  and Italy)  with access  to 
substantial amounts  of  low  cost gas  storage.  Where  storage is less 
plentiful  (as  in the  UK  or West  Germany),  the cost of providing peak winter 
supplies will  tend to be higher  and this may  be  reflected in a  greater 
price differential between those  customers  who  are  supplied all year  round 
and  those  who  can be  interrupted in the winter peak. 
3.40  Turning  to  sales  from  the  transmission companies  to  distributors, 
a  number  of different arrangements  have  again developed in the various 
Member  States.  Typically,  the  transmission company  is  seeking  a  positive 
trading margin,  after allowing  for  its gas  purchase costs,  transmission 
\ Table  3.4:  European  industrial  gas  prices  in  ECUtm3 
(load sizes  3-28  mcmja) 
Firm  gas 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom  (GB) 
West  Germany  (a) 
West  Germany  (b) 
Interruptible  gas 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom  (GB) 
West  Germany 
Notes: 
October  1986 
0.14  - 0.15 
0.14  - 0.16 
0.09  - 0.10 
0.07 
0.14  - 0.18 
0.10  - 0.11 
0.19 
0.13 
0.13 
0.08 
0.09 
0.09 
February  1988 
0.11  - 0.13 
0.12  - 0.14 
0.08  - 0.09 
0.10 
0.14  - 0.18 
0.10  - 0.11 
0.15 
0.09 
0.11 
0.07 
0.09 
0.09 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(1)  tariff for  6  mcmja;  variations reflect load factors  and nature of use 
(2)  range  reflects  load size,  load factor  and  location 
(3)  based on Gasunie  C/D  tariffs 
(4)  HFO  related contracts 
(5)  gas  oil or mixed  GO/HFO  contracts;  middle  of  a  wide  price range 
(6)  price for  fully  interruptible  (mutual  option)  supplies 
(7)  no  interruptible sales  to  customers  in this size band 
Source:  Confederation of British Industry  (October  1986);  estimated for 
February  1988 
S\ costs,  administrative  expenses  and  the  cost of any  other services provided, 
such  as  gas  storage  used to convert high  load factor  gas  purchases  into a 
lower  load factor  supply  to  the distributor.  Since  transmission companies 
often sell direct  to  large  industrial consumers  themselves,  most 
distributors will have  a  market mix  which  is biased in favour  of household 
and other small  consumers.  Such  consumers  tend  to have high value 
alternative fuels  (gas oil,  electricity)  and can thus  pay relatively high 
gas  prices,  but their size and  the highly seasonal pattern of their demand 
also makes  them  more  expensive  to  supply.  Thus  the distributor will 
usually  incur a  relatively high level of non-gas  expenses  and will be 
looking for  a  gas  purchase price sufficiently below  the  average  netback 
from  sales  to  final  consumers  to  provide  a  reasonable profit.  Commonly, 
therefore,  gas  is sold from  transmission companies  to distributors at some 
margin below  the price of gas  oil and prices often tend to move  broadly in 
line with  gas  oil over  time.  Provided  the  transmission company's  gas 
purchase  costs  and  the distributor's market realisation maintain a 
reasonably stable relationship,  the objectives of each can generally be 
satisfied,  but if they  do  not  then there  is automatically a  conflict over 
the burden of losses  resulting from  misalignment.  This  arose  in some  cases 
in 1986,  for  example,  when  competing oil prices fell rapidly while bulk gas 
purchase prices were  reduced only more  slowly  due  to  the  lags  in purchase 
price escalation clauses. 
3.41  Frequently,  prices  for bulk sales  from  transmission companies  to  the 
distributors are negotiated by  the  association of gas  distributors  on 
behalf of its members,  as  with VEGIN  in the  Netherlands,  for  example. 
However,  such arrangements  tend to be  closely monitored by Government  - by 
the Ministry of Economic  Affairs  in the Netherlands,  the  Interministerial 
Pricing Committee  in Italy or through  the  gas  and electricity Control 
Committee  in Belgium.  Within the last two  years  the  Dutch Government has, 
for  example,  intervened to stipulate more  gradual price reductions  in small 
user gas  prices  (and  in the price paid by  VEGIN  to Gasunie)  than the  two 
organisations had  agreed,  in order  to protect the  revenue which it obtains 
from  the  gas  industry through  the  financing  and  taxation arrangements  for 
producing  company  NAM. 
51 3.42  In Belgium,  sales  from  Distrigaz  to  the  local distribution companies 
are  supervised by  the  Control  Committee  and  there  is a  uniform "cost plus" 
tariff system  in place  for all distributors.  Sales  are made  at the  "G" 
factor  (average border price of gas  imports),  plus  a  non·gas  cost element 
plus  a  margin  for profit,  recalculated monthly using the  indexation 
mechanism  incorporated in the tariff.  There  is no  capacity charge  to be 
paid by  the distributors  and  no  take-or·pay,  so  that  they effectively get 
whatever  gas  they require.  The  Control  Committee  also supervises profit 
levels  in the  gas  industry and would have  the  power  to  require tariff 
reductions if Distrigaz profits appeared to be  excessive. 
3.43  In the  Netherlands,  the prices at which  gas  is sold from  Gasunie  to 
local distributors largely reflect the  gas oil parity price at which 
distributors sell to small  end-consumers,  less  a  distribution margin. 
However,  the distribution margin is set for each distribution company  in 
accordance with a  formula whereby  the  margin allowed is  inversely 
proportional  to average  consumption per gas  connection.  Thus  distributors 
with a  low  average  consumption per connection are  assumed  to have high 
distribution costs  and obtain gas  supplies at lower  cost from  Gasunie; 
3  3  purchase prices can vary by as  much  as  Gc  4/m  (just less  than  ECU  0.02/m  ) 
from  the  lowest to  the highest.  There  is no  distributors'  take-or-pay 
commitment  to  Gasunie  and no  capacity charge;  Gasunie  also has  to make 
sufficient  'L'  (low calorific value)  gas  available  to meet  their needs  as 
they cannot safely distribute  'H'  gas.  These  arrangements  are covered by  a 
rolling 15  year  "evergreen"  contract under which  the distributors are 
obliged to  purchase all their requirements  (some  20  bcm/a)  from  Gasunie. 
3.44  In Italy,  there  is  a  uniform,  published tariff system for sales  from 
SNAM  to  the  2000  local distribution companies.  This  is negotiated 
periodically between  SNAM  and  the  distributors'  representatives,  but is 
subject to  approval  by  the  Interministerial Pricing Committee  (CIP).  The 
current arrangement  includes  a  commodity  charge,  which  is  indexed with 
changes  in gas  oil prices,  and  a  capacity charge  which  is indexed with 
non-energy inflation.  Prices are  recalculated every  2  months,  with 
unusually short escalation lags of only 6-7  weeks  on average.  The 
distributors are  then allowed to set "cost plus"  prices  for  small  gas 
consumers  which vary  from  commune  to  commune  in line with a  formula incorporating cost parameters  such  as  the  average  level of consumption per 
gas  connection. 
3.45  In Denmark,  there  is yet another  system to reflect the  fact  that 
transmission company  Dangas  do  not sell to  any  final  consumers  apart  from 
power  stations.  For  each market  segment  (small users,  district heating, 
industrial consumers)  which  is supplied by  the distributors,  there  is a 
separate  gas  price  from  Dangas.  An  overall gross  margin was  estimated for 
each market  from  the sales  revenue  in that market,  minus  the  corresponding 
gas  purchase  costs under  the  contract between Dangas  and producer  DUC.  The 
gross  margin was  then shared out between the  distributors  and  Dangas  on  a 
two·thirds/one·third basis  in order  to establish the  Dangas  selling price 
and  this selling price is  indexed with  gas  oil or fuel oil prices,  as  the 
case may  be. 
3.46  In West  Germany,  prices  to distributors are not directly controlled 
by  Government,  but for  reasons  of competition law  there  is essentially one 
supply and pricing system for all distributors.  This  involves  a  firm  gas 
supply,  with separate capacity and  commodity  charges  and prices which 
reflect the  average netback across all the distribution companies. 
Capacity  and volume  requirements  are  discussed in advance,  but  the 
distributors are  required to  give  no  contractual capacity subscription or 
take-or·pay commitment  as  such.  Ruhrgas  and others sell to distributors 
under  long·term 20  year contracts,  but with  the  right for either party to 
reopen price discussions  if the market situation has  significantly changed. 
Similar principles,  with  a  number  of negotiated differences,  apply to sales 
from  Ruhrgas  and  BEB  to  the various  regional  gas  transmission companies  in 
West  Germany.  There have  been  a  number  of changes  in the  terms  of sale 
from  Ruhrgas  and others  to  local utilities in the last year or  two  · 
including a  trend away  from  a  mixed basket of price escalation to  100%  gas 
oil escalation,  an  increase  in the  frequency of price revision from  every  6 
months  to  every  3  months  and  the  introduction of a  "substitute commodity 
price"  when oil prices are very  low  to  protect the  transmission company's 
margin  to  some  extent.  When  oil prices are  falling,  the more  frequent 
price revisions would  tend  to act in favour  of the  distributors,  ensuring 
that  gas  costs fall  in line with market  realisations,  but could mean  that 
gas  costs will rise more  quickly at a  time  of rising oil prices  in the 
future. 
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3.47  An  important  issue  is  the  relative level of profits which 
transmission companies  earn on  sales  to  their own  industrial customers  and 
to  local distributors.  In general,  selling prices  to distributors  tend  to 
be  above  the  average  selling price  to  industrial customers  - particularly 
in Member  States where  practically all industrial sales are  made  at 
HFO-related prices.  It might be  argued that industrial markets,  where  a 
substantial proportion of users have  a  dual-firing capability,  are 
characterised by more  intense  inter-fuel competition than small user 
markets,  where  consumers  tend to  make  less  frequent  fuel  choices at the 
time  fuel-using appliances  are  replaced.  Thus,  particularly when oil 
prices are  falling,  there might be  a  tendency for  transmission companies  to 
reduce  industrial gas  prices relatively rapidly  - squeezing margins but at 
least retaining load  - but seek  to maintain higher margins  on sales  to 
distributors.  In the Member  States  examined above,  it seems  that 
distributors'  margins  are  generally quite well protected,  except where  they 
are  inefficient and  incur higher costs  than  the tariff system was  designed 
to  cover.  They  may  nevertheless  continue  to provide  a  relatively high 
margin sales outlet for  transmission companies,  especially where  capacity 
costs are  low,  as  in the Netherlands.  Some  distribution companies  might 
therefore  consider  the current margin excessive,  though it must be  added 
that the contractual flexibility they enjoy on both capacity and offtake 
volumes  is much  greater than they could expect if they tried to buy direct 
from  producers  for  themselves.  The  present arrangements  might also be 
questioned  from  an overall efficiency point of view,  since  in some  cases 
they  leave little incentive  for distributors to market effectively and 
operate efficiently to  reduce  their own  costs  and  those  they  impose  on  the 
gas  system as  a  whole. 
3.48  Although  transmission company  sales  to distributors are,  in many 
Member  States,  "policed"  by  the  Government,  the  intervention of the  Dutch 
authorities  in recent years  suggests  that Governments  cannot necessarily be 
relied upon  to  look after distributors'  interests.  Similarly,  the  fact 
that Bayerngas  was  sufficiently aggrieved  to  seek a  direct purchase  and 
than take its case  to  the  European Commission  suggests  that at least some 
local/regional utility buyers  have  felt their treatment was  not altogether 
equitable.  When  it is considered  that  there now  appears  to be  a  relatively 
narrow band of European  gas  purchase prices across  different Member  States 
55 and  the various  different exporting countries,  the  sheer variation in gas 
selling prices observed in the  Community  as  between comparable  purchasers 
is at least suggestive of some  monopoly  profit element  in prices  to  some 
consumers  or classes of consumers  which  a  more  open  internal gas  market 
might  conceivably  squeeze  out of  the  system.  Whether  this would  simply 
mean  higher gas  prices  to other consumers  or categories of consumers  is a 
question we  will return to in Section V below. 
Market  developments 
3.49  In order  to assess  the probable  impact of a  system of common  carriage 
it is  important  to  identify those  gas  consumers  most  likely to  take 
advantage  of such  a  system.  There  are  several factors  which may  influence 
the extent to which  an  individual  consumer  could benefit from  a  system of 
common  carriage,  including: 
(a)  location on  the  system  (i.e.  on  the  transmission or the distribution 
grid); 
(b)  size of the  consumer; 
(c)  load factor;  and 
(d)  the availability of a  stand-by fuel,  which  may  allow the  consumer  to 
negotiate  gas  transportation on  an  interruptible basis. 
3.50  Large  consumers  located on  the  transmission grid with a  high  load 
factor are  relatively well placed to  take  advantage  of a  system of common 
carriage.  This  is partly because  such  loads would be  cheaper  and easier 
for  producers  to  supply direct than other  types  of consumer,  and partly 
because  these  large  consumers  may  have  the negotiating strength and skills 
required to  deal direct with producers.  In this sub-section,  a  short 
summary  of  the  developments  in gas  demand  over  the last twenty years  is 
followed by  an assessment of the  three main  consumer  categories  - small 
residential/commercial users,  large  industrial users  and power plants.  We 
examine  the  likely development  of gas  demand  in each of the categories  and 
seek to  draw  some  preliminary conclusions  regarding  the  likely reaction to 
a  common  carriage  system. 3.51  In the  last twenty years,  gas  has  more  than doubled its percentage 
share  in gross  inland energy  consumption  in the  EC  countries  (from 9.1 per 
cent in 1971  to  19.2 per cent in 1985).  The  increasing  importance  of gas 
in overall energy  consumption has  been a  phenomenon  common  to most  EC 
countries,  but  the pattern and extent of this  growth  has  been  somewhat 
different in the different Member  States.  Common  to most  countries has  been 
the  rapid growth  in the  residential/commercial sector which has  increased 
its share of total gross  inland gas  consumption  from  31%  in 1973  to  50%  in 
1986.  In the  more  "mature"  gas  markets,  industrial  gas  demand  tended  to 
grow  quite rapidly  in the  1970's but  the  growth  rate has  generally been 
much  slower  in the  1980s.  In relatively  "young"  gas  markets  (eg Spain)  or 
in countries where  the  gas  grid has  undergone  significant recent extension 
(eg Italy),  however,  quite rapid growth of gas  consumption in the 
industrial sector has  continued into  the 1980's. 
3.52  Of  the  three main  demand  sectors  - residential/commercial,  industrial 
and electricity generating  - the  residential/coromercial sector has 
experienced the fastest rate of growth.  Consumption more  than doubled over 
the  period 1973  - 1986.  This was  mainly due  to  the  development of gas  for 
space heating in the  more  mature  markets  (Britain,  W.  Germany,  France  and 
the  Benelux countries).  In other markets  (eg Italy,  Spain),  the  increase 
in demand  in this sector also reflected the  expansion of the  gas 
infrastructure and  the ability to offer gas  to  new  consumers  who  previously 
had no  access  to  the  grid. 
3.53  The  typical consumer  in the  residential/commercial sector is small 
3  (around  2000-3000  m /a for  a  domestic  central heating user)  and connected 
to  the  distribution grid.  The  most  common  applications  for  gas  are  space 
heating,  water heating and  cooking,  which  implies  a  low  load factor 
(seasonal  in the  case  space heating,  and daily in the  case of cooking  and 
water heating).  Of  these,  space heating is quantitatively the most 
important in most  countries.  In the majority of the  Member  States,  gas 
faces  competition in this market principally from  light heating oil and  in 
some  cases  from electricity  (UK,  France).  In some  West  German  cities and 
in Denmark,  for  example,  certain areas  are  reserved for district heating, 
but  there  is not generally direct competition for customers between  gas  and 
district heat.  Few  small  commercial  customers  and almost  no  household consumers  have  installed capacity to  switch fuel  at short notice.  Gas 
supplies  to  this sector are  almost  exclusively made  on  a  "firm" 
(non-interruptible) basis.  Given  the  relative high appliance  cost 
(compared  to fuel  costs)  and  the  long life of appliances,  consumers  tend  to 
be  linked in to  one  particular fuel  for  a  considerable  length of time. 
This  implies  a  stable customer base,  although demand  can nevertheless 
fluctuate  from  year  to year  for weather-related reasons,  and means  that in 
the  short-medium  term,  small  gas  consumers  are effectively captive  to  the 
industry. 
3.54  Simply because  of their size,  it is  inconceivable  that individual 
small  consumers  in the  residential/commercial sector will benefit directly 
from  a  system of common  carriage.  They  might benefit indirectly,  however, 
since local distribution companies  might  take  advantage  of common  carriage 
and  the benefit could trickle down,  through price reductions,  to  the 
individual  small  consumer.  Experience  in the  UK  also  suggests  that groups 
of larger  "commercial"  sector users,  such as  local government authorities, 
might conceivably be  in a  position to  attempt  to purchase direct from 
producers. 
3.55  Further  growth  in demand  in this sector will depend  on  the extension 
of the  infrastructure in the  relatively  "young"  gas  markets  and  the 
increased use  of gas  for  space heating in the  mature  markets.  Demand 
forecasts  used by  the  European Commission  show  an  increase  in gas 
consumption of around 15  per cent in total between now  and  the  year  2000. 
The  fastest  growth  rates  in residential and commercial  gas  demand  are 
expected in the  relatively young markets  such  as  Ireland,  Spain and 
Denmark.  In  the  Netherlands,  on  the  other hand,  gas  demand  in this sector 
is expected to  stay approximately constant. 
3.56  In the  industrial sector,  gas  consumption in Member  States  grew  by 
more  than  30  per cent in the 1970s.  In the early 1980s,  however,  gas  lost 
most  of its gains  made  in the  previous  decade  due  to  a  reduction in 
energy-intensive  economic  activity,  increased energy efficiency and,  more 
recently,  a  fall in the price of fuel oil.  In analysing gas  demand  in the 
industrial sector one  needs  to distinguish between  three quite distinct 
types  of  gas  consumption: (a)  'premium applications'; 
(b)  'non-premium applications';  and 
(c)  feedstock uses. 
3.57  Gas  used  for  'premium applications'  competes  with high value 
alternative  fuels  such as  gas  oil,  LPG  and electricity.  In general,  the 
fuel  used needs  to be  clean and easily controllable sinca  the most  common 
applications  of gas  in this category are direct  firi~6 (heating of metals, 
baking etc)  and  space heating.  Load  factors  can vary  very considerably but 
may  on average  lie in the  range  of 50-60 per cent.  Although most  consumers 
of  this  type  are  much  larger than domestic  users,  ve!j  many  do  not use  more 
than a  few  million cubic metres  of gas  per year.  A high proportion of 
"premium"  industrial gas  use  tends  to be  accounted  for by  a  few very large 
process users,  of which  the steel industry is perhaps  the single most 
important example.  In the main,  premium  industrial users  do  not  tend to 
have  installed capacity to use  any alternative fuel  to  gas  and are 
therefore supplied on  a  firm basis. 
3.58  The  most  common  'non-premium application'  is raising steam in large 
boilers,  though  industrial auto-generation of electricity is another 
important  end-use  in this category.  Gas  tends  to  compete  mainly with fuel 
oil,  or  in some  cases  to  a  lesser extent with coal  (for example  in 
W.  Germany  and  the UK).  Non-premium  industrial consumers  tend to be  much 
larger  than most  premium  consumers  and  some  large chemical  companies  may 
consume  up  to  several hundred mcm  per annum.  In almost all cases, 
steam-raising customers  have  installed capacity to use  other fuels 
(generally fuel oil)  and are  therefore  frequently  supplied on an 
interruptible basis.  There  are,  however,  exceptions  such as  large  firm  gas 
deliveries  to  chemicals  companies  with substantial steam-raising and 
auto-generation requirements  in West  Germany.  Many  large non-premium 
industrial users  are  located on  the  medium,  if not high,  pressure 
transmission grid. 
3.59  In a  number  of major  gas-consuming countries,  a  significant 
percentage of total industrial demand  is accounted for by  a  few  very large 
feedstock  consumers.  These  consumers  often take  several hundred mcmja  and 
ICI  in Britain may  use  as  much  as  1  bern/a  for  feedstock purposes.  In most 
cases,  gas  feedstocks  are  used in ammonia/fertilizer or  sometimes  methanol plants.  They  tend  to be  connected  to  the  transmission grid and  to have  a 
high  load factor.  Some  such plants  are  in a  position to  use  propane  as  an 
alternative to natural  gas.  In most  cases,  however,  the  main alternative 
to  using  gas  would be  to  suspend production of methanol/ammonia  and 
purchase  product  from  other suppliers  for  further  chemical processing.  Gas 
supplies are mainly  firm,  though  there  are  some  interruptible feedstock 
supplies  (as  in the United Kingdom),  especially where  a  propane  alternative 
exists. 
3.60  The  changing  industrial structure  in Europe  and  the  trend  towards 
high-value,  non-energy  intensive  industries,  together with  the  adoption of 
more  energy efficient technologies,  is likely to mean  at best a  slow growth 
in industrial gas  demand,  at least in the  'mature'  gas  markets.  Demand  in 
the  premium  industrial market  may  be  relatively stable,  with  some  growth 
prospects  as  more  industrial users  go  over  from  indirect  (steam raising) 
process  use  to more  efficient direct heating,  for which  low grade  fuels 
such as  HFO  are unsuitable.  However,  demand  in the 
non-premium/interruptible market  may  fluctuate more  sharply with  the price 
of fuel oil,  as has  happened over  the last few  years.  In the  feedstock 
sector,  the  most  efficient European plants are  likely to  continue  in 
operation,  but increasing competition  from  low cost gas  producing countries 
(e.g.  in the Middle  East)  could lead to  the  closure of older,  less 
efficient plant in Europe.  In the  newer  European gas  markets,  there  is 
still considerable  scope  for  expansion in the  industrial sector.  Many  of 
the  countries planning a  significant development  of new  or much  expanded 
gas  industries  are  now  very dependent  on  imported oil  (e.g.  Greece  and 
Portugal).  Gas  development  is seen as  a  way  to diversify a  country's  fuel 
mix  and  industries will  therefore be  encouraged  to start using gas.  In the 
forcast used by  the  Commission,  total industrial  gas  demand  in the 
Community  is expected to  increase by  around  60  per cent  from  1986  levels 
before  the  end of  the  century.  A significant proportion of the  increase  is 
represented by  a  rise  in consumption  in the  newer  markets  (such as  Denmark 
and Spain).  Nevertheless,  the  overall forecast  seems  rather optimistic. 
3.61  Of  the  three  types  of industrial consumers,  feedstock users  are 
relatively well placed  to  take  advantage  of  the  introduction of common 
G;o carriage.  Feedstock prices  in N.W.Europe  tend  to be  quite  similar,  since 
the  Dutch  "F"  tariff is widely  regarded as  a  price marker.  The  companies 
in the  ammonia  business  are  faced with  international competition,  however, 
and  are  concerned about  relative feedstock costs outside  Europe.  Arguably, 
the  HFO-related  "F"  tariff does  not  really address  their need  to  remain 
competitive  and  they might be keen  to  try to  buy direct from producers,  in 
order to cover  themselves  against a  fertilizer market  downturn. 
Nevertheless,  the extent to which  a  system of common  carriage would  enable 
them  to negotiate further price reductions might be  limited since  they are 
already charged  the  lowest prices  in the  industry.  Large  non-premium users 
(eg major  chemical  companies)  might  also be  considered relatively well 
placed to buy  gas  direct from  producers via common  carriage.  Like  the 
feedstock  consumers,  however,  they are  often charged relatively low prices 
with  few  large variations  in price across  the  different Member  States. 
Energy-intensive non-premium users would be keen  to  see  gas-to-gas 
competition in the hope  that industrial  gas prices might fall below  those 
of the  competing fuel.  Whether  gas  producers  would be prepared to offer 
discounts  in this way  is an open question to which  we  return in section VI. 
3.62  The  biggest variation between  the  gas  charges  across  the different 
Member  States are  those  to  premium/firm customers.  This  indicates  that 
those  paying much  more  than average  have  the most  to  gain  from  the 
introduction of common  carriage,  but as mentioned before many  such 
customers  would not,  taken  individually,  be  large enough  to be  able  to buy 
gas  direct.  Industrial  consumers  who  could not  individually take  advantage 
of common  carriage might,  however,  benefit  through  the  formation of 
purchasing consortia or emergence  or marketing/trading companies  as 
occurred in the US.  In  the  UK,  the  AHS/Hadsons  joint venture Associated 
Gas  Supplies  is also  seeking to  develop  this kind of role  for itself via 
common  carriage. 
3.63  Demand  for  gas  in the electricity generating sector fell in the  1970s 
and early 1980s  and has  only recently started to  grow  again.  In part,  this 
reflected the  increase  in oil and  gas  prices relative to  those  of other 
fuels  from  1973  through  to  the  early 1980s.  Part of the  reason for  this 
decline  in demand  has  also been political decisions  to restrict the  use  of 
gas  for  power  generation,  often to protect the  coal  industry as  in the 
~I United Kingdom  and West  Germany.  In 1975,  the  European Community  adopted  a 
Council  Directive  limiting the  use  of natural  gas  in public power  stations. 
It says  that gas  has  great advantages  for certain specific uses  and  should, 
consequently,  be  converted into electricity only when  it can not be  used 
for  other purposes,  except  in cases  of  technical or  economic  necessity,  or 
in certain circumstances  to protect  the  environment. 
3.64  Currently,  quite  large  amounts  of gas  are being used for  power 
generation in Italy,  the  Netherlands  and West  Germany.  In Italy,  natural 
gas  consumption by  ENEL  has  been  increasing as  a  result of surplus 
contracted gas  supplies  (in relation to progress with grid development)  and 
a  related policy of substitution away  from  fuel  oil.  In the Netherlands, 
relatively low  cost  indigenous  gas has been competitive vis-a-vis  imported 
coal  and oil.  In both countries,  environmental  opposition to other  forms 
of generation  (nuclear and coal)  has  also played a  role  in the  importance 
of gas  fired generation.  Up  to  the late 1970's,  W.Germany  still used very 
considerable quantities of gas  for  power  generation.  Since  1979,  however, 
there has been a  significant reduction in the use  of gas  and priority has 
been given to  indigenous  coal and  to  a  lesser extent nuclear.  West  Germany 
now  uses  some  7  bcm/a of gas  in power  stations,  mainly for middle/peak load 
purposes.  In the  UK,  gas has  scarcely been used for public power 
generation,  due  to  a  policy of protecting British Coal,  the perception of 
gas  as  a  'noble fuel'  which  should not be  used for  power  generation and, 
until  the late 1970s at least,  a  scare natural  resource  which  should be 
reserved for higher value  purposes.  France  does  not have  a  history of 
using gas  for  power  generation either.  In the  1970's oil was  predominantly 
used,  but at present it is mainly nuclear. 
3.65  Several  factors  have  led to  a  recent revival of interest for using 
gas  in this sector: 
(a)  less concern,  on  a  political level,  with  the depletion of gas 
reserves.  This  is a  result of the  discovery of new  gas  fields  and  a 
considerable  increase  in the world's  proven gas  reserves.  (Since 
1975  they have  gone  up  by more  than  60  per cent); 
(b)  popular pressure  to  abandon  or  decrease  in scope  national nuclear 
programs  in the  wake  of the  Chernobyl  disaster; • 
(c)  the  changed relative  energy prices.  The  recent reduction in the 
price of gas  has  made  the  option of using  gas  for electricity 
generatio.n much  more  attractive;  and 
(d)  technology advances.  Recent  technology  advances  have  changed  the 
position of natural  gas  and made  it a  more  competitive as  a  base  load 
fuel.  Of  particular importance  are  the  development  of combined-cycle 
systems  which  can achieve  fuel  efficiency  of 45%  or better.  If 
waste heat can also be  used productively as  pare of industrial or 
municipal  CHP,  then overall  thermal efficiencies of  75%  or more  are 
obtainable. 
3.66  Several  countries,  including the  UK,  Denmark,  belgium and  the 
Netherlands,  are seriously considering the  option of introducing further 
gas  generators.  In the  Netherlands  SEP,  the association of Dutch 
electricity generators,  is planning  to build two  new  600MW  gas-fired 
stations.  These  would be  fuelled under  a  25  year contract with Statoil for 
2  bcm/a year  from  the mid-1990's.  Significantly,  the price of Norwegian 
gas will be  linked partly to  the  price of coal  and partly to  the rate of 
inflation.  Statoil's willingness  to  agree  to coal price  indexation 
significantly enhances  the  attractiveness of gas  and might  lead to  a 
substantial increase  in the use  of gas  in electricity generation,  as  many 
power utilities now  perceive  coal  to be  the closest alternative fuel.  In 
the  forecast used by  the  European  Commsision,  demand  in this sector is set 
to fall by more  than 40  per cent before  the  end of the  century.  Since  the 
preparation of this  forecast  in July 1987,  the attitude  towards  using gas 
for power  generation has  significantly changed,  as  outlined before,  and  the 
forecast  therefore  seems  much  too  pessimistic.  Some  increase in 
consumption  in this sector now  seems  more  realistic. 
3.67  Power  stations are  ideally suited to  take  advantage  of a  system of 
common  carriage.  They  are very large  consumers  with  a  high  load factor, 
are  linked to  the high pressure  transmission grid and are capable of 
receiving  interruptible supplies.  In West  Germany  several power  generation 
companies  (eg.  RWE,  EWE,  and  VEW)  have  been buying directly from  Gasunie 
for  many  years.  In Britain,  the  combination of the  introduction of common 
carriage  and  the  forthcoming privatisation of the electricity sector has led to considerable  interest by both would-be  independent  power  generators 
and existing utilities in gas  generation.  A number  of  them  are  considering 
either supplies  from  British Gas  or  a  direct purchase  from  North  Sea 
producers. 
3.68  Most  forecasts  now  indicate  that total Community  gas  demand  will  grow 
up  to  the  year  2010  but not  as  fast as  during  the period 1970-85.  In the 
forecast used by  the  European Commission,  total gas  consumption is expected 
to  increase  on  average  by just under  2  per cent per  annum  through  to  the 
end of the  century. 
Supply  Developments  and  Supply/Demand  Match 
3.69  On  the  supply side,  the  main  development  over  the last 15  years  has 
been an  increase  in the  number  of supplier countries.  In 1973  the 
Netherlands  were  the  only  important exporter of gas  to Member  States.  In 
1988  most  EC  countries  can choose between four  main  sources  of  imported 
supply:  Algeria,  Norway,  USSR  and  the Netherlands. 
3.70  Of  the  four  main exporting countries  the Netherlands  is the  one with 
the  smallest reserves.  Its most  significant gas  reserves  are  found  in 
Groningen.  The  Groningen field has  been the  major  source of supply of gas 
in the Netherlands  since its discovery  and  development  in the early 1960s. 
In the  1960s nearly all gas  sold by Gasunie  originated from  this field. 
More  recently the  importance  of the  Groningen field in total Dutch  gas 
supply has  fallen to  only around half of all gas  sold.  The  question of 
Dutch  reserves has  created some  uncertainty in the past and until  the  early 
1980s  it had been widely assumed  that by  the  year  2000  Dutch  gas  exports 
would decrease  to  zero.  Due  to  revised gas  reserves  estimates  and  the 
subsequent  change  in export policy,  gas  exports were  extended in 1984  and 
are  now  expected to  continue well  into  the next century.  However,  future 
export  levels will not be  above  the present level of supply and might very 
well be below this.  Gasunie has  a  first right of refusal over all gas 
produced in the Netherlands  and it has  been helped in its marketing efforts 
to sell gas  to  European  gas  utilities by  the  flexibility of the  Groningen 
field.  This  enables  Gasunie  to let the  purchasing utility choose  the  load 
factor at which it wants  to be  supplied.  Thus  SNAM  have  tended  to  take 
• • 
Dutch  gas  on  a  higher  load factor  (having extensive  storage capacity)  than 
Distrigaz,  for  example,  who  have  relatively little storage capacity of 
their own.  The  depletion of the  Groningen field and  the  consequent 
lowering of the  pressure  in the  field might make  production less  flexible 
and  therefore  decrease  the  flexibility of supplies  from  Gasunie.  At 
present Gasunie  supplies W.Germany,  France,  Belgium,  Italy and  the  Dutch 
seem  unlikely to want  to boost their gas  exports  above  current levels,  in 
order to  reserve  Groningen  gas  for  the  domestic  market  in the longer  term  . 
3.71  The  Soviet Union  is  the  largest producer of natural  gas  in the world 
today.  The  country has  also by  far  the  largest proven gas  reserves  in the 
world  (probably more  than 75  per cent of the world's  total reserves).  The 
sheer size of the  Soviet gas  industry quite easily leaves  room  for  export 
volumes  to  the West.  In 1987,  for  example,  the  Soviet Union produced 
nearly 730  bcm  of natural  gas  of which  only about  5%  was  delivered to 
customers  outside  the  Eastern bloc.  Gas  exports have  considerable 
significance  to  Soviet foreign  trade  and account  for  about  a  fifth of 
Soviet-hard currency  revenue  from  export  to Western  industrialised 
countries.  In the  long run the  Soviets will definitely be  interested to 
increase  their market  share,  and  the  present relaxation in East-West 
relations might help  the  Soviets  to  do  so.  Production capacity is 
effectively unconstrained,  although  a  very significant increase in exports 
would probably require  an  increase in transmission capacity across  the  USSR 
and Eastern Europe.  So  far Soviet exports  into  Europe  have  been 
voluntarily restricted by most  gas utility buyers  to  an  informal ceiling of 
30  per cent of the  total  gas  supply  in any Member  State.  It is not clear 
to what  extent this  informal  quota will continue  to operate  in the  future. 
In the short run  the  Soviets  are  seeking  to start selling gas  in Spain and 
some  of  the  smaller markets  such as  Greece,  Turkey  and  Sweden  (those 
countries where  they sell significantly less  than  30  per cent of total 
supply). 
3.72  Algeria is  the world's  sixth largest gas  power,  with estimated 
reserves  of 3,100 bcm.  Originally only a  LNG  supplier,  Algeria now  also 
supplies natural  gas  to  Europe  through  trans-Mediteranean pipeline.  In 
terms  of reserves,  the  country's potential for  further expanding its role 
in international gas  trade  is obvious,  as  are its needs  for  doing so.  Oil 
reserves  are  declining,  and by  the  turn of  the  century Algeria is expected to be  using all its oil production for  domestic  purposes.  That  leaves  gas 
exports  as  the  important  source of foreign earnings.  The  importance  of gas 
(and oil)  as  a  foreign currency earner has been highlighted by  the  recent 
economic  and political turmoil  in the  country.  The  economic hardships 
which  the  country is currently suffering can be partly explained the  recent 
fall  in oil and  gas  prices.  Algeria is  therefore likely to be  keen to 
increase  gas  exports wherever it can. 
3.73  The  development  of Algerian gas  exports has by  no  means  fulfilled the 
expectations raised in the  1960s  and  1970s  when  exports was  projected to  a 
'peak annual  volume  of more  than  70  bern  by  the  mid  1980s,  more  than three 
times  the present actual  annual  export volume.  Even  now,  Algeria is 
reported to have  an export capacity of up  to  46  bcmja,  as  against only 
about  20  bcm/a which  is actually sold.  In the  short  to  medium  term, 
therefore,  Algeria does  not  face  any binding capacity constraint on 
increasing sales.  Existing customers  include  Belgium,  France,  Italy 
(through the Trans-Med pipeline,  not  LNG),  and  Spain.  Contracts have  also 
been concluded for  LNG  sales  to Greece  and Turkey,  though deliveries have 
yet to  commence.  Algeria is even prepared to make  available boatloads of 
LNG  on  an option basis with no  buyer's  take-or-pay commitment,  as  the 
current arrangement for winter deliveries  to British Gas  illustrates. 
Future  growth  in exports will largely depend  on Algerian's pricing policy 
for natural  gas,  which  in recent years has  been highly controversial.  The 
principle of·linking the price of gas  to official crude oil prices  led,  for 
a  period,  to particularly high Algerian prices  compared  to other suppliers. 
In 1986,  Algerian negotiators  appeared  to be prepared to  adapt  to recent 
developments  in the market,  and  seemed  intent on  increasing their market 
share.  More  recently,  however,  the  contract price billed by  Sonatrach has 
been above  the  market  level once  again  - leading to protracted disputes 
with both Gaz  de  France  and Distrigaz.  Thus  the  experience of European  gas 
utilities with purchases  from  Algeria has  made  them  reluctant to become  too 
dependent  on  the  supply of Algerian gas. 
3.74  Commercial  production of natural  gas  in Norway  has  a  fairly short 
history.  The  first volumes  from  the  Ekofisk and  Frigg fields  started to 
flow  through pipelines  to West  Germany  and Great Britain in 1977.  The 
Norwegian  gas  market  received a  significant boost with  the  discovery of the 
..  .. Troll field in 1979  which  is of comparable  size  to  the  Groningen field.  A 
big difference between  the  two  fields  is  in the  cost of extracting the  gas. 
Gas  from  the  Groningen field is relatively cheap  to extract,  being an 
on-shore  field.  In contrast,  the Troll field is a  difficult geological 
structure located at a  water  depth of  320-350  metres with  a  soft sea bed, 
and consequently  the  cost of extracting the  gas  is significantly higher. 
Total production is expected to  reach  30  bcm  in 1988.  In the  late 1970s 
and early 1980s  Norwegian  gas  exports benefited greatly from  competition 
between British and continental European buyers  and  from  favourable  market 
conditions.  Norwegian deliveries were  considered strategically important  to 
replace  Dutch  gas  and  to fill the  perceived gas  in supply.  Norwegian  gas 
will also,  in the  future,  continue  to  expand  in the  European  gas  market. 
Recent marketing efforts by Statoil have  resulted in gas  contracts with  SEP 
(the association of Dutch electricity generators),  Spain and Austria. 
Further efforts are made  to start exporting gas  to Denmark  and Sweden. 
Especially  in view of declining sales  to  the  UK  and  lower  gas  prices  since 
1986,  the  Norwegians  are  likely to be very keen to  find new  markets  for 
thier gas.  The  Norwegian reserve base sets no  limits  to exports  in the 
foreseeable  future  and Norway's  geographic  and political location in 
Western Europe will  remain an asset.  At  some  point  in the  1990s,  it is by 
no  means  inconceivable  that Norway  could decide  to  apply for  membership  of 
the  Community  and  this might well bring advantages  in terms  of being able 
to  market  its gas,  especially if a  common  carriage  system is established. 
3.75  Libya was  an  LNG  supplier  to Italy in the past,  but proved  somewhat 
unreliable  and has  only been delivering to  Spain in recent years.  Other 
possible  future  suppliers  to  the  European  gas  market are Nigeria,  Qatar and 
IIsn.  Only Nigeria has  initiated preliminary export negotiations with 
various  continental  European buyers  for  about  5  bcmja.  Their main target 
customers  are  in West  Germany,  France,  Spain,  Italy and  Belgium.  Qatar has 
been discussing potential  LNG  exports  to  France  and West  Germany  in the 
1990s.  Iran has  been offering to  export  gas  to Turkey with  the ultimate 
export target being Western Europe. 
3.76  The  precise conditions under which  the  gas  is sold by  the producer  to 
the  gas  utility,  as  outlined in the  gas  purchase  contract,  can differ significantly between one  contract and  the  next.  There  are  some  features, 
however,  which  are  common  to  most  gas  purchase  contracts: 
(a)  long  term agreement  on volumes  to be bought  and sold; 
(b)  take  or pay  commitments; 
(c)  netback pricing,  often with periodic  (3  yearly)  price  reviews  on this 
basis;  and 
(d)  indexation with a  basket of competitive  fuels. 
3.77  In nearly all cases  the contracts are  long  term  agreements.  It is 
not uncommon  to have  contracts with a  duration of up  to  25  years.  This  is 
considered to be beneficial by both  the producer  and  the  purchasing  gas 
utility.  The  producer will seek a  guarantee  that he  can sell gas  over  a 
long period of  time  and  thereby  recoup  the  significant  investments  made  in 
the  development  of the  gas  field.  The  utility will want  to ensure  that it 
can meet  the  demand  requirements  of its consumers. 
3.78  Another  common  feature  of gas  purchase  contracts is a  take-or-pay 
commitment  by  the  gas utility.  The  utility commits  itself to buying  a 
certain amount  of gas  per annum  (the  "minimum bill" quantity)  and has  to 
pay  for  this quantity whether  or not it actual needs  it.  There  are 
different degrees  of take-or-pay commitment.  A 100%  take-or-pay commitment 
implies  that  the utility has  to  pay  for  the  full Annual  Contract Quantity 
(ACQ)  set out  in the  contract.  More  common  is  an arrangement where 
minimum  and maximum  quantities of gas  are  agreed and  the utility has  a 
take-or-pay commitment  with regard  to  the  minimum  quantity.  For  example, 
Soviet contracts  typically allow flexibility within 80-110%  of the  ACQ;  the 
Troll deal  includes  a  range  of 85-105%,  with  an extra  5%  in either 
direction under  defined weather  conditions. 
3.79  The  price which  the utility is willing to pay  the  supplier will 
depend  on  the  price  the  gas utility can obtain for  the  gas  from  its 
consumers.  In many  cases  the  price  the utility pays  the  supplier is based 
on netback pricing.  The  price Gasunie  pays,  for  instance,  for  the  gas  it 
buys  from  NAM  is related to  the price Gasunie  gets  for  its gas  from  the 
consumers.  The  difference between purchase  price  and  sales price  allows 
for  Gasunie  transmission costs  and  a  certain profit margin.  This  implies that the  producer will receive  the  economic  rent but will also have  to bear 
the  risks of price  fluctuations.  Common  to most  contracts  is that  the  gas 
prices will be  subject  to  indexation which  is designed  to  ensure  that gas 
prices  stay in line with  those  of alternative fuels. 
3.80  The  projected increase  in Community  gas  demand  can easily be  met  by 
Europe's  current producers  and suppliers.  Of  the  four  largest suppliers  to 
the  Community,  the Netherlands will probably decrease its market  share. 
The  other  three  suppliers have very significant reserves  (proven reserves 
to  commercial  production ratios of over  50  years)  and would have  little 
difficulty in delivering considerably more  gas  than at present.  It seems 
unlikely that  the  current supply situation,  with  fo~r main  sources of 
supply,  will change  significantly over  the  next  two  decades.  A system of 
common  carriage might,  however,  lead to  more  instense competition for 
market share. 
Comparison with  the US  situation 
3.81  As  mentioned  in section I  of the  report,  there are very  few 
precedents  in the world  for  the  introduction of a  common  carriage  system 
for  the  transport of natural gas.  The  most significant examples  are  the 
United States  and  the United Kingdom  and,  of these,  only in the United 
States  does  third party transportation actually take place.  Currently, 
around half of the  gas  volume  moving  through US  interstate pipelines is 
being transported for  third parties under  Federal  Energy Regulatory 
Commission  (FERC)  Open  Access  Orders,  rather  than having been bought  from 
producers  by  the pipeline  company  for  subsequent sale to distributors 
or  large end-users.  This very significant use  of third party 
transportation  - albeit on  a  voluntary rather  than  a  mandatory basis  - has 
led some  observers  to  suggest  that  there  might well be  scope  for similar 
development  of direct marketing  and  competition between gas  suppliers  in 
the  European  Community.  Having  now  examined  the  current and likely future 
gas  supply situation within  the  Community  itself, it may  therefore be 
helpful at this stage  to outline  the very significant differences  in the 
gas  supply situation in the  US. 3.82  In  the  context of common  carriage,  the  most  important  contrasts 
between  the  US  and  EC  gas  supply situations relate to:-
(a)  the  number  of  gas  producers  and  the  typical level of gas  production 
costs; 
(b)  the  extent of the  transmission pipeline  infrastructure; 
(c)  recent  trends  in gas  demand  and  the  consequences  of this  for pipeline 
utilisation; 
(d)  the  degree  of self-sufficiency in natural  gas  and  the  sources  of 
supply; 
(e)  the  energy policy  framework  and  degree  of government  intervention; 
and 
(f)  the  legislative,  administrative  and regulatory  regime  in force. 
In the  following paragraphs,  we  comment  briefly on  each of these aspects  in 
turn.  a  production cost point of view. 
3.83  As  we  have  already noted,  there are essentially four  main suppliers 
of natural gas  to continental Western Europe  - Gasunie  (the Netherlands), 
Norway,  Algeria and  the  Soviet Union.  In some  cases  these are  supplemented 
by  producers  of indigenous  gas  supplies,  but  the  number  of significant gas 
suppliers generally remains  low.  Even  in the UK,  where  international oil 
companies  supply  gas  from  North  Sea  fields,  the  top  10  suppliers have 
recently accounted for  around  80%  of total gas  supplies.  In the  US,  by 
contrast,  there are literally thousands  of  indigenous  gas  producers  and 
almost  40%  of production is accounted for by relatively small  independants 
rather  than oil company  majors.  Nor  are  the  largest suppliers  dominant  in 
size as  they are  in the  case  of deliveries  to Western  Europe;  for  example, 
Shell  and  Exxon  are  the  largest producers but each still only accounts  for 
around 4-5%  of the market.  This  suggests  that gas  producers/suppliers may 
have  less market  power  than in the  case of Western  Europe  and also helps  to 
explain the  emergence  of US  trading/marketing companies  who  have  no 
production interests  themselves  but act as  "brokers"  in respect of third 
party gas  transportation. 
3.84  In the United States,  some  60-65%  of gas  reserves lie onshore  in the 
lower  48  states  (principally Texas  and  Louisiana)  and  further  supplies  are 
io available  from  the  relatively shallow waters  of the  US  Gulf.  This  means 
that,  in general,  costs of gas  production tend  to be  relatively low.  By 
contrast,  a  significant proportion of gas  supplied to Member  States  is 
relatively expensive  to  produce  and deliver  - due  to offshore operations  in 
the  North  Sea,  for  example,  sulphur  removal  from  sour  gas  produced onshore 
in West  Germany,  liquefication and  regasification of LNG  supplies  from 
Algeria or difficult operating conditions  and high transport costs  in the 
case of gas  from  Soviet Siberia.  Groningen and other onshore  gas 
production in the Netherlands  is probably  the  only very major  source  of gas 
supply  to Western  Europe  which might be  regarded as broadly comparable with 
US  onshore  supplies  from  a  production cost point of view. 
3.85  There  are  also significant differences between  the  US  situation and 
that of Community  Member  States  in terms  of pipeline infrastructure and 
capacity utilisation.  Particularly from  the  main producing US  states of 
the  south and  south-west to  the major centres of consumption in the  more 
densely populated and  industrialised north-east and cities around the 
Great Lakes,  there are  often several different interstate gas pipelines 
(owned  by different pipeline companies)  through which  gas  can be  supplied 
to  the  same  locations.  It has  been estimated as  much  as  84%  of the  gas 
moving  through  the  interstate system  is subject  to  competition from  other 
pipelines.  (On  the  other hand,  many  smaller distributors are  effectively 
"captive"  and  two-thirds  of  them  are  reported to have  no  choice of pipeline 
company  supplier).  In the  Community,  with  a  somewhat  larger population but 
a  much  smaller  land area  than the  US,  there  is  frequently only  a  single 
high-pressure  transmission line and  invariably only a  single  transmission 
company  serving any particular market  area.  Thus  the  US  situation may 
exhibit a  degree  of competition between pipeline companies  and  a  choice of 
bulk supplier for distributors  and  large end-users  which  is not currently 
found  in Western  Europe. 
3.86  Another key  development  is that  the  level of US  gas  demand  has 
recently fallen from  a  high point of some  23  tcf/a  (around 640bcm)  in the 
early 1970s  to  only  17-18  tcf/a  (470-SOObcm)  in the  period since 1983. 
This  demand  reduction of some  25%  reflects  a  combination of increased 
energy conservation,  reduced activity levels  in energy-intensive  industrial 
sectors  and  a  lower  level of gas  use  in power plants.  It left the  industry with considerable unutilised capacity in some  major  interstate transmission 
lines  (though  there  is now  demand  for  additional capacity in the north 
east)  and put pressure  on pipeline  companies  to move  into third party 
transportation in an attempt  to boost  throughput.  At  the  same  time, 
reduced  takes  of gas  by pipelines  faced with falling demand  led many 
producers  to  investigate ways  of marketing  the  "gas bubble"  of shut  in 
production direct to end-users.  In Western Europe,  on  the  other hand,  gas 
demand  may  have  dipped in the early 1980s but has  since  recovered and is 
continuing to  grow  in most  EC  Members  States,  with  the  result that most 
major  transmission lines are  fully or almost fully utilised in periods of 
peak  gas  demand. 
3.87  Another  important consideration is  the  fact that the  US  is currently 
some  95%  self-sufficient in natural  gas.  Imports  from  Canada  account  for 
almost all the  other  5%  of supplies,  though very limited quantities of 
Algerian LNG  are  now  imported via an east coast regasification terminal  for 
peak-shaving purposes  in the winter period.  Although  the  US  used to  import 
relatively small quantities of gas  by pipeline  from  Mexico,  it has  not done 
so  in the last few  years.  By  contrast,  many  EC  Member  States are highly 
dependent  on  imported gas  supplies  (and other  imported fuels)  and almost 
30%  of gas  demand  in the  Community  as  a  whole  is met by non-OECD  countries 
which might be  regarded as politically less reliable.  Thus  the question of 
natural  gas  supply security generally looms  much  larger in Western  Europe 
than it does  in the US. 
3.88  The  concerns  over  supply security are  an  important  example  of  . 
significant differences  in Government  energy policy.  Of  similar importance 
is  the  degree  of state  involvement  and  ownership  in the natural  gas 
industry.  Whereas  gas  companies  in the  US  are  generally privately owned, 
we  have  already noted  the  degree  of state ownership  in most  transmission 
companies  of Western Europe  and  the  frequently municipal nature of many 
local distributors.  Especially in the  case of European gas  transmission 
companies,  the  Government  involvement  often reflects  an energy policy 
which,  since  the  1970s at least,  has  been geared towards  the promotion of 
natural  gas  as  a  means  of diversification away  from  oil fuels.  In turn,  it 
would be  surprising if this high degree  of Government  ownership  did not 
it 
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colour policy attitudes  towards  the  market position,  financial  performance 
and future  prospects  of the  transmission companies  concerned. 
3.89  The  corollary of an essentially private  gas  industry in the  US  is a 
degree  and complexity of regulation not known  in Western  Europe.  Although 
some  EC  Member  State Governments  may  seek to control or  influence  the  level 
of  gas  prices  to  final  consumers  and  (where  relevant)  the  price at which 
gas  is sold from  the  transmission company  to  local distributors,  the 
transactions between  transmission companies  and  the  gas  producers have 
(with  a  dew  exceptions)  been left to  commercial negotiation.  In the US,  on 
the  other hand,  changes  in the  regulatory  regime  and court action have 
often had  a  much  more  direct influence over  the way  in which  the natural 
gas  industry has  developed  than Federal Government  policy per se.  As 
outlined in Appendix  A to  this report,  the  emergence  of considerable third 
party transportation in the  US  since  1983  reflects efforts on  the part of 
gas  companies  to  take  full advantage  of a  rigid and  inflexible regulatory 
regime.  Regulatory action to allow local distribution companies  to  "market 
out"  of take·or·pay commitments  to  the  pipelines at a  time when  regulated 
city gate prices had become  significantly out of line with lower market 
realisations played a  particularly crucial role in the whole  process.  The 
legal,  administrative  and  regulatory aspects of the  US  situation are 
outlined in somewhat  greater length in section IV  of this report. 
3.90  The  fundamental  conclusion suggested by  these  important difference  in 
the  gas  supply situation as  between  the  US  and  the  EC  is the fact that the 
development  of common  carriage  in the  US  on  a  voluntary  (not mandatory) 
basis  reflected a  very particular set of circumstances  which  stand in 
marked contrast to  the  situation in the  Community.  It would  therefore be 
quite misleading  to  conclude  that US  experience  can easily be  transferred 
to  the  European context.  Nor  would it be  appropriate  to  conclude  that the 
US  situation is  in every way  preferable.  First,  it is  to be  questioned 
whether  common  carriage  on  the  present scale will survive  the  US  gas 
"bubble"  or  ("sausage")  of shut-in production and,  as  gas  prices recover 
from  their lowest  levels,  there  are  already  some  signs  of a  return to 
long-term contractual trading arrangements  in place  of 30  day  "spot" 
business.  Moreover,  the  regulatory  regime  in the  US  has  introduced such 
distortions of company  behaviour  and  resource allocation that the  more market-oriented approach  to  gas  trading generally  followed  in Western 
Europe  is now  regarded in some  quarters,  at least,  as  a  "role model"  for 
the United States  gas  industry.  Although  there  may  be  lessons  (both 
positive and negative)  for  the  EC  from  the  US  experience,  the  kind of third 
party transportation which has  emerged  in the  US  cannot be  regarded as  a 
direct prescription for  change  in the  EC  gas  market. 
Implications  for  common  carriage 
3.91  Having  examined relevant aspects  of the  gas  supply situation in the 
European Community  in some  detail,  as  well  as  presenting a  brief comparison 
with  the  US  situation,  it may  be  helpful at this stage  to highlight  some  of 
the  most  important  implications of our assessment  for  a  possible  common 
carriage system at the  Community  level.  The  most  important pointers  to  the 
likely impact of such a  common  carriage  system  include  the following:-
(a)  the  impact of common  carriage might  tend to be  greater in Member 
States where  the  gas  industry is not vertically integrated  (across 
transmission and distribution)  and where  there  is not  a  high degree 
of common  ownership  as between transmission and distribution 
companies; 
(b)  it is of crucial  importance  that many  of the  major  European gas 
transmission lines are heavily utilised under  conditions of seasonal 
peak  gas  demand,  thus  limiting the  scope  for  carriage deals  which 
would  add  to  throughput.  Nevertheless,  carriage deals which would 
simply substitute transported gas  for  transmission company  purchases 
or which  were  interruptible at times  of peak  demand  might still be 
accommodated  from  a  physical capacity point of view; 
(c)  many  pure  transmission companies  have  a  cost structure  in which  gas 
purchases  account  for  a  very considerable proportion of total 
expenses.  Even  if a  more  competitive market  were  to  lead to  greater 
efficiency in non-gas  expenditures,  the  total  impact  on gas  selling 
prices  would probably be  rather limited.  Vertically integrated 
utilities  (such as  GdF  or British Gas)  and distribution companies 
tend to have  a  much  higher proportion of non-gas  costs  and  thus 
greater scope  for  efficiency  improvements  but  in the  case  of 
distribution companies,  in particular,  the  competitive pressure which 
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• common  carriage might  conceivably  introduce  is unlikely to be  as 
great as  for  transmission companies; 
(d)  there are  some  significant variations  in gas  selling prices  to 
comparable  distribution companies  and large end-users,  both within 
and between Member  States.  Within-country variations are most  marked 
in countries  such as  the  UK  and West  Germany,  where  prices are 
negotiated rather than resulting from  published tariffs.  As  between 
Member  States,  price variations  for  large users  tend to be  more 
significant for  firm  gas  than for  interruptible sales.  Some  large 
buyers  in the  UK  and West  Germany,  in particular,  might consider that 
they  could achieve  lower prices  for  firm  gas  by making use  of common 
carriage,  while  interruptible prices are  sometimes  relatively high in 
Belgium and France; 
(e)  it is  important not  to exaggerate  the  number  of large consumers  who 
might be both willing and able  to  take  advantage  of common  carriage, 
in terms  of their offtakes  (level and reliability),  system location, 
load factor  and  take-or-pay  commitments  which might conceivably be 
attractive to  gas  producers  seeking to make  a  direct sale via common 
carriage.  Only  some  of the very largest consumers  would be  in a 
position to negotiate purchases  direct on their own  behalf,  though it 
is at least possible  that a  number  of medium  sized consumers  could 
join together  to  do  so,  either  through association (as with the  UK 
Major  Energy Users  Council)  or  through  an intermediate marketer/ 
broker  as  in the United States.  The  possible further  development of 
natural gas  consumption in power  stations could significantly add to 
the potential for  a  common  carriage system to be  used,  since  the  size 
and nature  of the  load would be  well  suited to  a  direct purchase. 
Nevertheless,  it seem  reasonable  to suggest  that some  of both  the 
proponents  and detractors of a  possible  gas  common  carriage system in 
I 
the  Community  have  tended  to  exag~·rate the  extent to which  such  a 
system might actually be  used,  particularly in the  short to medium 
term; 
(f)  on  the  supply side,  it is vital to:recognise  that many  European  gas 
transmission companies  have  already committed  themselves  extensively 
jl,• 
to  long-term gas  purchase contract\!  often with periodic price 
renegotiations but almost  invariabjy with  take-or-pay offtake 
commitments  as  well,  which will  co~~r a  substantial portion of their 
1S projected sales through  to  2000  and well beyond.  It will  therefore 
be  important  to return in section VI  to  the  likely  impact  of common 
carriage on  the purchasing utilities'  t.:Lke-or-pay positions;  and 
(g)  finally,  the  US  gas  supply situation is markedly different  from  that 
prevailing in the  European  Community  and it cannot be  presumed  that 
US  experience with widespread use  of thi.rd party transportation can 
be  transferred readily to  a  European context. 
• IV  THE  CURRENT  LEGISLATIVE.  REGULATORY  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE  SIIUATION 
Introduction 
4.1  In this section,  we  examine  the  current legislative,  regulatory and 
administrative situation in the  Community  as  it affects natural gas.  Two 
areas  are  of particular interest  - the  existing barriers  to  internal trade 
in natural gas  and legislation in some  Member  States which provides  for  or 
addresses  the possibility of common  carriage.  As  required by  the  study 
Terms  of Reference,  we  look in some  detail at the  UK  situation because of 
its legislative provisions  relating to  third party use  of the British Gas 
pipeline  system.  We  then examine  the  situation in other Member  States and 
at the  overall Community  level,  in terms  of the  relevant articles in the 
Treaty of Rome,  the  powers  of the  European Commission  and its 
administrative procedures  as  they  apply  to  internal trade  in natural gas. 
National  legislation in the various  Member  States  is discussed in an 
analytical rather  than descriptive manner,  since  DG  XVII  has  itself 
recently collected an  inventory of the  relevant  laws  and regulations,  on 
the basis of which other consultants have  prepared a  summary  of national 
legislative barriers  to  the  free  movement  of gas  in the  Community.  In 
order  to assess  any  lessons  (either positive or negative)  from  North 
American  experience,  we  then examine briefly the very different 
legislative,  regulatory and  administrative  system  in force  in the U.S. 
The  United Kingdom 
4.2  As  mentioned above,  the  existing UK  legislation  (1986  Gas  Act)  is of 
particular interest because it explicitly provides  for  the possibility of 
common  carriage  in the British Gas  system and also established a  regulatory 
body with powers  to  decide  the  terms  of carriage  if requested  to  do  so  by  a 
third party seeking  gas  transportation.  We  therefore  describe  the  overall 
legal  framework  in force,  examine  the  common  carriage aspects  and  then 
discuss  the  import/export  regime  for natural  gas. Legal  Framework 
4.3  The  legislation which provided for  the privatisation of  BG  was  the 
1986  Gas  Act,  which also put  in place  a  new  legislative and  regulatory 
framework  for  gas  supply  in Great  Britain.  This  was  required following 
privatisation and  the  abolition (in the Oil & Gas  Enterprise Act  of 1982) 
of  the  monopoly  which  BGC  had previously held  (by virtue of  the  1972  Gas 
Act)  over  the  supply of gas  through pipes.  The  1986  Act  gave  the  Secretary 
of State for  Energy  the  power  to authorise  gas  companies  to  supply  gas 
within a  specified area.  Companies  authorised under  Section 7  of the  Act 
are  known  as  public  gas  suppliers  and effectively have  a  statutory monopoly 
(and a  corresponding supply obligation)  in respect of supplies  to premises 
within their authorised area which: 
(a)  use  gas  at a  rate not  exceeding 25,000  therms  (69,000m3)  per year; 
and 
(b)  are within 25  yards  (23  metres)  of an existing distribution main 
belonging  to  the  supplier. 
No  authorisation is required to  supply  gas at rates  exceeding  2  million 
therms  (5.6  mcm)  per year,  but potential competitors wishing  to sell to 
customers  taking less  than this  amount  would  need authorisation to  do  so. 
On  28  July  1986,  British Gas  was  authorised to  supply  gas  through  pipes  to 
any  premises  in Great Britain and  is likely to be  the  only public  gas 
supplier for  the  foreseeable  future.  This  effectively means  that  they have 
a  virtual monopoly  of gas  sales  to tariff customers  at rates  of up  to 
25,000  therms  but may  face  competition for  supplies  to  larger customers. 
4.4  As  a  public gas  supplier,  BG  is obliged  (under  Section 14  of the  Act) 
to sell to customers  using not more  than 25,000  therms  pa  on  the basis of a 
non-discriminatory tariff.  It may  (but not obliged to)  sell to  larger 
customers  under  the  terms  of special agreements.  Section 9  and  10  give  BG 
a  statutory obligation to  supply tariff customers  situated within  25  yards 
(23  metres)  of an existing distribution main  and a  weaker  obligation to 
supply other customers  where  it is reasonable  and  economic  to  do  so. 
• 4.5  The  maximum  price at which  BG  may  sell to its tariff customers  is 
governed by  the  terms  of its Authorisation,  condition 3,  which  contains  a 
formula of the  type  "RPI·X+Y".  Effectively,  there  are  two  elements  to  the 
regulatory formula.  First,  there  is  the  average  cost of BG's  gas  purchases 
in the  relevant year  (Y),  which it is allowed to pass  on entirely to  the 
tariff customer.  Second,  there  is a  non-gas  element which  is allowed to 
increase  each year at a  rate equivalent to  the  increase in the  retail price 
index  (RPI)  less  two  percentage points  (X).  There  are procedures  for  the 
formula  to be  reviewed by  the  regulator at the  end of an initial five year 
period which  runs  to  31  March  1992. 
4.6  Prices  for  gas  sold to contract customers  (taking more  than 25,000 
therms  pa)  are not regulated under  the Act nor  the  BG  Authorisation,  but BG 
is required  (under condition 5  of  the  Authorisation)  to publish maximum 
prices  for contract sales.  The  maximum  price  for  firm contract sales has 
typically been set a  little below  the  commodity  element of the tariff and, 
in its initial publication of maximum  contract prices  on  23  August  1986,  BG 
also  gave  a  heavily qualified undertaking to  limit increases  to  around  the 
rate of inflation.  Contract sales are explicitly excluded from  the 
provisions of the  1986  Gas  Act  precluding  "undue  discrimination"  in pricing 
and  supply,  but BG's  statement of August  1986  includes  a  weaker  undertaking 
that  BG  "will not set prices  so  as  to restrict,  distort or prevent 
competition contrary to  the  public  interest".  The  original decision not  to 
regulate  gas  contract prices  following  BG  privatisation reflected the 
presumption that,  although  there was  not  immediate  competition from  other 
gas  suppliers,  the  industrial market  competition from  oil suppliers would 
be  sufficient to  ensure  that  BG  could not exploit its position.  Since 
November  1987,  however,  BG's  industrial gas  pricing policy has been under 
investigation by  the  Monopolies  & Mergers  Commission,  following complaints 
from  a  number  of industrial customers  that  BG  was  using its monopoly 
position in a  manner  contrary to  the  public  interest.  Reporting  in October 
1988,  the  Commission has  now  recommended  an amendment  to  the  BG 
Authorisation,  which would require  BG  to  operate non-discriminatory pricing 
and  supply policies  in the contract market.  This  would  appear  to  imply  a 
radical  change  in current  BG  policy,  towards  a  series of published large 
user tariffs. 4.7  The  Gas  Act of 1986  created the  post of Director General of Gas 
Supply  in order  to  regulate  the  gas  supply  industry in general  and  the 
privatised BG  in particular.  James  McKinnon  was  subsequently appointed as 
Director and currently heads  the Office of Gas  Supply  (known  as  Ofgas). 
Among  his duties  are  the protection of consumer  interests,  the  promotion of 
efficiency and economy  and a  duty  to  "enable persons  to  compete 
effectively"  in the  gas  contract market.  The  Director is responsible, 
among  other things,  for  the  regulation of the  tariff market  and  for 
monitoring  the  operation of the  regulatory pricing formula  on maximum 
tariffs. 
4.8  Since  the  gas  contract market  is not  regulated,  the Director does  not 
have  any specific powers  in this respect.  Instead,  the  contract market 
falls  under  general  UK  competition law,  including the  1973  Fair Trading Act 
and the  1980  Competition Act,  and  the  powers  under  that legislation of the 
Director General  of Fair Trading.  Customer  complaints  on BG's  industrial 
gas  pricing policy were  made  to  the  Office of Fair Trading  (OFT)  during 
1987  and this led to  the  reference by  the  OFT  to  the Monopolies  and 
Mergers  Commission  in November  of that year.  Just as  the  OFT  has  the  power 
to  refer matters  to  the  MMC  which relate to contract gas  supplies,  the 
Director General  of Gas  Supply may  refer matters  for  MMC  study which he 
considers  an abuse  of monopoly  power  in the tariff market,  particularly if 
it appears  they could be  addressed by modification to  the  terms  of the  BG 
Authorisation. 
Common  Carriage Aspects 
4.9  Under  the  1986  Gas  Act,  the Director General  of Gas  Supply  also has 
an  important role  in relation to possible third party use  of  the  BG 
pipeline system.  In this respect,  the Act's provisions  are  significantly 
stronger than  those  of the  1982  Oil & Gas  (Enterprise)  Act.  The  1982  Act 
first removed  BG's  statutory "right of first refusal"  on  the  purchase of 
UKCS  gas  supplies  and placed an obligation on  BG  to  transport gas  for  third 
parties in return for  a  carriage charge.  However,  no  third party use  of 
the  system actually occurred.  A combination of several different factors 
may  explain the  apparent  failure  of the  1982  legislation to produce 
competition in gas  supply,  including:-• 
(a)  the  time  lag involved in bringing new  gas  supplies  on  stream which 
are  not  already contracted or committed to  BG.  This  is probably at 
least  2-3  years,  even  in the  UK  Southern Basin,  reflecting the  time 
required for project planning and design,  construction,  Government 
approval  procedures  and negotiations  for  transportation and sale; 
(b)  the  downturn  in oil prices  from  late 1985  onwards,  which  eroded 
potential profit margins  on direct gas  sales  to  industrial consumers 
via common  carrier; 
(c)  the  imprecision of the  1982  Act's provisions  on carriage charges, 
which made  it difficult for  producers  and  end-consumers  to assess  the 
potential gains  from  common  carriage  and  reinforced a  certain 
reluctance  to put at risk their relationship with  BG; 
(d)  fear  that BG  might be  able  to discriminate  in its gas  purchasing 
policy against producers who  tried to sell direct to consumers via 
common  carriage; 
(e)  BG's  ability to  "out-bid"  large  consumers  in gas  purchase 
negotiations,  as  occurred when  ICI  sought  to buy  gas  from  the 
Hamilton-operated Esmond,  Forbes  and Gordon  fields  in 1982-83;  and 
(f)  the ability of  BG  to  conclude back-to-hack purchase  and sale 
agreements  in substitution for  gas  carriage,  as with  the  1986 
agreements  for  supplying some  of Shell/Esso's  Fulmar  gas  to  their 
Mossmorran ethylene plant. 
4.10  The  1986  Gas  Act  (Sections  19-22)  gives  the  Director General  of Gas 
Supply  three sets of powers  in relation to  common  carriage.  These  powers 
are  exercisable  in response  to applications  to him  from  third parties 
seeking  common  carriage  in the  BG  system and entitle the  Directors  to: 
(a)  specify the  terms  on which  gas  should be  carried; 
(b)  require  BG  to build additional capacity  into new  high-pressure 
pipelines  to  provide  for  common  carriage;  and 
(c)  require modifications  to existing high-pressure pipelines  (junctions 
or  increased compression,  for  example)  in order  to  provide capacity 
for  common  carriage. 
In considering applications relating to  common  carriage,  the  Director is 
required to satisfy himself that this would not prejudice  the 
Sl transportation of gas  required by  BG  to  meet  its own  statutory or 
contractual supply obligations or,  indeed,  any  common  carriage  arrangements 
which  have  already been put in place.  As  regards  the  terms  of payment  for 
providing transportation,  the  1986  Act  is more  specific  than the  1982 
legislation but may  still be  open  to different interpretations.  Section 
19,  sub-section  (5),  contains  the  key provisions  of the  Act  in this respect 
and refers  to charges based on  the  "appropriate proportion"  of pipeline 
system costs,  plus  the  return which  BG  is earning on  the capital value  of 
its system. 
4.11  The  Director General  of Gas  Supply,  James  McKinnon,  is taking his 
duty to enable  contract market  competition very seriously and has  gone  out 
of his way  to  encourage  third party use  of  the  BG  system.  Late  in 
September  1988,  the first application was  made  to him  for directions  in 
relation to carriage  through  the  BG  pipeline  system and  the  Director has 
decided to  give  directions  rather  than instruct the parties to  resume 
negotiations.  These  first directions will clearly be crucial for  the 
future  of common  carriage  in the  UK.  In the  meantime,  several other common 
carriage negotiations with  BG  are under way,  but there  is still no  actual 
third party use  of BG's  system.  Although  the  legislative  framework  is more 
conducive  to  common  carriage now  that it was  under  the  1982  Act,  the 
depressed level of oil prices is still a  factor hindering  the  development 
of competition to  BG  from  other gas  suppliers.  Especially in the 
interruptible market,  BG  has  had  to  reduce  its own  selling prices  to 
compete with oil and  the potential gains  from  a  direct supply are  often 
insufficient to make  it worth producers  and  consumers  putting at risk their 
existing relationships with  BG. 
4.12  During passage of the  Gas  Bill,  in June  1986,  BG  gave  to  Parliament a 
"Residual  Purchase Assurance"  which was  announced  on  their behalf by  a 
member  of the  House  of Lords.  This  was  a  statement  to  the effect that it 
would not discriminate against UKCS  gas  producers  who  offered to sell to  BG 
gas  that was  surplus  to  the  requirements  of other customers  supplied 
directly via common  carriage.  BG  undertook  to consider any  such offers of 
gas  on their merits.  The  force  of the  Assurance  remains  unclear and it has 
not dispelled concern among  UKCS  producers  that direct sales would 
prejudice  the  development  of other  gas  reserves  for  sale  to  BG.  As  part of its recommendations,  the  MMC  report also proposed  that  BG  should henceforth 
be  able  to contract for at most  90%  of a  gas  field's  reserves.  Only if the 
producers  were  unable  to  find a  buyer for  the  remaining  10%  within a  period 
of  2  years  could BG  then  take  up  the  remaining portion of the  field.  The 
aim  of this  recommendation  is clearly to open  the  way  for  direct sales and 
overcome  the  problem that industrial gas  buyers  could probably not 
"underwrite"  an entire field with  take-or-pay commitments. 
4.13  Under  Condition 9  of its Authorisation,  BG  was  required to prepare 
and have  available  on  request  a  statement setting out guidance  for persons 
wishing  to have  gas  conveyed  through  its system.  BG's  statement  (dated 
November  1986)  indicates  that carriage charges  would reflect the  input 
point and destination of the  gas  conveyed  (and  thus  the  elements  - national 
transmission,  regiional  transmission or distribution grid  - of its pipeline 
system which are used),  the  load factor of the  supply,  the volume  carried 
and  the  duration of the  carriage agreement.  Two  examples  are given of 
carriage charges,  at 3.5  and 4.0p/therm  (around  ECU  0.02/m3),  but these 
reflect only  the  use  of the  transmission system,  and not  the distribution 
grid.  For  customers  on  the distribution system the carriage charge  could 
be  considerably higher  than this  -perhaps another  7.5  p/therm  (ECU 
0.04/m3)  according to  the  recent  MMC  report.  The  Director General  of Gas 
Supply has  been careful  to  say that he has  not endorsed BG's  method nor its 
suggested charges  and it would be  open  to him  to set lower charges  in 
response  to  the application which has  been made  to him. 
4.14  A BG  customer can be  fairly confident of his  supply security,  because 
of the  diversity of gas  supply sources  available  to  the  company,  whereas  a 
direct supply  from  a  single field might well be  less reliable.  This  raises 
the  question of back-up  supplies  from  BG  in the  event that  the direct gas 
supply  to  a  consumer  were  interrupted due,  for  example,  to production 
problems  offshore.  In this respect  the  1986  legislation represents  an 
advance  on  the  1982  Oil & Gas  (Enterprise)  Act.  The  BG  Authorisation 
(condition 10)  required  BG  to prepare  and have  available on request  a 
statement for  guidance  on  the  supply of back-up  gas  to  third parties.  BG's 
statement,  dated November  1986,  is rather vague but envisages  an initial 
payment  for  the  right to back-up  gas,  a  standing charge  and  a  commodity 
charge  for  any back-up  gas  provided.  As  with  the  general  statement on conveyance  of gas  for  others,  this has  not been endorsed by  the  Director 
General  of Gas  Supply  and no  agreement  for back-up  gas  has  yet been 
concluded. 
Import/Export  Regime 
4.15  In 1985,  while  British Gas  was  a  nationalised industry,  the  UK 
Government  decided not  to  endorse  a  draft contract negotiated by  the 
Corporation for  the  purchase of gas  from  the  Norwegian Sleipner field. 
Subsequently,  the  Secretary of State  for  Energy  announced  on  6  March  1986 
that  BG  would  in future  be  able  to  import  gas,  subject to  the  normal 
requirement  for  consent under  the  Petroleum and  Submarine  Pipelines Act 
1975  for  the  laying of pipelines across  the  UKCS  and,  in the  appropriate 
cases,  the  conclusion of inter-governmental  treaties.  In turn,  BG  gave  an 
assurance  to  the  Secretary of State that it would consult the  Government 
about its import plans  as  these  develop.  Under  the  terms  of UKCS 
production licences,  all oil and  gas  from  the  UKCS  has  to be  landed in the 
UK  unless  the  Secretary of State consents  to  landing elsewhere.  On  6  March 
1986  the  Secretary of State also  announced that the  Government  was  prepared 
to  consider applications  for waivers  of this  "landing requirement"  for  gas 
on  a  case-by-case basis.  In doing  this it would  take  into account 
considerations relating to  the  security of the  UK's  gas  supplies without 
any  presumption that exports  should not  take place. 
4.16  Earlier this year,  the  Government  appears  to have  raised no  objection 
to  BG's  agreement with Algeria's  Sonatrach  for  limited peak-shaving 
supplies  of  LNG  over  the  next  few  winters.  The  relatively small  scale of 
the  deal,  its contribution to  the  security of peak gas  supplies  and  the 
fact  that  these  imports present no  real threat  to  the  continued development 
of UKCS  reserves  were  probably all factors  in the  relatively trouble-free 
passage  obtained by  BG  for  its proposals. 
Other Member  States 
4.17  In view of the detail of legislative,  regulatory and administrative 
situations already gathered by  DG  XVII  itself and by  other consultants  on 
its behalf,  our  assessment of  the position in other Member  States set out below is a  summary  of the  key  features  of relevance  to  the question of gas 
common  carriage  and  a  more  open  internal market  in natural gas. 
Belgium 
4.18  The  main legislative obstacle  to  the  free  movement  of natural  gas  in 
Belgium is the exclusive concession for  storage  and  transport by pipeline 
of natural  gas  given  to Distrigaz by  a  law of 1983.  As  Distrigaz is sole 
concessionaire,  it is effectively the  only organisation with a  right to 
physically  import  or export gas.  In turn,  the  Control  Committee  for  the 
gas  and electricity industries,  which  involves  Government,  trades union and 
industry federation representatives  as well  as  gas  and electricity 
executives,  has  a  broad mandate  of control over  the  gas  industry.  It 
effectively acts  as  a  watchdog body  in relation to tariffs,  gas  supply, 
technical  and financial matters,  gas  transportation,  imports  and exports. 
Moreover,  the  responsible Government  Minister has  a  right to  oppose  any 
Distrigaz management  decision which he  considers contrary to  the  law,  the 
relevant statutes or  the  public  interest.  From  a  strictly legal viewpoint, 
it is unclear whether  there  is any  impediment  to Distrigaz carrying gas 
within its own  pipeline system on behalf of a  third party.  In practice, 
however,  the  Belgian Government  and other Control  Committee  members  appear 
to retain considerable  influence  over  the way  in which  gas  transportation 
and  supply develops. 
4.19  Gas  distributors  in Relgium are  granted concessions  to distribute by 
local authorities  and are subject to  local authority regulations  on network 
development,  as well  as  the  statutes of local authority associations 
relating to  technical  and commercial  conditions  for  gas  distribution.  The 
legal obligation on Distrigaz  and  the distributors  to  supply gas  to 
consumers  exists only  in so  far as  it is technically and economically 
feasible  to  do  so;  this contrasts with  an absolute  supply obligation for 
some  consumer categories  in some  other Member  States,  such as  the United 
Kingdom. France 
4.20  The  legal  framework  for  gas  transmission  in France  dates  from  a  law 
of 1946  nationalising  the  gas  and electricity industries.  As  amended,  the 
law  provides  that only  a  public undertaking,  or a  national  company  in which 
the State or public undertakings  have  a  majority holding,  may  transport gas 
to  a  distribution utility.  This  effectively limits  gas  transmission to 
organisations  like Gaz  de  France,  the  Elf/GdF joint venture  SNGSO  and  the 
Elf/GdF/Total  owned  CeFeM.  In practice,  SNGSO  operates like an Elf 
subsidiary and manages  its own  transmission grid;  the  CeFeM  grid is 
actually operated on its behalf by  GdF.  The  1946  law also  gives  GdF  an 
absolute  monopoly  over  the  import  and export of gas.  Thus  Norwegian  gas 
produced by Elf Norge  and destined for  use  by  CeFeM  has  to pass  into GdF 
ownership  immediately prior to  the  French border,  following which title 
returns  to  Elf.  For  this  service,  Elf pays  a  fee  of  l%  direct to  GdF  and a 
further  1%  into a  GdF  employee benefits  fund.  Moreover,  all agreements, 
including  those  relating to  imports,  exports  or gas  in transit,  have  to be 
submitted for  approval  to  the  Government Minister responsible  for  gas.  The 
GdF  import monopoly  did not,  however,  prevent  ElF  from  seeking  (ultimately 
without  success)  to  import Norwegian  gas  from  the  Sleipner/Troll fields  for 
resale by  CeFeM.  Eventually,  GdF  signed the  purchase  contract but agreed 
to  supply  a  proportion of  the  imported  gas  to  CeFeM.  There  is no  common 
carriage obligation in France,  but GdF  transports  imported gas  to  CeFeM 
under voluntary agreements  and appears  likely to  transport Norwegian  gas 
across  France  on behalf of Spain's  ENAGAS  in the  1990s  and beyond. 
4.21  Public service concessions  for  gas  distribution are  granted for  local 
distribution.  Such  concessions  grant  a  local monopoly,  in return for which 
the  distributor accepts  a  supply obligation up  to 47  kWh/hour  or 1500 
hours/a of supplies  (equivalent  to  some  7,000  m 3;a or several  times  average 
annual household consumption)  in respect of existing customers.  New  small 
customers  only have  to be  supplied if it is economic  to  do  so  and  there 
appears  to be  no  legal  (as  opposed  to  contractual)  obligation to  supply 
large  industrial users.  In fact,  GdF  itself has  progressively absorbed 
almost all the  local concessions,  apart  from  around  20  local authority and 
mixed  enterprise distribution companies  which between  them  account  for  only 
2~% of French  gas  consumption.  GdF  is also responsible  for  almost all the c 
gas  distribution within the  areas  of south-west and central France  where 
SNGSO  and  CeFeM  respectively handle  gas  transmission and direct sales  to 
large consumers.  There  are provisions  in the  statutes of GdF  and in the 
local regulations  affecting distribution which  prohibit discrimination in 
pricing and  supply as  between customers  in comparable  circumstances. 
4.22  The  two  major  gas-producing provinces  in Italy are  the  Po  Valley and 
the Adriatic  Sea area of the  Italian continental shelf,  of which  the latter 
is  growing  in importance  over  time.  In the  Po  Valley area,  the state 
energy  company  ENI  (of which  AGIP  and  SNAM  are both subsidiaries)  has  an 
absolute monopoly  of gas  exploration and production.  ENI  also has  the sole 
legal right  to  the  construction and  operation of pipelines for  the 
transport of natural  gas  in the  Po  Valley area.  This  is a  long-standing 
law  from  the  1950s;  it originally related to  gas  produced in the  Po  Valley 
and it is legally unclear whether  this exclusive right also covers  the 
transportation of other gas  through  the  area.  Offshore,  the legal position 
is somewhat  different.  ENI  does  not have  a  monopoly  of gas  production but 
has  full rights  in respect of new  exploration acreage  over a  limited 
initial period.  In practice,  AGIP  accounts  for  the vast majority of 
offshore  gas  production,  although Montedison,  Petrofina,  Elf,  Total, 
Deutsche  Shell and others also hold offshore licences.  ENI  also has  a 
legal right of first refusal  over  domestic  gas  production and almost all 
the  output  is  in fact sold to its subsidiary  SNAM.  Thus  most  of Italy's 
gas  production is sold from  one  ENI  subsidiary to another  and  somewhat 
unusual  contractual provisions  are understood  to  apply.  Because  of its 
considerable  onshore  storage,  SNAM  is contractually obliged to  take all 
AGIP's  production on  a  daily basis,  regardless  of quantity,  which provides 
for considerable flexibility in offshore  operations.  Payments  made  by  SNAM 
for  this  gas  are  thus  an  internal  ENI  transfer price  and have  recently been 
reported as  around  80%  of international border price levels.  In practice, 
SNAM  has  not  insisted that all indigenous  gas  be  sold to it and  some 
independent producers  sell their gas  direct into  the market.  This  is 
particularly true of a  Montedison/Elf/Petrofina joint venture  who  own  their 
own  small,  indpendent  transmission grid.  There  are,  in fact,  three ways  in 
which direct sales are made:-(a)  deliveries  from  the  independents  into  their own  grid; 
(b)  sale  to  SNAM  and  re-purchase  for  deliveries  from  independent  fields 
remote  from  the  independent grid through  the  SNAM  system  to  the 
Montedison/Elf/Petrofina grid;  and 
(c)  deliveries  on  a  tariffed basis  through  the  SNAM  system  from 
independents'  fields  to their own  sites  (e.g.  Montedison chemical 
plants)  located on  the  SNAM  grid. 
The  volumes  supplied in this way  are,  however,  relatively small  and  some 
independent producers  (such as  Deutsche  Shell)  appear not  to have  been 
interested in selling their gas  other  than  to  SNAM. 
4.23  ENI  does  not have  a  legal monopoly  of gas  transmission outside  the  Po 
Valley area but has  a  virtual de  facto  monopoly.  As  mentioned  above,  there 
is a  small,  independent gas  grid in the east central part of the  country  to 
which  SNAM  supplies  "top up"  gas  if the grid is in gas  deficit and  from 
which  SNAM  buys  gas  when  it is in surplus.  This  is of minor  importance  and 
SNAM  accounts  for  some  97%  of all gas  supplied to Italian consumers.  SNAM 
does  not have  a  statutory  import  monopoly  either,  though again it is the 
sole  gas  importer  in practice.  As  far as  exports  are  concerned,  the 
national market  is given priority over  indigenous  gas  production,  which  may 
not be  exported without special Government  authorisation or without first 
being offered to  ENI.  In  two  Italian regions  (Trentino-Alto Adige  and 
Sicily),  the  regional  law provides  for  a  limited right to  third party 
transportation where  the  owner  of gas  deposits  does  not  take  up  the  gas 
pipeline concession but nevertheless  requires  gas  transportation.  In this 
case  the pipeline  owner  would be  obliged to  carry the  gas,  within the 
constraints of available capacity,  at a  rate agreed between the parties or 
otherwise  fixed by  the municipal  "Assessore"  for  Industry and Trade. 
Neither  region has  any  gas  reserves  and  these provisions have  not actually 
been used;  the  precedent is therefore  interesting but of no  practical 
significance.  There  is at present no  general obligation to transport gas 
for  third parties. 
4.24  SNAM  itself supplies  around  55%  of Italy's gas  sales direct to  around 
3,000  large  industrial customers,  while  the other  45%  is sold on  to nearly 
2,000  local distribution companies  for  on-sale  to  small  customers.  These 
are  governed by national legislation  (eg on  safety matters)  and by  the terms  of their local  concessions.  There  appears  to be  no  statutory supply 
obligation in Italy,  though  in practice gas  suppliers would  regard it as  a 
duty  to maintain supplies  to  existing customers. 
Netherlands 
4.25  Under  the  terms  of the  Groningen concession granted to  NAM  (a 
Shell/Esso joint venture),  the latter is obliged to sell all the  gas 
produced  to Gasunie.  This  is of great practical  importance  since over half 
of all gas  supplied in the  Netherlands  is still derived from  the  Groningen 
field,  which  accounts  for  an even higher proportion of remaining Dutch  gas 
reserves.  More  generally,  it is understood that all indigenous  gas 
production destined for  the  national market has  to be  offered to Gasunie. 
Gasunie  also has  a  "first offer"  right over non·Groningen gas  to be  sold 
for  export,  in that gas  must be  sold to it if it can match  the best offer 
made  by  any  foreign buyer.  In practice,  Gasunie  b~ys all Dutch gas  on 
offer regardless  of its source  and  accommodates  new  fields by  reducing 
output  from  Groningen.  This  then gives  Gasunie  an effective monopoly  over 
gas  exports  from  the Netherlands.  There  is no  statutory Gasunie  monopoly 
over  imports,  transmission or exports  and  in principle  imports  by other 
companies  are  permitted.  This  has  been illustrated recently by the 
proposed importation of some  2  bcmja of Norwegian gas by electricity 
association SEP,  an arrangement which would effectively by-pass Gasunie if 
approved by  the  Dutch  Government.  Since  the power plants which would use 
this gas  are  to  be  sited very near  to  the  Emden  landing point for  Norwegian 
gas,  it is perhaps unlikely that this  arrangement will necessitate common 
carriage  through  the Gasunie  system.  The  Dutch Government  is heavily 
involved in key  gas  industry decisions  and  the Minister of Economic  Affairs 
has  the  legal power  to  approve both buying and selling prices  for  gas 
within the Netherlands.  Although Gasunie  has  no  legal monopoly  of sales 
within the  Netherlands,  its "evergreen"  rolling 15  year sales contract with 
VEGIN  obliges  the  local  gas  distributors  to purchase  their entire 
requirements  from  Gasunie. -~~ ----- -- ~ ----
West  Germany 
4.26  The  legal  framework  for natural gas  supply in West  Germany  is rather 
less restrictive  than in most  other Member  States.  There  are  no  legal 
restrictions on  the  right  to  transport gas,  although  in practice Ruhrgas  in 
particular has  a  very strong position as  owner  or co-owner of most  major 
transmission lines.  The  established transmission companies  have  also 
divided  the  country between  them  through  a  series of long-term  (20  year) 
bilateral "demarcation agreements"  (Demarkationsvertraege).  These 
bilateral agreements  cannot preclude  competition from  a  third party,  but in 
practice distribution utilities and  large  consumers  have little real choice 
of  gas  supplier.  Under  the  1957  law against limitations  to  competition 
(Gesetz  Gegen  Wettbewerbsbeschraenkungen,  or GWB),  as  last amended  in 1980, 
those  demaraction contracts concluded before  1980  and expressed  to  run for 
more  than  20  years will automatically be  terminated on 1st January  1995. 
There  is no  legal  import monopoly  and  indeed electricity utilities EWE,  RWE 
and  VEW  all have  long-standing gas  import contracts with Gasunie,  in 
addition to  imports  made  by  gas utilities such  as  Ruhrgas,  Thyssengas  and 
BEB.  Government  approval  is required for  gas  import contracts of over  2 
years  in duration,  although  in practice this appears  to be  something of a 
formality.  In practice,  however,  it is difficult for  new  entrants  to break 
into  the  gas  market  since  they do  not have  a  demarcated supply area;  this 
was  illustrated by  the  experience  of BP  subsidiary Gelsenberg,  which was 
ultimately forced  to sell the  Norwegian  (Statfjord)  gas  it had bought  to 
Ruhrgas.  Under  the  GWB  (Article  103),  the possibility of third party 
transportation is envisaged but  there  is no  legal obligation to carry gas 
for  third parties.  Currently,  Article  103  explicitly states  that a  system 
owner  is entitled to refuse  transportation  (of gas  or electricity)  for  a 
competitor.  The  West  German  Government  now  proposes  to  remove  this 
provision;  this would  appear  to  make  a  refusal  to carry subject  to  testing 
in the courts,  but  there would still be  no  obligation to  transport and it 
is not clear that the practical  impact  of this  change will be very great. 
4.27  Distribution companies  in West  Germany  are  granted long  term  (20 
year)  local monopoly  "concession contracts"  (Konzessionsvertraege)  by  the 
municipality and  in many  cases  they  are  actually part of the  local authority public  service  arm  ("Stadtwerke").  In practice,  these concession 
contracts  do  not  appear  to  be  coterminus  (except by coincidence)  with  the 
long  term gas  purchase  agreements  concluded between distributors and their 
transmission company  suppliers.  Nor  are  they coterminus with the 
transmission companies'  demarcation contracts  and  the  Government  is now 
proposing  (as  an  amendment  to  the  GWB)  that transmission companies  should 
not be  bound by any  demarcation contract in respect of a  distribution 
company  whose  existing purchase contract is ending  and who  might wish to 
change  suppliers.  There  is a  general obligation on  gas utilities in West 
Germany  to  supply customers,  regardless  of size and  location,  unless it 
would be  unreasonable  on economic  grounds  to do  so. 
Others 
4.28  There  are also legislative constraints  on  the  development of a  more 
open  internal gas  market  in the  smaller gas-consuming Member  States.  In 
Denmark,  Dansk Naturgas  (Dangas)  has  the  sole right to  import,  trade  in, 
transport and store natural gas,  under  a  law of 1972.  Spain appears  to 
have  no  legal monopoly  as  such,  although national Government  controls  the 
concessions  for  gas  trunklines  and regional administrations are required to 
authorise  local pipelines.  BGE  does  not appear  to have  an exclusive  legal 
right to  transport gas  in the Republic  of Ireland,  though  in practice it is 
the  sole  transmission company.  Government  consent would be  required for 
any  gas  exports,  though  for  the  time being  the possibility of sales  to 
Northern Ireland appears  to have  receded.  The  legal position in Luxembourg 
is unclear but  SOTEG  is in practice  the  sole  gas  importer.  Even  when  there 
is no  statutory monopoly  over  gas  transmission,  therefore,  there are  de 
facto  monopolies  which  appear  to have  the  tacit approval  of the national 
Governments  concerned. 
Tbe  European  Community 
4.29  As  the  European  Commission has  emphasised  in its working  document 
COM(88)  238,  internal trade  in natural  gas  is subject to  the  general 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome.  The  working  document  also suggests  that 
the  Commission  now  recognises  the  need  to  apply  these  provisions more 
rigorously to  the  energy sector.  This  sub-section therefore  looks  at the powers  which  the  Community  has  under  the Treaty of Rome  which  could be  used 
to  implement  a  common  carriage  system in the  gas  sector.  These  are:-
(a)  free  movement  of goods  (Articles  30-37); 
(b)  competition  (Articles  85,86  and  90); 
(c)  state aids  (Articles  92-94); 
(d)  derogation  from  common  carriage  (Articles 8(a)  & (c),  Article 130(a) 
& (c));  and 
(e)  procedures  for  resolving disputes  and complaints. 
4.30  In the  terms  of competition policy within the  Community,  the  gas 
sector has  not as yet come  under  the  scrutiny of the  Commission.  The  rules 
regarding free  movement  of goods  and  competition have  not yet been applied 
to  this  industry,  so  there  is little in the  way  of a  developed 
jurisprudence of Commission  and Court of Justice decisions.  This 
sub-section therefore  looks at precedents  and  Community  action in other 
sectors which may  lay down  generally applicable principles which may  be 
relevant by  analogy  to  gas  common  carriage.  It addresses  issues  such as 
supply security and its relevance  to  free  movement  of goods;  how  the 
existing competition rules  may  be  used  to  open up  markets  and  force  access 
to  common  carriage;  questions  of pricing;  the position of state 
monopolies;  whether  there may  be  exemption  from  common  carriage for  the 
less developed  regions  and state aids.  It also describes  the  procedures 
which  may  be  used to  resolve disputes  and complaints. 
Free  Movement  of Goods 
4.31  As  a  product which  is not specifically exempted  from  the  scope  of the 
EEC  Treaty,  gas  is subject to  the  rules  on free  movement  of goods  (under 
Articles  30-36),  as well  as  on  free  circulation throughout  the  Community 
(under Article 10(1)).  The  Commission working  document  COM(88)  238  on  the 
Internal  Energy Market  emphasises  that  these  rules  should be  enforced in 
the  gas  sector and also lists those  measures  which  may  be  considered as  an 
infringement of the  free  movement  rules.  Those  measures  which are of most 
relevance  to  the  gas  industry are:-(a)  rules which  require mutuality for  imports  or exports; 
(b)  restrictions on  the use  of national utilities; 
(c)  pressure  to  purchase  from  national  suppliers; 
(d)  certain price controls;  and 
(e)  regulations which  lay down  technical  requirements  for  a  product. 
4.32  Whether  or not supply security in the  gas  sector would justify 
quantitative restrictions under Article  36  has  not been directly tested. 
There  is however  a  precedent  in the oil sector in the  Campus  Oil case  (case 
72/83  (1984)  ECR  272).  The  Court  of Justice upheld,  under Article  36,  the 
right of a  Member  State  (Ireland)  to maintain in force  legislation which 
required importers  to purchase  a  certain amount  of their requirements  of 
petroleum products  from  a  nationally based refinery on  the  grounds  of 
public security even  though  such  a  measure had the effect of a  quantitative 
restriction.  The  judgment sets a  precedent for  the  recognition of public 
security in the  energy sector.  This  might have  implications  for  the  gas 
industry if,  for  example,  a  national  gas utility were  alleged to be  giving 
protection to  indigenous  gas  production by obliging users  to purchase  a 
certain amount  of that production even where  imported gas  is available at 
cheaper prices. 
4.33  Monopolies,  both state owned  and private,  are  common  in the  gas 
sector  throughout  the  Community.  State monopolies  are  subject to  the 
provisions of Article  37  of the  EEC  Treaty,  whose  primary purpose  is to 
prevent discrimination regarding  the  conditions under which  goods  are 
procured and marketed between nationals  of Member  States.  According  to  the 
circumstances,  they may  also be  subject to  the  Rules  on Competition 
(described in paragraphs  4.35 et seq below),  by virtue of Article 90. 
Private monopolies  are  in any  event subject to  the  general competition 
rules of the  Treaty.  Article  37  has  so  far been used  in the  energy sector 
mainly  in relation to state oil monopolies  in the  new  Member  States.  The 
Commission has  pursued a  policy of endeavouring  to ensure  that the new 
Member  States  take action to  gradually dismantle  their state monopolies  in 
accordance with  the  provisions  of the  relevant Accession Treaties before 
the  end of the  transitional periods.  It has  forced  the  Spanish Government, 
for  example,  to  introduce liberalising measures  opening up  the  Campsa  oil 
monopoly. 4.34  In future,  however,  the  Co~nission could perhaps  make  use  of its 
powers  under  the  EEC  Treaty  in attacking exclusive  rights  of  the  state 
owned  gas  companies  to  import,  export,  transport or distribute natural  gas. 
Rules  on  Competition 
4.35  How  far  the Rules  on Competition contained in Articles  85-94  of the 
Treaty apply within  the  gas  sector depends  on whether  the  undertakings 
concerned with  the  supply of gas  are  involved in a  cartel  (in which  case 
Article  85  may  apply);  are  in a  dominant  position,  which  they  abuse  (in 
which  case Article  86  will apply);  are public undertakings  (in which  case 
Article  90  will  apply  and may  mean  that Articles  85  and  86  also apply);  or 
receive  State Aids  (covered by Articles  92-94).  (State Aids  are  discussed 
in paragraphs  4.46 et seq below).  Working  document  COM(88)  238  confirms 
the  Commission's  intention to  treat Articles  85  and  86  and Regulation 17/62 
as  applying  to  the  gas  sector.  The  document  recalls  the  judgement of the 
Court  of Justice  in Case  45/85  to  the effect that the Rules  on  Competition 
apply  to all sectors of economic  activity which  are  not  expressly exempted 
and  that Article  85(3)  allows  the  characteristics of  the  sector to be  taken 
into account without it being necessary  to  resort to  a  regulation under 
Article  87(2)C. 
4.36  The  fact  that gas  undertakings  may  be public undertakings,  or 
undertakings  to which  exclusive or special rights are  granted,  does  not 
necessarily remove  them  from  the  scope  of the  Rules  on Competition:  the 
test is whether  the  application of  the  Rules  on  Competition would  obstruct 
the  performance,  in  law or in fact,  of the particular tasks  assigned  to  the 
undertakings  (Article 90(2)). 
4.37  Where  gas  undertakings  (whether  they are  State monopolies  or not) 
fall within the  scope  of Article  90,  the Rules  on  Competition can be 
enforced by means  of a  Commission  Decision or Directive:  the  Commission  can 
act without having recourse  to  the  Council  (Article  90(3)). 
4.38  The  Commission has  used Article  90(3)  in the  Telecommunications 
sector when  it adopted  the  directive  on  the  liberalisation of the market 
for  Telecommunications  Terminal  Equipment  in order  to  force  Member  States 
to  open  up  their markets  to  free  competition and  to  dismantle  the  exclusive 
rights of the  State monopolies.  France  has  challenged  the  Commission's 
action before  the  Court  of Justice.  If the  Court  rules  in the  Commission's 
favour it will reinforce  the  Commission's  power  in this  area. 
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4.39  The  exception referred to  in paragraph 4.36  above  may  apply  to  gas 
undertakings  if,  in the provision of services,  they  are  under  a  statutory 
duty  to  carry out  such  tasks  as  the  maintenance  of secure  supplies. 
4.40  In the  Sacchi  Case  (155/73  (1974)  ECR),  the  Court  of Justice 
interpreted this  exception strictly in holding  that,  in order  to qualify, 
undertakings  must  show  that  the  application of the  competition rules would 
be  incompatible with  the  performance  of their tasks.  This  may  have 
implications  for  access  to  the pipeline by  third parties. 
4.41  If a  gas utility refuses  to  transport third party gas,  it may  be  in 
breach of Article  86.  There  is no  legally binding precedent for  saying 
that refusal  to grant access  is an abuse  of a  dominant position.  DG  IV 
did,  however,  issue  an  informal decision regarding  the refusal  to  allow 
Texaco  access  to  a  kerosene distribution facility  at Charles  de  Gaulle 
Airport  in 1986  on  the basis of a  comfort letter,  a  procedure which  does 
not create  a  legally binding precedent  (see below).  There have not been 
many  complaints  to  DG  IV  on refusal  to provide  access.  In the  gas  sector 
there has  been only  one  complaint.  This  concerned Ruhrgas'  refusal  to 
allow Bayerngas  to  transport gas  through  its system which  Bayerngas 
proposed  to purchase  in Algeria.  Following price concessions  from  Ruhrgas, 
Bayerngas  subsequently dropped its interest in gas  transportation. 
Notwithstanding the  resolution of  the  dispute between the parties,  it is 
procedurally possible  for  the  Commission  to continue with its substantive 
case  in order  to set a  precedent. 
4.42  If a  public  gas  pipeline  owner  were  considered to  be  in breach of 
Article  86,  the  Commission  could address  a  decision to it under Article 
90(3)  unless  the  Member  State  in question could prove  that the  case falls 
under  the  exception in Article  90(2).  If the  exception in Article  90(2)  is 
invoked,  it has  to  be  proved that all requirements  are met.  It is unlikely 
that  the  transmission of third party gas  would be  an obstruction of the 
particular tasks  assigned to  the  public  gas utility under Article 90(2),  so 
it is likely that Article  86  would be  applicable. 
4.43  If it appeared necessary  to  the  Commission  and Council  to  apply  the 
Rules  on Competition in a  particular way  to  the  gas  sector,  powers  exist 
under Article  87(2)(c)  of the  EEC  Treaty to define  the  scope  of the Rules 
on Competition in that particular branch of  the  economy.  Regulations  or Directives having  this Article  as  their legal basis  may  be  adopted by  the 
Council,  acting by  qualified majority  on  a  proposal  from  the  Commission  and 
after consulting the  European Parliament.  The  use  of this  power  is 
without prejudice  to  any  other powers  which  the  Commission and Council  may 
have  under,  for  example,  Articles  100,  lOOA,  101  or  235  of  the  EEC  Treaty. 
4.44  Under  the Rules  on  Competition,  there  are certain precise provisions 
governing pricing,  in particular  the  direct or indirect fixing of purchase 
or selling prices by cartels and  the  direct or indirect  imposition by 
undertakings  enjoying  a  dominant  position of unfair purchase  or selling 
prices.  Also,  case  law  suggests  that predatory pricing can fall under 
Article 86.  In the  Akzo  Case  of 1985  (Fifteenth Competition Report  as 
point 82),  the  Commission held that action taken by  Akzo  Chemie  in lowering 
prices  in order  to  force  a  smaller  competitor out of the market,  was  an 
infringement of Article  86.  More  generally,  however,  predatory pricing may 
be  difficult to prove. 
4.45  There  is no  cost-based rule setting out at what  stage price 
undercutting becomes  an  abuse.  Below-cost pricing may  be  judged in some 
circumstances  to be  an abuse  and equally a  dominant  firm  may  not even have 
to sell below cost  in order  to  force  competitors  from  the market.  The  test 
is whether  the price cutting constitutes unreasonable  or unfair behaviour 
intended  to  eliminate or damage  the  particular competitor  (Fifteenth 
Competition Report point 82). 
State Aids 
4.46  The  working  document  emphasises  the  importance  of enforcing the  State 
Aid  rules under Articles  92-94  in order  to eliminate distortions of 
competition in the  energy sector.  The  Commission  intends  to  examine  three 
categories of aid in the  energy sector,  including the  use  of energy tariffs 
as  a  means  of giving aid to  energy  consumers,  particularly in those  sectors 
where  energy costs  are  an  important  factor.  There  are,  however,  no  cases 
where  the  Commission has  had to  apply  the  State aids  rules  to direct aid to 
the  gas  sector. • 
4.47  With  regard  to  the  use  of energy  tariffs as  a  means  of subsidising 
energy  consumers,  there have  been  a  number  of decisions  taken by  the 
Commission,  of which  one  is of particular interest to natural gas.  In 
February  1988  the  Court of Justice ruled in joined cases  67,  68  and  70/85 
Kooy,  Vliet,  Landbouwschap  and  the  Kingdom  of the  Netherlands  V Commission 
(not yet reported),  concerning preferential gas  prices charged to  domestic 
glasshouse horticulturists,  that revenue  which  is  forgone  by  the State 
through preferential treatment  amounts  to  an aid. 
4.48  The  Commission has  drawn  up  an  inventory on State aid in the context 
of Internal Market White  Paper.  The  information which it has  gathered on 
aids  existing in the  energy sector will assist it in its assessment. 
Temporary Derogation  from  Common  Carriage 
4.49  If the  Commission  decides  to proceed with  gas  common  carriage but 
considers  a  temporary  derogation appropriate  for  "new"  gas  industries  in 
Member  States  such as  Spain,  Portugal  and Greece  (see  section VI),  then it 
would have  a  legal basis  for  doing  so  under Article  8c.  Article 130a and b 
may  also provide  a  basis  for  giving a  derogation from  the  common  carriage 
system. 
Procedures 
4.50  An  important related issued for  the  Commission  is  the  extent  to which 
existing procedures  are  adequate  to  "police"  a  common  carriage  system, 
particularly as  regards  the  length of time  required for  a  decision.  In 
general,  the  remedies  available  in this area seem  rather  inadequate  from 
the point of view of normal business  practice,  primarily because  of the 
limited action available  to  aggrieved parties  and because  of the  length of 
time  which  available procedures  take.  We  consider  in turn the  procedures 
relating to  the  free  movement  of goods  and  to  competition matters. 
4.51  Matters  concerning free  movement  of goods  may  in many  cases be dealt 
with directly in the national courts,  which  may  refer questions of 
interpretation to  the  Court  of Justice under Article  177  of the  EEC  Treaty. Action may  also be  taken by  the  Commission,  first by way  of reasoned 
opinion and  secondly by  way  of reference  to  the  Court  of Justice under 
Article  169  of the  EEC  Treaty.  Article  177  references  themselves  may  take 
up  to  18  months  from  the  date of reference by  the national court until the 
preliminary ruling is delivered by  the  Court of Justice.  It must  also be 
taken into account  that it is only  the court of final  authority in a  Member 
State which  is under  a  duty  to refer  to  the  Court  of Justice.  Thus 
litigants may  have  to  appeal  cases  through  the national courts before  the 
point may  be  interpreted by  the  Court of Justice,  with all the  delays  which 
different Member  State judicial systems  may  involve.  Although  there  are  no 
specific provisions  for  sanctions  for  non-compliance with  the  rulings  of 
the  Court of Justice,  it may  be possible  to  enforce  the  ruling in the 
national courts.  Also,  although Article 169  proceedings  may  only be  taken 
by  the  Commission,  it is open  to  other parties to  lodge  a  complaint with 
the  Commission which  may  lead to  the  Commission  initiating proceedings. 
4.52  The  disadvantage  of the procedures  in competition matters  from  the 
point of view of business practice  is again the  length of time  which it 
takes  for  a  formal  decision to  issue  from  the  Commission  following  a 
complaint  (usually over  two  years).  While  the majority of competition 
cases dealt with by  the  Commission  are settled without  a  formal  decision, 
there may  be  a  problem  insofar as  third parties are  concerned.  Because 
informal  decisions  taken by  the  Commission are not legally enforceable  and 
as  such have  only persuasive authority in the national courts,  there  is a 
lack of legal certainty in such  cases. 
4.53  The  problem could perhaps  be  resolved by  the  Commission  dealing with 
complaints  referred to it in this  area  on a  formal  basis  in order  to build 
up  a  body of jurisprudence  and  then  introduce  a  block exemption regulation 
which  could perhaps  also apply  to  other energy or public service sectors. 
United States 
4.54  In Section III of the  report,  the very significant differences  in the 
US  gas  supply situation from  that prevailing in the  European  Community  were 
identified and  discussed.  The  legislative,  regulatory  and administrative 
framework  for natural  gas  industry activities  is also markedly dissimilar 
from  that prevailing in Western  Europe.  Federal  legislation such  as  the • 
1978  Natural  Gas  Policy Act  (NGPA)  has  been of considerable significance, 
while  both  the  regulatory authorities  and  the courts have  played a  much 
more  important role  in the United States  than their European counterparts. 
Regulators  control each level of the natural  gas  market,  although  the 
wellhead prices of  some  50%  of total  US  gas  production have  now  been 
deregulated.  There  is a  basic division of labour between  the  Federal 
Energy Regulatory  Commission  (FERC),  which  is responsible  for  regulating 
the wellhead prices of  "old"  gas  as  well  as  the  transportation and sale of 
gas  by interstate pipelines,  and  the various  State regulatory commissions 
which  regulate  intrastate pipeline trade  and local distribution companies. 
As  the  regulatory agency  responsible  for  interstate pipelines,  FERC  has 
played a  major  role  in the  emergence  of open access  gas  transportation. 
4.55  Federal  regulation of interstate pipelines  in the  US  dates  right back 
to  the  Natural Gas  Act  of 1938.  A Supreme  Court decision of 1954  then 
reinterpreted the Act  in such a  way  as  to extend Federal regulatory control 
to wellhead prices  for natural gas  sold into  the  interstate market.  At 
this  time,  gas  sold into the  intrastate pipeline system remained 
unregulated.  However,  regulated wellhead prices failed to keep  up  with the 
rising cost of developing new,  higher cost gas  reserves  and this 
contributed to  the  emergence  of gas  shortages  and curtailment of deliveries 
to  customers  through  the  interstate system by  the winter of 1976-77.  This 
situation,  together with forecasts  of future  gas  scarcity,  led to  the 
passage  of the  NGPA  and  the  Powerplant  and Industrial Fuel Use  Act  (FUA). 
The  NGA  extended wellhead price controls  to  "old"  gas  sold in the 
intrastate market,  whilst at the  same  time  allowing for  phased partial 
wellhead price decontrol of new  and high-cost gas  production.  This 
legislation - with  some  parallels to  the  1975  European Council directive on 
the  use  of natural  gas  in power  stations  - also restricted the use  of gas 
by  large  industrial users  and power utilities,  though  many  waivers  of  FUA 
restrictions were  subsequently given in the  changed market situation of the 
1980s. 
4.56  FERC  regulation of prices  for  sales  from  pipeline companies  to  local 
distributors has  operated on  a  historic average  cost basis,  allowing 
pipelines  to  add certain permissible costs  and  a  specified rate of return 
to  their average  system  supply cost of  gas  purchases.  This  system,  coupled 
with  the  very  low  regulated wellhead prices of  "old"  gas  and  the partial 
decontrol of other wellhead prices  introduced by  the  NGPA,  encouraged pipeline  companies  to  respond  to  perceived gas  shortages  by  paying 
above-market  prices  for  new  and high  cost gas  and  "rolling in"  these high 
prices  to  achieve  an  average  cost acceptable  to  their citygate  customers. 
Many  of the  contracts  made  between pipelines  and producers  over  the  period 
1978-82  included non-market-responsive  price  terms  (such  as  indexation with 
general price  inflation,  regardless  of alternative fuel prices).  This 
contributed very significantly towards  the  problems  which  emerged as  demand 
began  to  turn down  in the  early 1980s,  due  to  a  fall in oil prices, 
difficult economic  conditions  and accelerated energy conservation.  As 
explained in Appendix A,  many  pipelines actually shut-in low price  "old" 
gas  supplies  in order  to minimise  the  take-or-pay cost under  their gas 
purchase contracts.  This  gave  rise  to  the well known  "bubble"  of shut-in 
gas  production. 
4.57  In the  new  market situation which arose  from  1982,  the weaknesses  in 
a  non-market-responsiv,e,  regulated system were  exposed as  producers  sought 
customers  for  low priced shut-in gas  and local distributors  sought 
transportation services  from pipelines  so  that they could buy  lower-priced 
gas  direct from  sources  independent  of the pipelines.  A short-term "spot" 
market  in gas  began  to  emerge,  associated with  the  growing use  of third 
party transportation in interstate pipelines.  Following court action which 
ruled against  the  discriminatory  terms  of some  transportation services 
provided  to  third parties by pipeline companies,  FERC  issued its Order  436 
in 1985.  This  provided interstate pipeline companies  with blanket 
authority to  transport third party gas  on  a  non-discriminatory basis.  It 
was  intended to provide  consumers  with greater access  to competitively 
priced gas  but participation by pipeline  companies  in the  Order  436 
programme  is voluntary.  Thus  there  is no  mandatory obligation on pipelines 
to carry gas  for  others.  Once  they opt  into  the programme,  however,  they 
may  not  refuse  to  provide  transportation as  long as  they have  the  requisite 
pipeline capacity.  Moreover,  the  service must be  provided on a 
non-discriminatory basis.  In practice,  this means  that in the  event of 
restricted throughput capacity,  third party volumes  shipped under 
transportation arrangement  are  cut back on  the basis of "first come,  first 
served"  priorities among  third party shippers.  Gas  transported on  an 
"interruptible" basis at lower  rates  (usually on behalf of industrial  and 
power  plant end-users,  rather than distributors)  may  be  cut back  and,  where 
rates differ between  shippers,  those  shippers  paying  the  lowest 
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transportation rate will receive  the  lowest priority.  Following  the 
introduction of Order  436,  the  proportion of interstate pipeline  gas  being 
moved  under  transportation deals  rather  than conventional purchase  and sale 
arrangements  rose  to  around half by  the  end of 1986,  as  against just 3%  in 
1982 . 
4.58  In 1986,  FERC  moved  to relax control over  "old"  gas  wellhead prices, 
through its Order 451.  Instead of a  previously complex  system of different 
regulated prices  for different  "vintages"  of old gas,  Order  451  created a 
single new  ceiling price for  old gas  of around  $2.50  per 1000  cubic  feet, 
subject  to  monthly  adjustment,  below which producers  and purchasers are 
free  to negotiate  a  contract price between  themselves.  This  programme 
therefore created greater incentives  for producers  to  develop  incremental 
output  from  old gas  fields  and  to sell this additional gas at commercially 
more  attractive prices. 
4.59  To  European observers,  the  US  gas  industry may  appear  something of a 
paradox.  Essentially privately owned,  its development has been extensively 
shaped by  the action of legislators,  courts and  (especially)  regulators. 
In particular,  the  development of third party transportation on a  voluntary 
basis has  its roots  not only  in recent regulatory action to  introduce more 
market-orientated behaviout  in conditions of surplus,  but also  in the 
market  imbalances  created in large part by  th~ rigidities and lack of 
market  responsiveness  in the  regulated trading environment of perceived gas 
shortage  in the  late 1970s  and early 1980s.  The  regulatory system in the 
US  is extremely complex  and we  have  only been able  to outline its key 
features  in this brief review.  Nevertheless,  it is absolutely crucial to 
be  aware  of the  enormous  differences between this  system and  the situation 
in the  gas  industry of  the  European  Community,  especially as  regards  the 
arguments  for  and against  the  introduction of a  common  carrier system in 
Europe. 
Summary  of Key  Issues 
4.60  As  with previous  sections of the  report,  it may  be helpful  to 
summarise briefly the  key  conclusions of this section as  regards  the 
specific  issue  of common  carriage  in natural gas.  A number  of points are 
of particular  importance,  including  the  following:-
\0\ (a)  de  facto  monopolies  over  gas  transmission are  almost  universal within 
the  Member  States of  the  European  Community  and  these  are  reinforced 
by  de  jure monopolies  of one  sort or another  in countries  such  as 
Belgium,  Denmark,  France  and  Italy; 
(b)  comprehensive  common  carriage  legislation only exists  in the  UK  and 
the practical  impact of this legislation has  yet  to be  tested, 
although it is understood that a  carriage negotiation has  now  been 
referred  to  the  regulator for  a  ruling; 
(c)  administratively as  well  as  legally,  many  national Governments  retain 
a  substantial measure  of control  over  the  development  of the natural 
gas  industry  in Member  States,  so  that the attitude and policy 
response  of Governments  could have  an  important  influence  on  the 
impact  of a  possible  common  carriage  system  in the  Community  as  a 
whole; 
(d)  the  European  Commission  already possesses  a  number  of general powers 
under  the  Treaty of Rome  which it could apply more  rigorously  to  the 
natural  gas  sector in order  to  "police"  a  common  carriage  system, 
though  there might well be  a  case  for  a  Council directive containing 
more  specific guidelines  and  a  streamlining of procedures  for 
resolving complaints  and disputes;  and 
(e)  the  role  of regulatory agencies  and  the courts  in the  development  of 
the  US  natural  gas  industry has  been more  significant than it has  in 
EC  Member  States  and  this  is an  important factor  to bear in mind when 
considering the  degree  of third party gas  transportation which  takes 
place  in the US. 
Before  reaching any definitive conclusions  in respect of  (c)  and  (d)  above,  · 
in particular,  it is necessary  to  consider  in considerably more  detail the 
kind of common  carriage  regime  which might be  desirable,  practicable and 
effective at  the  European  Community  level.  We  therefore  turn to  an 
examination of this  issue  in Section V of the  report. 
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Introduction 
5.1  Before  moving  in Section VI  to  a  detailed assessment  of the 
advantages  and  drawbacks  of a  gas  common  carriage  system at the  Community 
level,  it is  important  to  examine  precisely what kind of system might be 
envisaged and  the  conditions which would have  to be  fulfilled in order for 
it to  be  effective.  UK  experience under  the Oil & Gas  (Enterprise)  Act 
from  1982-86  suggests  that the  legal possibility of common  carriage may 
exist for  a  considerable period without actual third party use  of pipeline 
systems  taking place.  Even  under  the  more  conducive  provisions of the  1986 
Gas  Act  in the  UK,  it is likely that competition to British Gas  will take 
some  years  to  emerge  and  the  recommendations  of the  recent Monopolies  & 
Mergers  Commission Inquiry effectively recognise  that further  intervention 
is required to promote direct producer-consumer sales by  common  carriage. 
Although  third party gas  transportation emerged very rapidly in the United 
States,  this  took place under  conditions which were  very different from 
those prevailing in the  European gas  market.  This  therefore suggests  that 
careful consideration needs  to be  given to  the conditions under which  a 
common  carriage  system in the  Community  could be  made  effective.  If these 
conditions are not fulfilled and  third party transportation is not 
effectively promoted,  then the  impact of a  common  carriage system would be 
negligible  and  the question of advantages  and drawbacks  becomes  redundant. 
5.2  Key  issues  which  need  to be  addressed in connection with the possible 
introduction of a  common  carriage system at the  Community  level include: 
(a)  the  nature  of the  legal obligation (if any)  to carry gas  for  third 
parties; 
(b)  the  level  and structure of carriage charges  to be  paid by  third 
parties for  transportation; 
(c)  the  approach  to pipeline capacity constraints  and  the provision of 
new  pipeline capacity; 
(d)  ways  of ensuring that competition within the  new  environment  is not 
distorted by state aids,  predatory pricing or by discriminatory, 
\o~ collusive or other anti-competitive practices  on  the part of gas 
industry players; 
(e)  the  removal  of barriers  to  free  competition in natural  gas  created by 
statutory monpolies,  exclusive rights,  statutory restrictions  and 
restrictive commercial  agreements;  and 
(f)  the  development  of an appropriate  institutional  framework  for  the 
regulation and supervision of a  more  open and  competitive  gas 
industry. 
Each  of  these  key  issues  is addressed in turn below. 
Obligations  to  transport 
5.3  An  absolutely fundamental  question is  the nature of the  obligations 
which might  be  placed on pipeline owners  to provide  transportation and 
related services  for  third parties.  In the US,  commercial  incentives  to 
engage  in third party transportation were  such  that no  legal obligation was 
required for  common  carriage  to  develop.  As  Appendix  A points  out,  blanket 
transportation Order  436  was  voluntary and yet most  of the  interstate 
pipeline  companies  opted into  the  scheme.  In the  light of the very 
different circumstances prevailing in the  European  gas  market,  it is 
unlikely  that this voluntary approach would be very effective in the 
Community.  Careful consideration therefore needs  to be  given to  the 
overall  framework  of carriage obligations. 
5.4  It is  important  to be clear at the outset of this discussion that 
common  carriage might  mean  some  sort of obligation on  owners  of pipelines 
and related facilities  to provide  a  range  of services,  of which 
long-distance  gas  transportation is simply  the most  important.  In 
practice,  the  services which  a  transmission company  could conceivably be 
required to provide  include:-
(a)  "firm"  (year  round)  third party gas  transportation; 
(b)  "interruptible"  transportation,  under which  the  pipeline  owner  can 
interrupt  the  third party carriage arrangement  at times  of peak  gas 
demand  on  the  system; 
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(c)  a  "load factor"  service,  converting a  high annual  load factor  supply 
from  the  producer  to  a  lower  load factor  supply which meets  the 
consumer's  requirements; 
(d)  a  "modulation service",  converting a  regular supply  from  the producer 
to meet  any  fluctuations  (over  the  day or over  a  longer period)  in 
the  consumer's  gas  offtake; 
(e)  a  "back-up"  service,  protecting the  consumer  against any shortfall or 
interruption in the producer's  supply or  (conceivably)  covering the 
producer against plant downtime  or other failures  to  take  on  the part 
of the  consumer;  and 
(f)  adjustment  of gas  quality to meet  the  requirements of customers' 
appliances. 
5.5  Transmission companies  currently use  a  combination of their pipeline 
systems,  storage facilities  and multiple  gas  supply  sources  to provide 
these services  to their own  customers  and many  of their suppliers.  These 
often allow producers  to  make  the best use  of their production and 
transportation equipment by  supplying regular volumes  at high load factor, 
whilst at the  same  time  meeting  the varying needs  of gas  consumers  for 
flexible,  secure  supplies at reasonable  cost.  For  third party 
transportation to  take place,  both producer and end-consumer must  see 
advantages  in direct marketing.  Given  that consumers  often have 
requirements  which  go  beyond gas  volumes  (supply security,  flexibility,  gas 
quality etc),  there  is a  need  to  address  the possible provision by 
transmission companies  for  third parties of all the  services referred to 
above. 
5.6  A number  of different contexts  may  be  envisaged in which 
transportation and related services might be  provided for  third parties, 
including: 
(a)  gas  in transit through  the  country  (or supply area)  concerned, 
ultimately destined for  sale in another utility's market; 
(b)  gas  being marketed directly to  a  new  customer  in the pipeline owner's 
own  supply area; 
(c)  gas  being marketed directly to  an existing customer  in the pipeline 
owner's  own  supply area,  with  gas  originating from  the  same  producer 
as  with  the  previous  purchase  and sale arrangements;  or 
\o~ (d)  gas  being marketed directly to  an existing customer  in the pipeline 
owner's  own  supply area,  with  gas  originating from  a  different 
producer  than before. 
5.7  Particular problems  are  likely to be  encountered where  the provision 
of services  to  a  third party by  the  transmission company  concerned may 
conflict with  the provision of similar services  to  the  company's  own 
remaining customers.  Arrangements  relating purely to transit  - such as 
Norwegian  gas  passing  through  the  Netherlands  to  Belgium  and  France,  or 
across  France  to  Spain  - may  not raise  any  such conflicts,  especially if it 
is recognised that a  new  pipeline  is required for  the  specific purpose.  In 
contrast,  direct marketing  to  large,  new  customers  (such  as  a  new  gas-fired 
power  plant)  in the pipeline owner's  own  supply area may  well place  demands 
on  the  transmission company  which  exceed its existing capacity to meet 
them.  Turning  to existing customers  who  may  seek to buy direct,  the 
distinction between  (c)  and  (d)  above  may  in practice be blurred since 
particular supply  sources  are rarely identified with particular customers 
and  in some  cases  the  source of gas  supplied to  an existing customer may 
vary according to  the  time  of year,  for  example.  In principle,  however,  it 
is possible  to  conceive of a  proposed direct purchase by an existing 
customer which  does  not  add  to  the  services which were  previously  "bundled" 
into  the  sale of gas  at the  plant or city gate.  On  the  other hand,  an 
existing customer  might  seek to  buy direct from  a  new  or different source 
in such  a  way  that that would strain the  transportation and related storage 
capacity of the pipeline system owner. 
5.8  It is  important  to  recognise  that transmission companies will have  a 
number  of firm contractual  commitments  to  their existing customers  - to 
provide certain volumes  of gas  of an acceptable quality and in most  cases 
to provide  a  certain amount  of delivery capacity or offtake flexibility as 
well.  Some  companies  also have  statutory obligations of one  kind or 
another  to meet  their customers'  requirements,  as  discussed in Section IV 
above.  These  contractual and/or statutory commitments  involve  supplies  to 
many  household  and  other  consumers  who,  in the  short to medium  term,  have 
no  real alternative  to  the  use  of gas  and who  would not  themselves  be  in a 
position to purchase  gas  direct  from  producers.  Even  where  there  is no 
specific long-term statutory or contractual  commitment  to  supply,  domestic 
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users  and others quite  reasonably expect  that gas will be  made  available  to 
fuel  their central heating and other appliances  over  the entire life of  the 
equipment.  For  social welfare  reasons  as  well  as  on legal or contractual 
business  grounds,  it would be  most  unreasonable if new  direct marketing 
arrangements via common  carriage were  to  pre-empt capacity required to meet 
already existing commitments  to  supply other users.  Apparently,  there are 
some  precedents  internationally for  common  carriage  systems  which permit 
new  users  access  to  already full pipeline systems  and cut back existing 
users'  throughput  rights pro rata in order  to facilitate this arrangement. 
Some  oil pipeline transportation in the United States is understood to 
operate  in this way  and  some  objections which have  been raised to  the  idea 
of gas  common  carriage  in Europe  appear  to rest on fears  that similar 
principles would apply  in this case.  For  the  reasons  explained above, 
however,  we  consider that this would be  quite unreasonable  in the context 
of  the  European gas  supply situation.  Instead,  any obligation to provide 
transportation and related services  to  third parties should normally be 
subject to  the availability of sufficient capacity to provide  these 
services,  without prejudice  to other supply obligations already existing at 
the  time.  The  question of providing further  system capacity to meet  the 
demand  for  additional services is discussed below. 
Carriage  charges 
5.9  As  regards  carriage charges  themselves,  it is possible  to envisage 
two  extremes  in terms  of the  t~e of common  carriage system which might be 
introduced.  At  one  extreme,  the  European Commission might  simply  announce 
that commercial negotiation of transportation arrangements  is encouraged 
and that it (or  some  agency acting on its behalf)  will act as arbiter of 
disputes.  It might  then use  its powers  under  the Treaty of Rome  (primarily 
Article  86  on abuse  of dominant  position)  in the  event  that one  party or 
another considers  that good-faith negotiations are  not  taking place.  At 
the  other extreme,  the  Commission  could actually seek to set tariffs at 
which  gas  should be  carried by pipeline owners  for  third parties.  There 
are many  objections  to  the  latter,  not  least the  sheer complexity of the 
gas  transportation system  in Europe  (including different costs of 
transmission in different parts of the  system)  and  the  dangers  evident  from 
US  experience of inflexible over-regulation.  Moreover,  the  Commission has 
tended,  wherever possible,  to  allow competition to  flourish  on a  commercial basis established between willing parties,  providing this  is not  injurious 
to  the  public  interest.  A single tariff,  or  even  a  single set of tariffs, 
would  almost certainly be  inappropriate  in many  contexts,  lead to  a  number 
of objections  or  anomalies  and  run  the  risk of  the  Commission becoming 
embroiled in detailed and protracted disputes.  These  arguments  therefore 
militate against  any  attempt  to  try and specify ex-ante precisely what  the 
tariff should be  in any particular circumstance. 
5.10  Nevertheless,  it must  be  recognised that many  producers  and  consumers 
(apart,  perhaps,  from  new  power  station gas  users)  seeking to make  use  of 
common  carriage would be putting at risk a  long-established relationship 
with a  gas  transmission company.  They  would naturally seek to  compare  the 
commercial  terms  of their existing arrangements with  those which  they could 
expect  from  direct marketing.  Given  the  risks attached to  an  innovative 
form  of trading,  they may  only pursue  the  common  carriage option if the 
commercial prospects  appear  to be  clearly superior to  those of continued 
sale  and  purchase  dealings with  the  transmission company.  If no  ex-ante 
guidelines or principles are established for what  constitutes a 
"reasonable"  carriage charge,  then  there  is a  danger  that producers  and 
consumers  will not  take  the  risk of exploring the  common  carriage option, 
since  they would have  no  basis  on which  to  judge  in advance  whether it 
would be  worth  their while  to  do  so.  In this event,  the  common  carriage 
system  introduced is unlikely to be  very effective.  It is  sometimes 
suggested that a  contributory factor  to  the  lack of common  carriage 
response  to  the  UK  Oil & Gas  (Enterprise)  Act  of 1982  was  the  absence  of 
any  guidelines  on carriage charges  and,  in this respect,  the  1986  Gas  Act 
was  an  improvement  but still not altogether clear in its meaning.  If, 
moreover,  the  Commission  is  to act  in some  sense  as  the  arbiter of disputes 
- and  some  protection against abuse  of monopoly  positions will no  doubt be 
needed to make  common  carriage effective  - then it would  seem  sensible  to 
set out  some  guidelines  or principles  for  resolving  such disputes before 
the first negotiation breaks  down  and  is referred to  Brussels.  Some 
consideration therefore needs  to be  given to  the  type  of guidelines  or 
principles which  the  Commission  might  set down. 
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5.11  The  key  issues  to be  considered in relation to  charging principles 
include: 
(a) 
(b) 
whether  charges  should be based on average  or on marginal cost; 
whether  transportation charges  should distinguish between different 
levels of system cost; 
(c)  whether  transportation charges  should be  distance related; 
(d)  the distinction between firm  and  interruptible carriage charges; 
(e)  charges  for  other services  such as  storage  and  "back up";  and 
(f)  "ship-or-pay"  ("use-or-pay")  provisions. 
Merely  raising these  issues  does  not necessarily mean  that we  believe  the 
Commission  would  need  to make  a  definitive policy statement on each of 
them.  In the  UK,  for  example,  the  legislation on carriage charges  is 
rather general and  BG  itself was  required to make  statements of charging 
policy which  could then be  considered by  the  regulator.  Nevertheless,  a 
policy of seeking  to  "rule by  exception"  (only intervening in commercial 
negotiations when  an apparent  abuse  of monopoly  position had taken place) 
would still require  the  Commission  to have  reached a  view  on what it 
regards  as  reasonable  commercial behaviour.  We  therefore consider briefly 
each of the key  charging issues  in turn. 
5.12  The  argument  on  average versus marginal costs  turns  largely on  the 
stage of development of the  transmission grid and related facilities, 
including the  degree  of capacity utilisation.  Average  costs are  simply  the 
total unit cost of constructing and operating a  pipeline;  there is often a 
problem of defining  the unit capital cost for existing lines  (historic cost 
versus full replacement cost depreciation),  but in concept  the  average cost 
approach  is fairly straightforward.  Marginal  cost is rather more  complex. 
Where  transportation requires  new  capacity,  the marginal cost is relatively 
high;  for pipelines with spare capacity,  however,  the  (short run)  marginal 
cost of moving  additional gas  volumes  may  be very  low,  reflecting only  the 
compression and other variable costs  of gas  transmission.  Before  examining 
the specific issue of charges  for  common  carriage,  it may  be helpful  to 
consider how  transmission companies  currently behave  in relation to their 
own  customers.  At  least in respect of firm  gas  sales,  any  transmission 
company  which  is still expanding its grid or which  is operating at or near 
full capacity utilisation will generally seek to  recover  the full cost of 
its facilities,  plus  a  return on capital.  If it did not do  so,  it would be 
unlikely  to  generate  the  cash required to  finance  the construction of the 
\o~ replacement  and additional capacity it requires.  For  a  short period, 
perhaps,  such  a  company  might be  prepared to  cover  only its  (short run) 
marginal  operating costs of supply  to  some  customers,  for  whom  it needs  to 
reduce  selling prices  in order  to  remain competitive  in times  of low oil 
prices,  for  example.  The  longer  term overall objective would,  however, 
generally be  to  recover average  cost plus  a  profit.  On  the other hand,  a 
transmission company  which has  essentially completed its pipeline grid,  or 
which  faces  lower  than expected  throughputs  and  thus  spare capacity,  might 
well be  prepared to make  more  sales which at least cover  (short-run) 
marginal but not average  costs,  in order  to  achieve  greater utilisation of 
its system and contribute  towards  fixed costs.  Some  US  pipelines  are 
currently in this position and  there  are  perhaps  one  or  two  European 
examples  as well;  the Netherlands  appears unlikely to need any very 
significant expansion of its pipeline network  and  the  Belgian grid was 
planned to  accommodate  a  higher level of throughput  and sales  than those 
currently being achieved.  Nevertheless,  the vast majority of Member  States 
will need to  expand their networks  to  some  degree at least and it therefore 
seems  reasonable  to  assume  that firm  gas  is generally sold at prices which, 
taken as  a  whole,  cover  average  costs plus  a  profit. 
5.13  We  turn now  to  the  specific question of carriage  charges.  Leaving 
the possibility of interruptible transportation aside  for  the  present,  our 
view is that it may  not be  sensible  to  oblige  transmission companies  to 
provide  common  carriage at the  short  run marginal,  or  incremental,  cost of 
that specific service.  If,  on  the other hand,  the pipeline owner  is 
prepared to offer marginal cost transportation for  commercial  reasons,  then 
there could surely be  no  objection.  The  main argument  against  a  marginal 
cost carriage obligation is that,  in order  to  finance  continued grid 
development,  the  transmission company  might  then seek to over-recover on 
average  costs  for  its remaining customers.  These  customers would  generally 
include  smaller and  less powerful  gas  consumers  who  could not  themselves 
take  direct advantage  of a  common  carriage  system.  If the  transmission 
company  were  unable  to  increase prices  for  other users  in this way  -
because of regulation,  for  example,  or competition from  other fuels  - then 
its capacity to  finance  future  grid development  or  even  to  service existing 
debt  might well be  impaired. 
5.14  One  argument  in favour  of obliging pipeline  system owners  to provide 
services at marginal  cost is that selling prices  to  some  of their own  large 
customers  may  not fully recover  average  costs.  If the  transmission company 
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can sell at prices which  reflect only marginal costs  to  its own  large 
customers  and is entitled to  levy carriage charges  on  the basis of average 
cost plus  a  reasonable  return,  then this may  give  the  transmission company 
an unfair competitive  advantage  over  gas  producers  seeking to sell direct 
into its market  area.  The  transmission company  might  only need to  do  this 
for  a  short period to head off the  threat of  competi~ion,  following which 
it could increase its price again.  Although this appears  to us  to be  a 
logical argument,  there  are  several  comments  which  can be  made  in regard to 
it: 
(a)  gas utilities may  need  to sell to  their own  customers at marginal 
cost prices at some  periods  in order  to  compete  with other fuels  and 
it would be  anti-competitive  to curtail their freedom  to  do  so; 
(b)  marginal cost sales pricing to  a  limited number  of consumers  could 
probably be  regarded as  discriminatory,  but it is not predatory in 
the  sense  that the avoidable costs are recovered; 
(c)  it is,  in practice,  difficult to assess whether pipeline owners  are 
covering marginal  or average  system costs for their own  gas  sales, 
since  the relevant cost  information is generally not available and 
the extent of joint costs  in the  gas  industry makes  it difficult to 
allocate  system costs  as between different types  of customer;  and 
(d)  marginal cost carriage charges  could vary enormously,  depending on 
the state of capacity utilisation in a  particular part of pipeline 
system  and  the need (if any)  for uprating  investments,  such as  extra 
compression,  to  accommodate  the  third party gas.  This  could then 
appear  to give  anomalous  or discriminatory results. 
5.15  Ultimately,  the  average versus marginal  costs  argument  comes  down  to 
assessing a  balance  of risks,  from  the point of view of achieving an 
effective common  carriage  system without undue  damage  to other objectives 
such as  equity and continued gas  supply security.  An  obligation to provide 
services  for  third parties at (short  run)  marginal cost could have  adverse 
consequences  for  other gas  consumers  and  for  the  future  development  of the 
grid,  while  an entitlement to  charge  average  cost could in certain 
circumstances  give  the pipeline owners'  own  sales  a  competitive  edge  over 
direct marketing by producers.  On  the balance of the  arguments,  our  own 
view  is that it would not be  sensible  to oblige  gas utilities to provide 
firm  transportation  (or other services entailing year-round or peak period 
capacity)  at marginal cost. 
'" S.l6  If we  assume  for  the present an average  cost charging principle  -
pipeline  owners  being permitted to  recover at most  their average  costs plus 
a  reasonable profit  - an  important practical question is  then  the 
distinction between different levels of system cost.  The  point here  is 
that  the cost of providing transportation for  third party gas will vary 
very greatly as  between different parts of a  pipeline  system.  One  reason 
for  this is that the unit capital cost of a  pipeline  tends  to  increase much 
less  than in proportion to  the  capacity of the pipe.  Moreover,  higher 
operating pressure  in parts of the  system mean  great  throughputs  and  lower 
unit costs.  While  it would be  undesirable  for pipeline owners  to 
discriminate unduly between third party shippers requiring similar services 
from  similar parts of the  system,  it does  appear  to make  sense  for  the 
owners  to distinguish between different "layers"  of  the grid.  British Gas, 
for  example,  are understood to base proposed carriage charges  on a  "three 
tier"  approach  to  their system;  in order of increasing unit carriage cost, 
these are national  transmission  (high pressure),  regional  transmission 
(medium  pressure)  and distribution system  (low pressure).  In gas 
industries which  are not vertically integrated,  transmission and 
distribution systems  are under  separate ownership,  but the general 
principle appears  a  sound  one.  Thus  a  direct marketer selling to  a 
customer  located on  the high pressure  transmission system should expect  to 
pay  a  lower  transportation charge  (other  things being equal)  than for  an 
arrangement  involving  lower  pressure deliveries  from  a  different "tier"  of 
the  system. 
S.l7  'The  issue of distance  related carriage charges  is linked to  the 
possibility of re-optimising gas  flows  within the  integrated European gas 
grid,  following  a  decision to market  gas  direct via common  carriage.  This 
may  perhaps best be  illustrated by  some  extremely simplified numerical 
examples,  as  set out  in Figure  Sa  overleaf.  We  assume  that there is, 
initially,  no  common  carriage and  that  gas  demand  of 100 units  in each of 
France  and West  Germany  is supplied equally from  Norway  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  In each  consuming  country,  90  units  are  sold to  small  domestic/ 
commercial users  and 10  are  sold to  large  industry.  We  also  assume  for  the 
sake  of simplicity that each pipeline has  10  units of spare capacity. 
Suppose  now  that a  new  industrial user  in West  Germany  requires  an 
additional  10  units of gas,  but decides  to buy direct  from  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  result is straightforward  (Case  A in Figure  Sa)  in that  gas  is 
transported through  the  West  German  pipeline  system along  the  "notional Figure Sa 
DISTANCE-RELATED CARRIAGE CHARGES: 
Simplified illustrative examples 
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Case 8 (direct marketing, USSR to France) path"  marked  in bold.  In such  a  case,  it is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the 
carriage charge  might  be  related in some  way  to  the distance  along  the 
notional path. 
5.18  Suppose,  however,  that  the  new  industrial demand  for  gas  to be 
carried from  the  USSR  arises  in France,  rather than West  Germany.  This  is 
shown  in Figure  Sa  as  Case  B.  In this case,  the  industrial consumer  would 
probably negotiate with French  and West  German  pipeline  owners  for carriage 
over  the notional path shown  as  a  double  line.  However,  the pipeline 
owners  may  then be  able  to agree between  them  to  an arrangement which would 
reoptimise  flows  and reduce  their transmission costs.  If pipeline 
capacities permit and  the  distances  involved are  shorter,  the  West  German 
transmission company  might  agree  to  a  gas  "swap"  whereby it would receive 
an additional  10  units  of Soviet gas,  in exchange  for which  the  French 
would accept  10  units of Norwegian  gas  contracted for sale to West  Germany. 
Thus  the  amount  of Soviet gas  physically transported to  France would be 
unchanged.  In this case,  additional volumes  of gas  are carried along  the 
routes marked  in bold and less gas  moves  from  Norway  to West  Germany;  the 
additional cost of the carriage arrangement  thus bears little relation to 
the  "notional path"  and charges  related to  distances  along  the  "notional 
path"  might well over-recover  the  cost of carriage.  This  is clearly a 
simplified example  for  purposes  of illustration.  In practice,  some  new 
investment will almost certainly be  required,  but  the  gas  swap  arrangement 
might  require provision of less new  capacity than would  transportation 
along  the  "notional path".  Currently,  the  transmission companies'  policy 
is  to build "notional path"  capacity for  supply security reasons,  even 
where  a  swap  will normally  take place  (eg  for  Soviet  gas  bought by  BEB  and 
Thyssengas).  Thus  only limited operating cost savings  are made.  In 
future,  a  buyer of direct supplies via common  carriage might 'be  prepared to 
take  a  greater supply security risk and dispense with  the  "notional path" 
capacity as  a  fallback.  This  could then permit a  greater saving  in 
transmission costs.  Whether  this would be  acceptable  to  the  gas  producers 
and  transmission companies  involved is,  however,  open  to  doubt. 
5.19  Thus  an argument  could,  in principle,  be  made  for  a  detailed,  case-
by-case,  investigation of  incremental  carriage costs  (taking account  of any 
gas  flow  reoptimisation which  takes  place),  rather  than relating charges  to 
distances  along  the notional path along which  the  third party gas  might 
initially be  assumed  to  travel.  There  are  a  number  of comments  which  can 
be made  on  this point: (a)  "swap"  deals  to  reoptimise  gas  flows  might not be  practicable  in some 
cases,  owing  to  limited spare capacity on other pipelines; 
(b)  it is notoriously difficult to  "trace molecules'j  of physical  gas  flow 
through  a  complex pipeline system,  especially when  deliveries  from 
certain producers  and  to  some  classes of customers vary considerably 
as  between different times  of the year; 
(c)  gas  swaps  are  the  subject of commercially confidential deals between 
transmission companies  and their terms  could not easily form  the 
basis of carriage negotiations with producers or consumers; 
(d)  charges based on  distances  along  the  "notional path"  for  gas  carried 
may,  on  occasion,  lead to  some  over-recovery of costs by pipeline 
owners,  but  do  at least have  the  great advantage  of simplicity and 
transparency;  and 
(e)  even if carriage charges  could practicably take  account of any 
reoptimisation of flows,  such a  charging system could remove  or at 
least diminish  the  commercial  incentives which  transmission companies 
currently have  to make  swap  deals  and  thus  reduce  costs. 
5.20  On  balance,  therefore,  we  would  favour  a  system of carriage charges 
which  is relatively simple  and  transparent.  Transparency is important 
since both producers  and consumers  should ideally be  able  to evaluate  the 
likely commercial benefits of a  carriage arrangement,  as  compared to sale 
and purchase of the  conventional kind.  A reasonable  charging system might 
therefore be based on  the distance along  the most direct "notional path" 
between  the point of entry to  the pipeline owner's  system and  the point of 
delivery to  the  consumer,  taking account  (as  argued above)  of the  "tiers" 
in the pipeline system used by  the  third party gas.  It is worth noting 
that this  system could perhaps begin to  erode existing non-discriminatory 
tariff systems  which set similar prices  for all comparable  large consumers, 
irrespective of their geographical  location on  the  transmission grid.  Yith 
common  carriage,  favourably  located users would have  the  opportunity to 
secure relatively low  gas  supply costs. 
5.21  A further  element  in the structure of charges  for  third party gas 
transportation is load factor  and  the distinction between firm  and 
interruptible carriage.  As  far as  firm  transportation is concerned,  it is 
reasonable  for  the pipeline owner  to charge higher rates  (in ECU/m3/km,  for 
example)  for  gas  transported at lower  load factors.  This  is because  a 
\\S large  proportion of  gas  transportation costs  are capacity costs;  operating 
costs  (compressor  fuel,  labour  and  other running costs)  are  relatively 
minor  in comparison.  Since  a  lower  load factor  reduces  throughput  for  a 
given pipeline capacity,  unit capacity costs  can be  significantly 
increased.  Turning  to  interruptible carriage  (transportation interruptible 
on an agreed basis at the pipeline owner's  option when  capacity is required 
to meet  seasonal,  year round  demands),  this does  not appear  to be 
specifically addressed in the  UK  legislation but does  take place  to  a 
significant extent  in the  US.  Clearly,  this service is more  appropriate 
for  direct marketing  to  large  industrial or power  plant customers  with a 
standby fuel  than it would be  for direct sales  to local distributors or to 
firm  gas  customers.  The  idea would be  that  some  consumers  could take 
advantage  of seasonal  spare  capacity in some  transmission pipelines which 
carry lower  load factor  supplies  (such  as  Dutch  gas  exports  to West  Germany 
or Belgium,  for  example).  By  definition,  interruptible carriage in 
pipelines which  are not  fully utilised outside  the winter peak does  not 
impose  any  capacity cost  on  the pipeline owner  and it would be  reasonable 
to expect carriage charges  to reflect this.  Depending  on  the contractual 
freedom  of the  transporter to  interrupt,  it appears  that interruptible 
carriage  ought  to be  much  cheaper  (in ECU/m3/km)  than firm  transportation 
and  a  "fair" charge might be  nearer  to  (short run)  marginal  than to  average 
costs  in this case. 
5.22  The  foregoing  discussion relates mainly  to  charging for 
transportation itself, but it may  be  equally important  for  the 
effectiveness of a  common  carriage  system to  ensure fair and reasonable 
charges  for  other services outlined earlier in this section,  including 
storage,  back-up  and  gas  processing or blending  to meet  quality 
requirements.  Although  the  distance-related and  system levels  concepts  are 
not relevant to facilities other than pipelines,  the  "average cost plus 
normal  return"  principle could still be  applied.  In the  case of storage or 
blending plant,  a  relatively high proportion of the  cost  to  third parties 
is likely to be  the  charge  for  reserving capacity.  "Back-up"  gas  is  a 
somewhat  complex  issue,  since this could conceivably be  provided either out 
of storage or  in some  cases by using offtake flexibility in the 
transmission company's  own  gas  purchase contracts.  If a  consumer  who  is 
purchasing gas  directly via  common  carriage  requires year  round back-up 
against  a  shortfall  in the  direct supply,  then this may  prove  rather 
expensive  since  the  means  of providing back-up  to  a  third party are  often 
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of considerable value  to  the  transmission company  for meeting its own 
customers'  peak winter  demands.  Much  may  depend  on  the  utility's peak 
match  (peak supply capacity versus  projected severe winter  firm gas  demand) 
and  che  period over which back-up  is required.  It would be  most  unusual 
for  a  utility to  have  a  considerable projected surplus at peak for many 
years  ahead,  which might allow back-up  to be  prvvLae~ relatively cheaply. 
Large  industrial or power  plant users with  a  standby fuel  option therefore 
have  a  further  advantage  in terms  of ability to buy  d~rect,  since  they may 
be  able  to  accept carriage without  an expensive back-up provision. 
5.23  Transmission utilities providing  transportation and related services 
may  well wish  to  secure  "ship-or-pay"  ("use-or-pay")  commitments  from  the 
shipper.  This  means  that the  shipper would agree  in advance  to pay for 
services relating to at least a  specific volume  of  gas,  whether or not he 
actually uses  the pipeline system and other facilities to that extent.  In 
the US,  FERC  does  not  appear  to have  permitted ship-or-pay  terms  for 
transportation under  Order  436,  but this may  reflect the  degree of 
under-utilised capacity in the  interstate system.  Within  the  Community, 
there is a  much  greater likelihood that some  additional capacity will need 
to be  provided to meet  third parties'  requirements  and  in such cases 
ship-or-pay appears  entirely reasonable.  Even  where  new  capacity is not 
provided,  there will frequently be  some  opportunity cost to  the pipeline 
owner  of committing  some  spare capacity to  a  third party  - such as  loss of 
system flexibility,  supply security or  the  chance  to sell that capacity to 
another  third party.  In consequence,  it appears  to us  that ship-or-pay 
could well constitute part of a  fair and  reasonable  package  of terms  for 
common  carriage. 
Transmission Capacity 
5.24  As  we  have  argued  throughout  this report,  a  good deal of  the  European 
gas  pipeline  and storage facilities are heavily utilised and  the extent of 
any  spare  capacity is very considerably less  than in the United States.  In 
some  instances,  such as  interruptible carriage or  a  decision by  an existing 
customer  to buy direct  from  the  producer whose  gas  he has  been burning 
already,  it may  be  possible  to  meet  third parties'  requirements  from 
existing system capacity.  Nevertheless  there will undoubtedly be  many 
situations  in which  capacity uprating  (such as  extra compression)  or 
completely new  capacity would be  required in order  to  accommodate  proposed 
\ll direct marketing arrangements.  One  possibility might be  for  the  third 
party to construct and  operate new  pipelines or other facilities itself, 
though  in some  Member  States  there  are currently legal restrictions  on  the 
right  to  import  or  transport natural  gas  which might  prevent this.  Another 
option is  some  sort of joint venture with  the  transmission company  already 
operating in the  area and  considerable  volumes  of gas  already move  across 
European borders  on  the basis of joint ventures between  gas utilities.  A 
third possibility is  to develop  some  system for  incorporating third party 
requirements  when  the  grid is updated or expanded. 
5.25  In order  to  facilitate  the  incorporation of third party requirements 
into grid development,  some  form  of notice procedure  may  be  appropriate. 
Gas  utilities planning  to construct new  pipelines or upgrade  the capacity 
of existing lines  (in each case,  those  above  a  certain pipe diameter or 
operating pressure)  could be  obliged to register their plans well  in 
advance with  the  Commission,  or  some  other body  acting on its behalf,  and 
to publish them officially.  Third parties would  then be  free  to  identify 
any  known  capacity requirements  of their own  for  gas  transmission along  the 
published routes  and,  where  physically and environmentally practicable,  the 
responsible  gas utility could then be  obliged to  incorporate  the  extra 
capacity required in their project.  Payment by  the  third party could 
conceivably take  the  form  of a  direct contribution to capital costs 
(including a  reasonable  return for  the pipeline  owner)  in return for 
subsequent dedicated throughput  rights,  or else  a  prior commitment  to 
ship-or-pay quantities at an agreed tariff once  the  new  facilities are  in 
operation.  Similar provisions  to  this already exist in the  UK  Gas  Act  of 
1986,  articles  20-21,  where  a  two  year notice period applies unless 
otherwise  specified by  the  Director of Ofgas.  Whereas,  in relation to 
carriage charges,  the  Commission  might  choose  to  "regulate by exception" 
(intervene only where  a  breach of competition law is alleged to have  taken 
place),  the  institution of this system  in the  Community  would require  a 
definite initiative from  the  Commission.  The  approach would  probably need 
to  allow for  short notice construction of pipelines  in exceptional 
circumstances,  in order  to meet previously unanticipated consumer  demands. 
5.26  A further  issue  to be  considered is  the possibility of restrictions 
of pipeline capacity and  interruptions  to,  or shortfalls  in,  gas  supply 
which  might  affect consumers  who  were  buying  gas  direct via common 
carriage.  This  raises  questions  of priorities,  both as  between  the pipeline owner  and  third party shippers  on  the  one  hand,  and  among  a  number 
of different third party shippers  on  the  other.  To  an extent,  such matters 
could be left to  commercial  agreement between  the parties  involved;  the 
main  concern that the  European Commission might have  is  to  ensure  that 
pipeline operators  do  not  abuse  their position by applying priority rules 
in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.  The  application of some  kind of 
"first come,  first served"  priority system  (as  in the US)  would appear  to 
be  a  reasonable  step,  though  the  US  also has  some  precedents  for 
establishing priorities among  interruptible carriage arrangements  on the 
basis of the  transportation rates paid.  Since  this  is an extremely complex 
area in which  the procedures  may  need  to be  tailored to particular 
circumstances,  it would probably be  unwise  for  the  Commission  to  seek to  do 
more  than establish general  guidelines or principles of what would be 
regarded as  acceptable behaviour under  the Treaty of Rome  (Article 86). 
Fair Competition 
5.27  One  of the chief purposes  of introducing some  form of common  carriage 
system for natural gas  transportation within the  Community  would be  to 
promote  a  greater degree of competition among  gas  suppliers  - among 
Community  gas  producers,  between  these  producers  and  non-Community 
suppliers,  among  gas  transmission companies  and between established 
transmission companies  and new,  direct marketing arrangements.  ferhaps  of 
crucial  importance  is the  competition between transmission companies' 
merchanting activities and direct sales  from  producers  to  consumers  via 
common  carriage.  In all these areas,  it will be  important  to ensure  that 
"fair"  competition takes place  and  we  have  already raised some  of the  key 
concerns  in the  course of this section.  There  are  a  number  of other areas 
which  need  to be  considered,  including: 
(a)  the possible availability of subsidies or "state aids"  to existing 
gas utilities; 
(b)  selective  "predatory"  price discounts  to preserve market position 
against  the  threat of competition;  and 
(c)  collusive,  discriminatory or other anti-competitive behaviour on  the 
part of market players. 
Matters  such  as  this would fall under  the  European  Commission's  general 
powers  to  enforce  fair competition under  the Treaty of Rome;  it may, 
however,  be helpful  to highlight some  potential problems  at this stage. 
111 5.28  Earlier this  decade,  both Gaz  de  France  and  SNAM  were  placed under 
some  political pressure by  their respective Governments  to  conclude  gas 
purchase  contracts at above-market prices with Algeria.  As  part of these 
arrangements,  direct Government  subsidies were  provided  to  the  two 
utilities for  a  limited period.  Much  criticised in  some  quarters at the 
time,  these  subsidies  came  to  an  end  several years  ago  and contract prices 
were brought more  into line with market netback realisations.  At  the  time 
of writing,  none  of the major  gas  transmission companies  appears  to  receive 
any direct subsidy of this sort.  However,  the  Danish  gas  industry obtains 
a  considerable  indirect subsidy  in that it sells  to  small users  and 
district heating plants at prices related to  tax-inclusive oil prices. 
There  is no  tax on natural gas  in Denmark,  while  taxes  on  gas  oil and fuel 
oil are  around  130%  and  220%  respectively;  thus  the utilities effectively 
get  to keep  the  tax revenue  which  the  Government  loses when  gas  is 
substituted for oil.  This  arrangement  thus  releases  funds  which  the 
industry can use  for  further  investment  is expansion of the  gas  grid and 
storage facilities.  Denmark  is certainly not  the  only Member  State which 
taxes oil products  more  heavily than gas;  it is perhaps  the most  dramatic 
example,  although Italian rates of duty on  gas  oil are also extremely high. 
Such  instances reflect deliberate Government  intervention through  the  tax 
system to promote  the  substitution of natural  gas  for  imported oil.  It 
should,  however,  be  noted that indirect subsidies of this sort do  not 
constitute a  "state aid"  under  the  terms  of the Treaty of Rome. 
5.29  In the  event  that a  common  carriage  system were  introduced,  there  is 
at least a  possibility that direct subsidies  might  re-emerge  or that 
indirect subsidies resulting from  high oil taxation in non-industrial 
markets  could be  used  to  cross-subsidise selling prices  for  gas  in the 
industrial market,  in order  to  fend off competition from direct marketing 
by  gas  producers.  It is also worth noting that state-owned companies  are 
responsible for all gas  exports  from  Algeria and  the  Soviet Union,  as well 
as  a  substantial proportion of Norwegian gas  sales.  There  is therefore  the 
possibility that their marketing efforts could be  supported directly or 
indirectly by  the  Government  in those  countries.  Under  common  carriage, 
even more  than at present,  it would be  important  to  ensure  that subsidies 
provided to producers  or  to  gas  utilities did not distort  the  pattern of 
competition and  trade. 
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5.30  Predatory pricing is in some  ways  a  similar issue.  One  concern is 
that gas utilities should not be  able  to  make  selective discounts  below 
cost in order  to  drive off the  threat of competiti.on  from  direct marketing. 
In those  Member  States with  transparent tariff sales of gas  to large users, 
such selective discounting is unlikely  to  take place,  but it would be  more 
feasible where  prices are  individually negotiated or adjusted from  the 
published tariff level.  In principle,  it is predatory to price below 
avoidable  costs;  pricing below full  average  cost  (including fixed costs) 
but above  avoidable cost should generally be  regarded as  legitimate, 
especially over  short periods,  and  is  common  for off-peak electricity sales 
as well  as  for  interruptible gas  sales.  The  definition and  "policing"  of 
predatory pricing in the  gas  industry is,  however,  particularly difficult, 
given  the extent of joint costs  (both gas  and non-gas)  across different 
market  sectors.  There  is,  for  example,  no  internationally recognised 
convention on  the allocation of system capacity costs as  between firm and 
interruptible customers.  However,  it is not just transmission companies 
which might be  tempted  to price  in a  predatory manner.  There  is also the 
possibility that producing countries might be  tempted to  "dump"  limited 
volumes  of gas  through direct sales at prices below costs,  in order  to gain 
market  share.  Dumping  would be  extremely difficult to prove  and in any 
case  gas  production costs  are probably still some  way  below selling prices 
in most  producing countries.  It has,  however,  been reported that the 
current selling price of Norwegian  gas at Emden  does  not cover  the 
transportation tariff through  the  StatpipefNorpipe  system for  those  sellers 
who  do  not have  a  stake  in the  line.  Predatory pricing may  be facilitated 
by  a  subsidy or state aid;  it may,  however,  simply reflect a  pure 
commercial  judgement  that a  temporary loss position is justified by 
long-term competitive  advantage  gained as  a  result.  Whichever  is  the  case, 
it would be  important for  the  European  Commission  to  recognise  the  danger 
it presents  to fair competition and  to develop  a  view of what constitutes a 
"fair" selling price  for  gas  in relation to  the cost of supply. 
5.31  A number  of other  threats  to  fair competition may  also be  envisaged . 
For  reasons  which  we  have  examined  above,  there may  be  legitimate  reasons 
why  a  pipeline  company  with spare  system capacity cannot offer third party 
transportation  - including supply security and  commitment  to meet projected 
peak demand  from  existing firm  customers.  There  may,  however,  be  a  need to 
ensure  that access  to  the pipeline,  storage  and  gas  processing system is 
\t\ not unreasonably  refused and  that pipeline  owners  do  not collude  to refuse 
transit transportation in order to  protect one  another's markets.  As  with 
some  of the  other fair competition  issues  raised in this sub-section,  the 
role of the  European  Commission  in this matter would be  to  respond  to  any 
complaints  alleging abuse of dominant  position.  There  are,  however, 
important  issues  of supply security and capacity reservation for  the 
foreseeable  demands  of existing customers which  must  be  addressed in order 
to establish whether  a  stated inability to  transport third party is genuine 
or not. 
Monopolies  and  exclusive  ri&hts 
5.32  There  are  in the  European  gas  industry a  number  of statutory 
monopolies,  exclusive rights  and preferential treatments which  appear 
inconsistent with the principle of free cirulcation of natural  gas within 
the  Community,  particularly if a  common  carriage system were  to be 
established.  Failure  to address  these  would  leave  a  situation of uneven, 
partial and unfair competition in the  gas  industry,  given the  favourable 
legal  treatment of certain enterprises  in certain Member  States.  A number 
of examples  were  identified and discussed in Section IV  and  they  include: 
(a)  exclusive rights  to  import,  transport or export natural gas  (such as 
the  Gaz  de  France  import monopoly,  the Distrigaz  monopoly  of gas 
transmission and  similar exclusive  rights held by  Dangas); 
(b)  exclusive  rights  to  install and  operate distribution grids  and  to 
sell gas  to  small  consumers  within a  local area  - these  are usually 
given by  a  municipality and are  common  in most  Member  States where 
the  gas  industry is not vertically integrated; 
(c)  preferential "rights of first refusal"  over  the  purchase  of 
indigenous  gas,  such as  those  granted to  Gasunie  in the Netherlands 
and  SNAM  in Italy.  (British Gas  in the United Kingdom  had such  a 
right until 1982,  when  this was  abolished);  and 
(d)  restrictions on  trade between Member  States  in natural gas,  such as 
the  UK  "landing requirement"  which,  although it could be waived by 
the  Government,  still means  that UK  producers  would  need specific 
permission to export their gas. 
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As  part of any  move  to  introduce  common  carriage,  it would  therefore be 
important for  the  Commission  to  tackle  these  legal  restrictions on  internal 
trade  in natural  gas. 
5.33  There  is an  important  issue  to  be  decided  ;~  ~~=pect of  the 
application of common  carriage  to  gas  pipeline  systems.  One  approach would 
be  to  open  up  transmission pipelines  to  common  carri.age but to retain local 
monopolies  over distribution grids.  In our view,  this would be arbitary 
and  discriminatory,  since  the division of customers  as  between  transmission 
and distribution companies  is very different in the  various Member  States. 
Some  distribution companies  supply only fairly small  users,  while  those  in 
Denmark  supply all customers  except  power  stations"  Problems  are  also 
raised by  the  existence of vertically integrated gas  companies  operating 
both  transmision and distribution grids  and in the  UK  the  common  carriage 
regime  makes  no  distinction between  the  two.  Our  view is that the physical 
installation and operation of a  distribution grid is a  natural monopoly, 
but  the  construction and operation of transmission grids  does  not 
necessarily require  an exclusive right at the national level,  as  the Yest 
German  experience  illustrates.  There  is no  convincing reason why  gas ~ 
should be  a  monopoly  at either level,  at least in a  "mature"  gas  industry. 
We  therefore consider that  the  Commission  should address  local exclusive 
rights  to  use  the distribution system as well  as  exclusive rights to  import 
and  transport.  In political terms,  Commission initiatives in these  areas 
will inevitably mean  a  reduction in the  sovereignty of certain Member 
States over matters  of energy policy as it relates  to  the  gas  sector.  This 
raises  important  questions  regarding  the balance  in policy-making authority 
as  between Brussels  and  the national Governments. 
5.34  There  are  also  a  number  of contractual arrangements  which,  although 
not part of the  legal  framework,  effectively give  rise  to  a  degree  of 
exclusivity and which might  arguably be  considered restrictive  .  For 
example,  the association of Dutch  gas  distributors VEGIN  is understood  to 
be  contractually bound under  a  long-term  "evergreen"  agreement with Gasunie 
to  purchase all its gas  requirements  from  the  transmission company.  In 
West  Germany,  there  is no  legal monopoly  over  imports  or  transmission but 
the  Demarkationsvertraege  (Demarcation Contracts)  concluded bilaterally 
between  transmission companies  have  the effect of dividing the  national 
market  up  into regional  supply areas.  They  are not strictly exclusive,  in that bilateral agreements  cannot preclude  competition by  a  third party,  but 
do  in practice  give  rise  to  de  facto  regional  monopolies.  The  European 
Commission would  therefore  need  to  form  a  view as  to whether  such 
arrangements  are  compatible with  a  free  internal market  in natural  gas. 
5.35  The  1975  European Council Directive on  the  use  of gas  in power 
stations could also be  considered a  restriction of a  kind on the  free 
internal market.  Formulated in a  time  of perceived gas  shortage  and rising 
oil and gas prices,  there  are  convincing reasons  to believe that it is no 
longer appropriate  in an era of abundant  gas  reserves,  low  oil and  gas 
prices,  efficient gas  combined cycle  technology for  generating power  and 
growing  concern for  the  environmental  impact of other  forms  of electricity 
generation. 
Institutional issues 
5.36  In this section,  we  have discussed a  number  of  important  issues 
relating to  the regulation of a  common  carriage system.  While  the 
Commission has  received only one  complaint  to date  regarding access  to  gas 
pipeline systems,  this way  well be because  consumers  consider  they have  too 
much  to  lose by  complaining in the present environment.  Large users  can 
ill afford to  damage  relationships with  their existing gas  suppliers unless 
there  is an expectation of ultimate  advantage  and this expectation may  not 
exist at present,  since  there  is no  common  carriage  system in place  and  the 
cost of constructing entirely new  lines would normally be prohibitive for 
any but  the very largest or most  favourably  located of gas  consumers.  We 
therefore consider  that  the  introduction of a  common  carriage  regime  is 
likely to bring with it a  very significant increase  in the  number  of 
complaints which  the  Commission  receives.  This underlines  the  importance 
for  the  Commission,  not only of establishing a  clear approach  to  the 
principles underlying  the  establishment and regulation of a  common  carriage 
system,  but also of ensuring that it is institutionally prepared for  the 
extra workload of regulating a  complex  industry. 
5.37  The  US  experience of unwieldy over-regulation and  a  FERC  of some 
1,500  employees  is not  an  example  which  we  believe  Europe  should follow, 
but  from  1986  the  UK  has  recognised that a  small,  specific,  gas  industry 
regulatory body  is required to  administer  a  more  open market.  It would 
114 
• .. 
seem  appropriate,  therefore,  for  the  Commission  to  consider whether its 
existing institutions possess  the  resources,  expertise  and experience  of 
the  gas  sector to carry out this role.  In our view,  it may  be necessary  to 
consider  a  separate body with delegated powers  and  an ability to 
short-circuit some  of  the  more  time-consuming  Commission procedures  in 
order  to  reach decisions  in a  timely manner  appropriate  to  the  industry. 
There  may  also be  some  scope  for  delegating regulatory control to the 
individual Member  States,  though  this would create  some  danger of 
regulation being applied inconsistently,  with adverse  consequences  for  the 
free  and  fair circulation of natural  gas within the  Community. 
Recommendations 
5.38  In Section VI  of this report,  we  shall address  the  advantages  and 
drawbacks  of a  possible  gas  common  carriage system.  If the  European 
Commission,  in due  course,  reaches  the  conclusion that there  are net 
benefits to be had  from  such  a  system,  then it is vital that the  system 
introduced should be both effective  and,  as  far as  possible,  fair.  It is 
also most  important  that the  complexities raised by  developing and 
"policing"  such  a  system should not be  underestimated.  Within the  scope of 
this study,  we  have  only been able  to highlight some  of the key  issues,  but 
our  discussion and analysis  does  suggest  the  following  tentative 
recommendations  for  further consideration by  the  Commission:-
(a)  in order  to  promote  open access  and  third party gas  transportation in 
the  Community,  some  form  of  (qualified)  obligation to provide 
transportation and related services  should be  considered; 
(b)  any  such obligation should be  made  subject  to  the availability of 
sufficient spare  capacity  (or additional capacity which  could be  made 
available readily and at  low  investment cost by  the  transmission 
company  concerned),  over  and  above  that required to  provide  secure 
supplies  to existing or remaining customers,  taking into account  any 
reasonably  foreseeable  increase  in their demand  for  gas; 
(c)  existing statutory monopolies  to  import or transport gas  appear  to be 
incompatible with  open access  to  the  gas  grid and would logically 
need  to be  dismantled if an effective  common  carriage  system were 
desired.  The  physical construction and operation of gas  distribution 
networks  is  a  natural monopoly  and exclusive rights  to  "dig up  the 
roads"  should be  preserved,  but  this monopoly  should not preclude  the 
possibility of direct sales  to customers  on  the distribution grid, 
via common  carriage; (d)  even if the  Commission wishes  to  npolicen  the  common  carriage  system 
nby  exceptionn  (eg.  to  intervene  only  in response  to  complaints  that 
dominant  positions are being abused),  it should nevertheless  consider 
providing guidelines  on what  it considers  to be  reasonable  and fair, 
in the  interests of clarity and  transparency; 
(e)  for  example,  the  Commission  could stipulate that tariffs for  a  nfirmn 
(year round service)  should not  exceed  the  system owner's  average 
cost  (including fixed capacity costs)  for  the  type of facility 
concerned  (high pressure  transmission line or storage facility etc), 
including a  reasonable  return in line with that normally  earned by 
the utility concerned; 
(f)  charges  for  services  interruptible at the  option of the pipeline 
owner  should not,  however,  include capacity costs unless  they can be 
shown  to  impose  such  a  cost on  the  system; 
(g)  charges  for  common  carriage could then be left to  commercial 
negotiation,  within these  guidelines,  so  that pipeline owners  wishing 
to provide  services at lower  cost would be  free  to  do  so; 
(h)  the  Commission  should consider a  procedure  for publishing utilities' 
system  development proposals,  in order  to  allow  the  incorporation of 
third party capacity requirements,  where  practicable,  at the  cost of 
the  third party concerned; 
(i)  the  Commission  should develop  a  policy position in respect of unfair 
competitive practices,  including definition of predatory pricing or 
unreasonable  refusal  to carry third party gas,  in order  to permit  a 
clear response  to  any  complaints which might be  addressed to it in 
this regard;  and 
(j)  the  Commission  should also consider whether  its existing 
institutions,  gas  industry expertise  and  resources  are  adequate  to 
"policen  effectively a  system which will raise  a  number  of complex 
issues  and may  well  leave  to more  complaints being referred to it for 
resolution.  In particular,  the  Commission  may  wish  to consider the 
option of setting up  a  dedicated,  separate body with delegated powers 
but responsible  to  and reporting  to  the  Commission  itself. 
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VI  ADVANTAGES  AND  DRAWBACKS  OF  COMMON  CARRIAGE 
Introduction 
6.1  Having  assessed  the  energy  policy,  gas  market  and legislative 
environment  into which  a  common  carriage  system might  be  introduced, 
together with  the  sort of system which  would be  required to  promote  a  more 
open  internal  gas  market,  we  now  turn  to  the  advantages  and drawbacks  of 
common  carriage.  For  the  purposes  of this discussion,  we  assume  that  the 
system would be  an effective  one  (at least in the  long  run)  and  we  examine 
in turn the  likely  impact  of common  carriage  on:-
(a)  gas  consumers  - small  users,  large  industrial consumers  and power 
plants; 
(b)  the  gas  industry  in the  Community  - transmission companies, 
distributors  and  Community  gas  producers;  and 
(c)  the  interests of  the  European  Community  as  a  whole. 
6.2  It is  important at the  outset of this discussion to  distinguish 
between effects of common  carriage which would  simply  involve  a 
redistribution of  income  within  the  Community  and  those  which would 
generate additional benefits  for  the  Community  as  a  whole.  Some  of the 
impact  of a  common  carriage  system might be  to  transfer  income  or profits 
as  be  tween: -
(a)  different gas  industry organisations  (eg between  transmission 
companies  and  indigenous  gas  producers  or between  transmission 
companies  and distributors); 
(b)  different consumers  or classes  of consumers;  or 
(c)  gas  suppliers  and  consumers. 
To  the  extent that economic  rents  are  merely  reallocated without changing 
the  total resource  cost of gas  supply  in the  Community,  the  impact must  be 
carefully assessed but  the benefit to  the  Community  as  a  whole  would not be 
substantial. 6.3  Real benefits  to  the  Community  as  a  whole  rely  on  some  identifiable 
reduction  in the  economic  resource  cost of energy  supply.  This  could 
conceivably come  about  through:-
(a)  a  reduction  in the  real  resource  cost of gas  production within the 
Community  as  a  result of greater competition and  increased efficiency 
or perhaps  a  geographical  restructuring of production towards  lower 
cost areas; 
(b)  a  reduction in the  cost  (border  price)  of gas  imported  into  the 
Community  from  non-EC  producing countries; 
(c)  a  reduction in the  non-gas  resource costs of gas  supply,  again as  a 
result of increased efficiency or  a  rationalisation of industry 
activities promoted by  common  carriage;  or 
(d)  a  substitution of natural  gas  for  other more  costly forms  of energy 
supply which might  not be  expected to  take  place without  common 
carriage. 
The  benefits which  might  ensue  would  thus  be  a  combination of what 
economists  call  "X  efficiency"  improvements  (given organisations providing 
the  same  result at lower  resource  cost  than they did before)  and resource 
allocation improvements  resulting  from  improved pricing signals  and  a 
rationalisation of activity  in the direction of the  more  efficient 
operators  in the sector.  Our  list of effects set out above  focuses  on  the 
possible benefits  to  the  Community;  arguments  could be  and have  been made 
that the  impact will be  in the  opposite direction and it is  therefore 
necessary  to  give consideration to  the balance  of probability and  the 
likely net benefit in each case. 
6.4  Even if it can be  demonstrated  that common  carriage  is likely to  lead 
to  significant positive net benefits  to  the  Community  as  a  whole,  it will 
nevertheless be  important to establish: 
(a)  a  clear assessment  of the  likely  'winners'  and  'losers'  from  common 
carriage and  the  nature  and extent of  the  gains  or  losses;  and 
(b)  a  realistic appraisal of any  increased risks  (in  terms  of supply 
security or vulnerability  to  external  energy  market  "shocks")  that 
might be  entailed by  a  common  carriage  system at the  Community  level. 6.5  Having  identified the  key  issues,  we  now  examine  the  likely  impact  of 
an effective  common  carriage  system  on  consumers  and  the  gas  industry, 
followed  by  an assessment  of  the  advantages  and  drawbacks  for  the  Community 
as  a  whole. 
Impact  on  gas  consumers 
6.6  As  mentioned  above,  we  consider  in this sub-section the  impact  on 
three  main categories  of  gas  consumers  - small users,  large  industrial 
consumers  and  power  plants.  First,  we  look at  the  impact  on household gas 
consumers  and  other  small users. 
Small  consumers 
6.7  As  suggested  in Section III above,  it is almost  inconceivable  that 
individual households  or other  small  consumers  would be  in a  position to 
take  direct advantage  of a  common  carriage  system.  It is therefore  to be 
presumed  that small  consumers  will,  in general,  continue  to be provided 
with gas  by  their existing supplier,  be  it a  local distributor or  (in some 
cases)  the  integrated national  gas  company.  The  impact  of common  carriage 
on  small  consumers  would  therefore  depend  largely on:-
(a)  the  extent  to which  their suppliers are affected by  common  carriage; 
and 
(b)  the  extent  to  which  those  suppliers pass  on  any net costs or benefits 
to  their customers. 
6.8  Perhaps  the first point  to be  made  here  is that,  in some  Member 
States,  the possibility of small  consumers'  existing gas  suppliers  taking 
advantage  of a  common  carriage  system  does  not arise.  In both  France  and 
the United Kingdom,  there  is  a  vertically integrated gas  company 
responsible  for  transmission and distribution,  with  the  exception of the 
SNGSO  and  CeFeM  supply areas  in France.  Ireland is also experiencing 
increasing integration of  BGE  into  the  municipal  distribution end of the 
business.  Effectively,  therefore,  the  supplier of gas  to  small  consumers 
must  be  taken as  given. 
111 6.9  In other Member  States,  there  is  in principle  the possibility that 
local distributors  could buy  direct  from  producers,  as  has  happened  to  some 
extent  in the United States.  For  reasons  which  we  examine  in the 
sub-section dealing with  the  impact  on  distribution companies  below,  it 
appears unlikely that many  would  be  both willing to  do  so  and also  in a 
position to obtain gas  on  more  favourable  terms  than at present.  If this 
conclusion holds,  then  the  direct  impact  on  small  gas  consumers  of a  common 
carriage  system would  be  slight. 
6.10  It could,  however,  be  argued  that even if the  use  of common  carriage 
is largely confined  to  major  industrial users  or  gas-using power  stations, 
the  introduction of new  competitive pressures  into  the  gas  market  could 
lead to  a  general  reduction in costs,  to  the benefit of all consumers 
including smaller users.  This  is  a  complex question  to  which  we  will 
return below;  in our view,  the  key  cost element  is  the  price of gas 
purchased  from  producing countries  and  there  is considerable uncertainty as 
to  whether  the  introduction of additional buyers  would  force  a  general 
reduction in gas  purchase  costs.  The  current  "buyers'  market"  conditions 
for  gas  supplies  into  the  Community  provide  a  favourable  environment,  but 
the  market  also  looks  set  to  remain  an oligopoly and  this makes  the  outcome 
much  more  uncertain.  Perhaps  the  most  important point as  regards  small 
users  is that,  even if a  general  reduction  in costs  could be  achieved,  it 
would probably require  a  more  competitive situation in residential and 
commercial  energy markets  to  ensure  that  the benefits were  passed on  fully 
to  small  gas  consumers.  Our  assessment  is  therefore  that even  the  indirect 
benefits  to  small  users  of gas  common  carriage  system are both highly 
uncertain and probably  rather limited. 
6.11  There  could,  in fact,  be  a  number  of ways  in which  small  gas 
consumers  could be  adversely affected by  common  carriage.  If,  for  example, 
pipeline  owners  were  obliged to provide  services at marginal  (or variable) 
cost  to  large end-users  who  currently buy  gas  at prices which  reflect full 
average  co.st.  (including fixed costs),  then  they could well  seek  to  recover 
a  higher proportion of fixed costs  in prices  to distribution companies  and 
thus  to  small users.  A similar effect could result if the  loss  of large 
consumers  to  direct marketing  leads  transmission companies  to  incur 
take-or-pay penalties  which  would  then have  to be  recovered  from  the 
remaining  customers.  In  the  longer  term,  competing  fuel  prices  would 
probably place  some  limit on  the  extent  to  which  costs  would be  passed on 
to  the  residential/co~nercial markets  in this  way,  but  in the  short  term there would be  little market  (as  opposed  to political)  resistance  to  such 
moves. 
6.12  There  remains  one  further  aspect which  should,  perhaps,  be 
considered.  If it could be  demonstrated  that a  gas  common  carriage  system 
would  allow  the  efficient use  of natural  gas  in combined cycle power 
stations  to  flourish  in  a  way  which  would not be  likely without it,  thus 
allowing power  to  be  generated at reduced cost,  then  there  might be 
considerable  indirect benefits of  gas  common  carriage for households  and 
other small  electricity consumers,  as  well  as  for  large users  of power. 
The  likely  impact  of a  gas  common  carriage  system  on  the  power  sector is 
addressed in a  separate sub-section below.  In brief,  our view is that if 
the  increased use  of  gas  in power  stations  is economically and commercially 
attractive  then,  in the  present circumstances  of abundant  gas  reserves  and 
relatively slow projected growth  in  "mature"  gas  markets,  it would not 
generally require  common  carriage  to  make  it happen.  Nevertheless,  the 
favourable  position of power  generators  as  potential direct buyers  of gas 
via common  carriage would  undoubtedly contribute  downward  pressure  on  the 
price of gas  to  power  stations if a  carriage alternative were  available  to 
them.  There  are  already  some  signs  of  this  in the  UK,  where  would-be 
gas-fired power  generators  are  considering the  direct supply option as well 
as  purchases  from  BG.  Even  if power plants did not actually purchase 
direct via common  carriage,  our view  is  that  the  mere  existence of a  gas 
common  carriage option would probably be  of benefit to electricity 
consumers  in those  Member  States where  gas  use  in power  stations is likely 
to  increase.  We  therefore  consider  that household energy consumers  may 
perhaps  be  more  likely to benefit  from  a  gas  common  carriage  system in 
their role  as  electricity purchasers,  rather  than as  users  of gas  itself. 
6.13  In summary,  there  is clearly an  important distinction to be  made  here 
between large  and  small  gas  consumers.  A number  of large users  (though 
even here it is probably  a  minority)  are  strong advocates  of common 
carriage  and believe  that  they would benefit significantly from it.  The 
"burden of proof"  in this  regard appears  to lie mainly with  those  who 
oppose  common  carriage  to  demonstrate  why  increased competition should not 
be  permitted.  In marked contrast,  many  millions  of small  gas  users  are  in 
\  'b\. effect bystanders  in  the  sphere  of common  carriage  and  in this case  the 
burden of proof would  appear  to lie with  the  large  consumer  proponents  of 
common  carriage  to  demonstrate  that  there would  also be  significant 
benefits  to  small  users.  There  may  be  a  separate  argument  which  turns  on 
the  macro-economic  benefits  to  society of lower  industrial  gas  costs,  but 
we  consider  that there  is  no  convincing case  for  the  argument  that small 
gas  consumers  would derive  significant direct benefits  from  a  common 
carriage  system. 
Industrial  consumers 
6.14  The  position as  regards  large  industrial consumers  is rather 
different and  a  number  would  undoubtedly be  keen  to  try and buy  gas  direct 
from  the producers.  For  the  foreseeable  future,  however,  direct interest 
in common  carriage  is likely to  be  confined  to  a  relatively small  number  of 
very large users,  many  but not all of whom  are  in the  chemical  industry. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  most  likely direct buyers  are  found  in highly 
energy-intensive sectors where  relative  gas  costs are  an  important element 
of their overall competitive position in international markets.  Moreover, 
the  large  gas  consumers  found  in the  chemicals  and  (to  a  lesser extent) 
steel industries  often have  the high volume,  high  load factor  gas  offtakes 
which  would  given  them  a  reasonable  prospect of negotiating attractive 
direct purchase  terms.  Since  a  number  of major oil companies  do  not 
support  the  idea of  gas  common  carriage,  independent  chemicals  concerns  are 
probably more  likely to  be  direct purchasers  than  the majors'  downstream 
chemicals  subsidiaries.  In  the  case  of Italy,  heavy  ENI  involvement  in the 
chemicals  sector as  well  as  in the  gas  business  could make  common  carriage 
initiatives less  likely.  Elsewhere  in continental  Europe,  moves  to buy 
direct are  perhaps  most  likely in the  major  industrialised countries of  NW 
Europe  with  developed  gas  industries  (B,D,F  and NL),  since more  options  are 
available  to would-be  direct purchasers.  One  particular possibility is 
that large users  might  approach producing countries  who  do  not  as yet sell 
gas  into  the  national  market,  as  with  the  USSR  in the  case of Belgium or 
Algeria in the  case of West  Germany,  for  example.  These  producers  would 
not be  encumbered by  business  relationships with  the  importing gas  utility 
in  the  markets  concerned.  In  the  UK,  the  common  carriage  system already  in 
force  and  the  possibility of relatively  low  volume  direct supplies  (from 
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• smaller fields)  could mean  that would-be  direct purchasers will  emerge  in a 
number  of different  industrial sectors.  More  generally,  however,  the 
chemicals  and  (possibly)  steel sectors  are  likely to  predominate.  Other 
large  consumers  might ultimately benefit  from  the  emergence  of a  more 
competitive  gas  market,  but  in the  short  to  medium  term  there  are likely to 
be  a  limited number  of potential industrial direct buyers. 
6.15  For  the  use  common  carriage  to proceed,  it is merely axiomatic  that 
both producer  and  end-consumer  must  see  an  advantage  in direct supply 
arrangements.  While  industrial  consumers  typically have  fairly short  time 
horizons,  gas  producers  are  used  to  taking a  very  long view of the market  -
as  evidenced by  the  conclusion of  the  Troll  deal  at a  time  of low  gas 
prices,  for  example,  or  the  direct sale of UK  Miller  gas  to  the  Peterhead 
power  station at a  price  which  appears  to  be  below  that which British Gas 
might have  offered,  even allowing  for  the  producers'  saving in gas 
processing costs.  Arguably,  therefore,  there are  precedents  for producers 
taking a  strategic view where  the  short-term advantage  appears  slight,  but 
the point remains  that producers  need  to  see  a  benefit to  them  from  direct 
sales,  be it short or  long  term  in nature. 
6.16  Few  Community  gas  producers  (outside  the  UKCS)  have  much  potential 
gas  production waiting  to  be  sold which  cannot find  a  place  in today's 
market.  This  is  true  of  France,  West  Germany,  Italy and offshore 
Netherlands,  for  example.  There  exists  the  potential  to  step up  output 
from  Groningen,  but  the  Dutch  Government  is not  looking  to  expand  gas 
exports  any  further,  for  long  term depletion policy and  supply security 
reasons.  This  means  that  the  main potential sources  of direct supplies  to 
continental  Europe  in the  short  to  medium  term are  non-Community  gas 
producing countries,  principally Algeria,  Norway  and  the  USSR.  All of 
these  tend  to sell gas  on  a  fairly high  load factor basis,  for  economic 
(capacity utilisation)  reasons. 6.17  Among  the  principal  concerns  of  these  potential direct suppliers  of 
natural  gas  are  likely  to  be:-
(a)  buyers'  take-or-pay  commitments; 
(b)  offtake volumes; 
(c)  security of offtake; 
(d)  load factor  of supply;  and 
(e)  price  and price  indexation. 
In relation to  the  non-price  factors  referred to  above,  it will generally 
be  the  case  that:-
(a)  most  large  industrial  customers  could only  commit  themselves  to 
take-or-pay for  (at most)  5-10 years  ahead,  as  compared  to  20-25  year 
commitments  from  gas utility buyers; 
(b)  there are very  few  industrial users  who  take  more  than 0.5  bcmja,  for 
example,  but  this  is only equivalent  to  a  fairly small  North  Sea  gas 
field and is very  small  in comparison  to  the major  international 
supply contracts,  which  are not  field-specific.  Although volume 
would not be  all-important  to  a  producer  looking  for  suppleme~tary 
outlets at the  margin,  there  could still be  a  concern that 
relationships with  a  10  bern/a utility customer  should not be  put at 
risk for  the  sake  of a  relatively small  supply  increment  which  could 
be  gained  through  common  carriage; 
(c)  the  long  term  future  of energy-intensive manufacturing businesses  in 
the  Community  is  likely  to  face  growing  competition from  low cost 
areas  such  as  the  Middle  East,  thus  raising doubts  as  to  the  long 
term security of direct supply offtakes.  Moreover,  plant maintenance 
or unplanned  downtime  at the buyer's site could  impair  the  short-term 
offtake security of direct sales,  as  compared  to  the  relative 
stability of offtakes  assured by  gas utility buyers with  a 
diversified portfolio of customers.  There  is also  an offtake 
security point relating to  the  configuration of  the  European  gas 
grid.  If a  consumer  were  seeking  to  buy direct  from  a  source which 
would not normally be  physically able  to  deliver  gas  to him,  then  the 
producer would  be  dependent  on  a  gas  "swap"  with  some  other  source  to 
effect delivery.  The  possibility of  a  supply failure  in the  other producing  country  involved  would  therefore  imply  a  loss of offtake 
security for  the  country  making  the  direct supply.  If Soviet gas 
were  sold direct  to  gas  consumers  in southern Italy or northern West 
Germany,  for  example,  then  those  consumers  might continue  to get 
physical  supply  from  Algeria  and  Norway  respectively and  the  USSR 
would be  adversely affected by  a  supply shortfall on  the part of 
these  other producers;  and 
(d)  quite  a  number  of large  industrial buyers  are able  to  take  gas  on 
high  load factor,  for  chemical  feedstocks,  auto-generation or other 
process  users.  Where  this  is not  the  case  (a minority of large 
users),  most  producers  would still be  looking  to sell on  a  high  load 
factor  and  the  industrial user might  therefore need  to hire storage 
capacity from  a  gas  transmission company. 
6.18  In general,  the  non-price  "package"  which  large  industrial consumers 
could offer to  the  gas  producing countries  is likely to be  less attractive 
than that which  purchasing gas utilities currently provide.  One  way  in 
which  industrial buyers  might  overcome  this is by  forming  a  purchasing 
consortium or by acting  through  a  traderjbroker,  although this might raise 
difficulties for  them  where,  as  large  industrial concerns,  they are  in 
competition with one  another.  In any  event,  it can be  argued that the 
direct buyer acting alone  would normally have  to offer a  higher price  than 
that currently paid by  importing  gas  utilities in order to offset the 
non-price  disadvantages  which  the  producer may  perceive  in selling direct. 
There  is,  in fact,  some  tentative evidence  that such  a  situation may  have 
arisen in the  past.  In an attempt  to break into  the  West  German  market,  BP 
subsidiary Gelsenberg  agreed  an early 1980s  purchase price for  Norwegian 
gas  of around  $6.00/mmBtu,  above  the  $5.50  base price  for Statfjord gas 
delivered to  the  continental utilities'  buying consortium at Emden.  (Since 
then,  the  continental buyers  have  renegotiated their purchase price,  while 
Gelsenberg have  had  to  abandon  their attempt at market entry).  Similarly, 
Elf Aquitaine  were  reportedly offering a  higher price  for Troll/Sleipner 
gas  they  required for  SNGSO  than  that agreed between  the  Norwegians  and  the 
consortium of continental utility buyers.  Most  recently,  the base price 
for  SEP's  2  bern/a  gas  purchase  from  Norway  is understood  to be  above  the 
current  "E"  tariff price  they would  otherwise pay Gasunie,  though  SEP  are 
hoping  that  the  indexation provisions will bring the  Norwegian price lower in the  long  term  as oil prices  rise  in real  terms.  There  is  thus  an 
argument  that new  entrants  to  the  gas  buying business  might  have  to  pay  a 
"strategic premium"  above  the  going  market  rate  in order  to  buy  their way 
into  the  market. 
6.19  An  important point  to bear  in mind  is that the  international gas 
market  is scarcely a  model  of atomistic perfect competition.  It is 
effectively oligopolisticjoligopsonistic,  with perhaps  only  three  or  four 
large potential sources  of direct gas  supplies  to  consumers  in continental 
Western  Europe,  informally recognised  "rules of  the  game"  and buying 
consortia which  effectively reduce  the  number  of  independent buyers  to  a 
handful.  This  market  is  therefore unlikely  to  function like  a  perfectly 
competitive market,  even if common  carriage were  to  double  or treble  the 
number  of buyers.  Oligopolisticjoligopsonistic markets  can be  unstable  and 
much  depends  on  the  strategic thinking of the  significant players.  This 
therefore raises  the possibility that an  industrial  consumer  might  obtain 
gas  at a  lower price  than  the  major  purchasing gas  utilities,  if the 
producer concerned believes  that it is  thereby possible  to  "buy"  a  more 
than proportionate  increase  in market  share.  A producer might  consider 
that a  specific price  reduction  to  a  large direct buyer  could stimulate 
extra gas  consumption  on  the buyer's part.  This  might be  achieved  through 
substitution of low  cost,  low quality fuel oil,  for  example,  increased 
auto-generation to displace electricity purchased  from  the  grid or higher 
ammonia  production levels using  feedstocks  of natural  gas.  The  producer's 
aim would be  to grant  a  specific discount  and  thus  avoid having  to  give  an 
across-the-board price  reduction  to all industrial users  through 
renegotiations with  the  purchasing  gas  utility.  This  would  require  the 
producer  to be  fairly  sure  that:-
(a)  its gas utility customer(s)  will not  immediately be  able  to  demand 
and  secure  the  equivalent price  reduction;  and  that 
(b)  other producers will not perceive  a  threat to  their market  share  and 
thus  trigger off a  &eneral  round of competitive  price cutting. 
6.20  The  best result for  industrial  gas  consumers  would arise if at least 
one  major  producer  can be  persuaded  to  take  this risk and  turns  out  to have 
made  a  mistake,  in that  a  &eneral  imported  gas  price  reduction follows 
f. through  a  process  of gas-to-gas  competition.  Whether  producing countries 
would  in fact  seek  to  "buy"  market  share  in this  way  if a  common  carriage 
system were  introduced  into  the  Community  is  a  matter  for  judgement. 
Recent history suggests  that  there  is  a  tacit understanding between  the 
major  producers  that  none  will  seek  to  undercut  the  "going rate"  by very 
much;  of all producers,  the  USSR  may  be  in the best position to  do  so,  but 
in practice its prices  are  typically only  a  little below  those  for  Dutch  or 
Norwegian  supplies.  If producers  were  to  continue  to  take  this  approach, 
then common  carriage would  probably not  produce  a  significant reduction  in 
gas  prices  to  industrial users.  If,  however,  one  producer  seeks  to  "break 
the  ring",  then gas-to-gas  competition could ensure  and bring a  general 
price reduction with it. 
6.21  In the U.S.,  open access  gas  transportation has  indeed stimulated 
gas-to-gas  competition and  resulted in significantly lower  gas  prices  for 
large  industrial users  - typically around  $1.50/mmBtu  (ECU  0.05jm3)  in mid 
1988  as  against  a  Dutch  "E"  tariff of  some  $2.50.  As  we  have  pointed out, 
however,  this arose  in circumstances  where  there were very many  U.S. 
producers with shut-in,  low  cost  gas  production and  a  need  to  find a  market 
for  cash  flow  reasons,  combined with  a  substantial excess  of long distance 
pipeline capacity.  European conditions are  totally different and it would 
be  unwise  to predict  the  same  result.  In the current European market 
situation,  the  impact  of a  common  carriage system  on  gas  import purchase 
prices  - perhaps  the  central  issue  of  this whole  inquiry  - must  be  regarded 
as  an  open question since  so  much  depends  on  the market  reaction of the 
major  players.  To  the  extent that past behaviour is a  reliable guide  to 
future  conduct  in a  different environment  in which  common  carriage were 
established,  our view  is that a  very significant reduction in gas  purchase 
prices  to  industrial consumers  is rather unlikely over  the  medium  term,  at 
least. 
6.22  The  belief that  common  carriage  would  lead to  lower border prices  for 
imported gas  supplies  is almost  certainly the  main motivating factor for 
those  large  industrial consumers  who  would be  interested in the  opportunity 
to  buy  direct  from  producers.  There  could,  however,  be  other advantages 
which  they consider  important,  such as:-(a)  the  opportunity  to  try  to  negotiate  price  indexation clauses  which 
are  more  appropriate  to  their requirements;  or 
(b)  the  chance  to  take  advantage  of relatively  low  non-gas  costs  imposed 
on  the  system. 
We  consider each of these points  in turn below. 
6.23  A  few  very large  industrial users  (eg  cement  plants)  may  regard coal 
as  a  major alternative  fuel  to  gas,  as  well  as  (or  instead of)  HFO.  Gas 
feedstock users  could also  argue  that  HFO  is  an  irrelevant marker price as 
regards  the  market  for  gas-based  ammonia,  for  example.  Some  industrial 
users  may  therefore  take  the  view  that,  especially if oil prices rise in 
real  terms  in the  future,  the  tendency  of gas utilities to link selling 
prices  for  gas  to  those  of oil products  is  inappropriate  and likely to  make 
gas  unduly expensive.  In practice,  some  gas utilities have been fairly 
flexible  in meeting coal  competition  (during 1984-5,  for  example)  and  in 
adjusting to  the  economics  of gas  feedstock use.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a 
general  argument  that large users  might prefer to  see whether  they can 
negotiate  something better for  themselves. 
6.24  The  non-gas  cost of  supplying particular large  industrial consumers 
may  vary  considerably,  depending  on  load factor,  location,  delivery 
pressure  and  a  number  of other factors.  Individual  consumers  with high 
load factors,  located on  the high-pressure  transmission grid or near  to  the 
border at which  gas  is  imported may  consider  that their gas  purchase price 
(linked to  the  HFO  price,  for  example)  exceeds  the  current border price  for 
imported gas,  plus  any  non-gas  (transmission and  storage)  costs which  they 
impose  on  the  system.  They  might  therefore  see  advantages  in a  direct 
supply via common  carriage,  even  though  they  do  not expect  to be  able  to 
undercut  the border price already obtained by  the  purchasing utility.  This 
could be  the  case,  especially,  in Member  States where  a  "premium"  fuel  (eg 
gas  oil)  related gas  price applies  to  premium  industrial applications,  as 
in the  UK  and West  Germany. 
6.25  So  far,  we  have  largely been discussing  the  impact  of  a  common 
carriage  system  on  those  industrial users  who,  themselves,  would be 
interested in seeking  to  buy  gas  direct via common  carriage.  It is, 
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( however,  important  to  recall  that many  industrial  users  - especially those 
using  gas  mainly  for  seasonal,  space  heating purposes  - use  relatively 
little gas  and  are  unlikely  to  be  in a  position to  buy direct.  The  impact 
of a  common  carriage  system on  them  may  depend  to  some  extent  on  the 
natural  gas  pricing system  in force  for  industrial  sales.  To  the  extent 
that very large users  are  able  to  secure benefits  from  common  carriage, 
transmission companies  may  then be  prompted  to  improve  their terms  of 
supply  in order  to  remain attractive.  If there  is  a  non-discriminary 
tariff system  in force,  then  improvements  offered in order  to  fend off 
direct marketing competition for very  large  consum~rs will  tend to  spread 
automatically  to  other users.  (The  transmission  rompany  would,  of course, 
weigh  up  these  across-the-board concessions  against  the  cost of simply 
foregoing  sales  to  the  very large  consumers(s)  concerned).  Where  prices 
with large  industrial users  are  individually negotiated,  however,  this 
"spreading"  of competitive benefits  across  the  industrial market  is 
somewhat  less  likely to  occur. 
6.26  In the  section on  small  residential/commercial users,  we  raised the 
possibility that  transmission companies  losing part of the  market  to direct 
sales could seek  to  pass  more  of their fixed costs  (including  any 
take-or-pay penalties)  on  to  the  remaining  consumers.  Many  smaller 
industrial consumers  would be  protected to  some  extent  from  this by 
inter-fuel competition and  (in some  countries)  by unified industrial tariff 
systems  which make  it difficult to discriminate between  that part of the 
industrial market  which  is  under competitive  threat  from  direct supplies 
and  that part which  is more  "captive
11  to  the existing gas  supplier. 
Nevertheless,  there  are  many  smaller industrial users of firm  gas  who  do 
not,  in the  short  term,  have  any  economically attractive alternative to  gas 
- perhaps because  they  do  not have  the  space  to  install oil tanks  on their 
site.  Moreover,  several  countries  do  have  separate  tariffs for  large and 
small  industrial users  which  could allow a  gap  to  open  up  between  them  in 
the  event of a  common  carriage  system being  introduced.  There  is, 
therefore,  the possibility of an  adverse  impact  - certainly in relative and 
possible also  in absolute  terms  - on  the  smaller end of the  industrial gas 
market. Power  Stations 
6.27  Gas-fired power  stations  are very  much  a  special  case  among  the 
largest users  of natural  gas,  since  their size  and  location on  the 
transmission grid make  them  particularly suitable  for  a  direct supply  from 
producers.  They  might  also be  able  to  provide  the  long-term  take-or-pay 
commitments  which  producers  are  looking for  and which  most  industrial gas 
users  (even large ones)  are  unable  to  provide.  Particularly if gas  were 
used  for base  load generation,  the  load factor of supply would also be 
attractive  to  producers.  However,  conventional,  single-cycle  gas  stations 
are  not generally economic  to  run  in the base  load,  which is often filled 
by  coal and/or nuclear  generation.  In  the  Netherlands  and  West  Germany, 
for  example,  gas  is currently used  in  the  peak/middle  load and  this would 
be  less attractive to  producers  than  a  base  load or base/middle  load sale. 
In Italy,  ENEL  run their  gas  stations  on  a  higher  load factor,  but their 
multi-fuel concept  (oil/gas or  even coal/oil/gas stations)  precludes  the 
use  of efficient gas  combined  cycle  technology.  Gas  used  in this way  would 
have  a  value  equivalent  to  the  lower  of  HFO  and coal prices  and  this is 
unlikely  to  be  very attractive  to  a  gas  producer. 
6.28  At  current prices,  the  use  of  gas  in efficient combined cycle plant 
may  now  find  a  place  in  the  middle/base  load.  This  relatively high value, 
high  load factor  use  puts  power  companies  in an even  stronger position to 
buy direct,  as  illustrated by  the  recent reported deal  between  SEP  of  the 
Netherlands  and  the  Norwegians.  In  the  UK,  where  considerable extra 
generating capacity is  required  in  the  1990s,  the  proposed electricity 
privatisation is giving  a  further  stimulus  to  interest in gas-fired power 
generation and  a  number  of new  power  consortia are  looking at the direct 
purchase/common carriage option as  well  as  supplies  from British Gas. 
Interest in gas  use  in power  stations is,  however,  country-specific;  there 
is  no  demand  in France,  where  nuclear stations predominate,  and  there is 
unlikely  to  be  much  interest in West  Germany  for  the  foreseeable  future  due 
to  excess  installed capacity,  unless  liberalisation of  the  European power 
market  increases  the  pressure  to  substitute high cost  indigenous  coal with 
other,  cheaper  fuels.  Nevertheless,  there  is clearly a  number  of Member 
States  in which  a  major  opportunity exists  to  expand  gas  sales  into  power 
stations.  Unlike  the  industrial sector,  where  many  of  those  seeking  to  buy 
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direct would be  existing gas  consumers,  the  power  sector is likely to  to 
have  a  much  higher proportion of potential  new  gas-using plants. 
6.29  As  discussed earlier in  this  section VI,  we  do  not  consider  that 
common  carriage  is generally a  necessary condition for efficient gas  use  in 
power  stations  to  develop.  If there  is a  new  and attractive power  station 
market  for  gas,  then gas utilities will almost certainly seek  to  take 
advantage  of the  opportunity,  especially when  other  gas  demand  is  growing 
only  slowly  in mature  markets.  For  example,  British Gas,  for  a  long period 
held in check by  Government  policy  and its own  perception of gas  as  a 
"noble  fuel"  in short  supply,  is  now  actively engaged  in negotiations  for 
sale  to  power  stations.  A certain flexibility in approach  is needed  to 
sell into  the  power  market,  as  the alternative fuel  to  gas  is  frequently 
coal  and not oil.  Gasunie's  policy of only selling to  power  stations at 
HFO-related prices  ("E"  tariff)  appears  to have  been part of the  reason for 
SEP's  deal with Norway,  which  is understood  to have  a  mixed coal/inflation 
rate price  indexation.  In general,  however,  it would not appear  to be  in 
gas  transmission companies'  interests  to  stand in the way  of developing a 
new  market  and it would be  surprising if they were  to  do  so. 
6.30  Where  common  carriage  is having  an  impact  in the  UK  is  in providing 
new  power  station projects with  a  choice  of supplier  and  a  degree  of 
gas-to-gas  competition.  Even  if the  new  consortia or existing utilities do 
not ultimately buy  their gas  supplies  direct  from  the producers,  it is 
likely that the  threat of competition  from  direct sales will secure better 
purchase  terms  from  British Gas  than would be  the  case if there were  no 
alternative  gas  supplier for  this attractive new  market.  The  import  option 
used by  SEP  (although  probably not  involving common  carriage  in this case) 
also  illustrates  the  flexibility  to  secure appropriate  terms  which  a  common 
carriage  system might  facilitate.  Similar competitive  pressures  could 
contribute  towards  the  development  of new,  low-cost electricity generation 
capacity in other Member  States,  especially those with  a  need  for 
additional  power  system capacity.  Such  Member  States  could  include 
Belgium,  Italy and  Denmark,  as  well  as  the Netherlands  and  the UK.  The 
achievement of maximum  benefit might  also  require  some  liberalisation of 
the  power  sector as  well  as  the  gas  sector,  but  gas  common  carriage by 
itself could make  a  significant contribution in this  area. 
141 Impact  on  the  Gas  Industry 
6.31  Having  reviewed  the  possible  impact  of  a  gas  common  carriage  system 
on  the  three  main  categories  of  gas  consumers,  we  now  turn in this 
sub-section to  the  impact  on  the  gas  industry within the  Community.  The 
possible  impact  on  local  gas  distribution companies,  gas  transmission 
companies  and  Community  gas  producers  are  each discussed,  beginning with 
the  local distribution companies. 
Distribution Companies 
6.32  As  discussed in the  earlier sub-section on  small  (residential/ 
commercial)  consumers,  it is  important  to  be  aware  that  the  issue of impact 
on distribution companies  does  not arise at all in the United Kingdom  and 
scarcely arises  in France  or  the Republic  of Ireland,  since  the  gas 
industries are vertically integrated or very nearly so.  Elsewhere,  we  need 
to  distinguish between countries  like  Denmark,  where  local distributors 
supply virtually all ends-users  apart  from  power  stations,  and  those  (such 
as  Belgium,  Italy and  the  Netherlands)  where  the  local distributors  supply 
mainly residential  and  commercial  users.  In West  Germany,  the position is 
intermediate  in that larger Stadtwerke  often have  a  significant  (minority) 
portion of industrial sales  in their market  mix.  The  West  German  situation 
is also unusual  in that many  Stadtwerke buy  gas  from  a  regional 
transmission company  who  in turn purchase  from  an  importing utility 
(usually Ruhrgas)  or  gas  producer  (such as  BEB). 
6.33  Before  analysing  these  different situations  in more  detail,  it may  be 
helpful  to  make  a  few  general  remarks  about  the ability of local 
distributors  to buy direct.  First,  many  distributors  take  quite  small 
volumes  of gas,  especially  in West  Germany  where  there  are  500  local 
companies  and  in Italy where  there  are  around  2000.  Second,  few  have 
significant gas  storage  facilities of their own  and  thus  typically take  gas 
on  a  very poor  load factor,  with considerable weather-related fluctuations 
in offtakes.  Third,  many  are  restricted to  a  particular gas  quality in 
order  to  permit safe utilisation in small  consumers'  appliances  - something 
which  is rarely a  constraint for  large  industrial users.  If they were  to 
buy direct,  many  local utilities would  face  tougher  non-price  terms  -
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capacity charges  and  take-or-pay  commitments  - which  they  do  not currently 
face.  In the  case  of direct supplies  at high  load factor,  they would have 
to  pay not  only  for  third party carriage  (transportation),  but also  for 
storage  in order  to  meet  seasonal  demand  fluctuations.  Thus  the 
distributor would either have  to  take  on,  or pay  for  as  ''unbundled" 
services,  all the  functions  which  are  currently exercised by  the 
transmission company  prior  to  supply at the city gate.  Particularly for 
smaller distribution companies,  therefore,  a  direct purchase would raise 
complex  commercial  and  technical  issues with which  they are not equipped  to 
deal.  From  the  producer's  point of view,  it is also more  attractive to 
sell to  a  large,  secure  transmission company  buyer  than to  a  large number 
of small distributors. 
6.34  In some  Member  States,  there  is also  a  degree  of common  ownership  as 
between transmission companies  and  local distributors,  which  makes  it less 
likely that  the latter would  seek to by-pass  the  former  and purchase  gas 
direct from producers.  This  is particularly true of Belgium and Italy,  for 
example.  The  private  Intercom/Tractabel  group  who  hold  33%  of Distrigaz 
are  also  responsible  for  a  significant portion of local gas  distribution in 
Belgium,  while  the  Italgas  group  (effectively controlled by  SNAM  as 
dominant  shareholder  through  their 40%  interest)  accounts  for  some  25-30% 
of all gas  distribution in Italy,  often in joint venture with  the 
municipality concerned.  In  these  circumstances,  direct purchasing by  the 
local distributor appears  particularly unlikely. 
6.35  There  are also  contractual barriers  to  common  carriage in some 
instances,  as  in the  Netherlands.  VEGIN,  the  association of Dutch  gas 
distributors,  is committed  to purchase  the  gas it requires  exclusively  from 
Gasunie,  under  the  terms  of an  "evergreen"  long  term contract.  Even if 
VEGIN  were  in a  strong position to  deal direct with producers  - which it is 
not,  for  the  reasons  set out  in the  previous paragraph  - it would  s~ill be 
in breach of contract if it attempted  to  do  so. 
6.36  In the  West  German  situation,  there  is  a  further possibility not 
encountered elsewhere.  Those  local distributors who  currently buy  from  a 
regional  transmission  company  (Bayerngas,  Gas  Versorgung  Suddeutschland 
etc)  could conceivably by-pass  the  regional  company,  but stop  short of dealing direct with  gas  producers.  Thus  they might  purchase  gas  from  an 
indigenous  producer  (such  as  BEB)  or  importing utility  (such  as  Ruhrgas) 
and  seek carriage  through  the  regional  system.  An  argument  could perhaps 
be  made  that regional  "middlemen"  do  not exist elsewhere  in the  Community 
and  could  therefore  be  cut out of  the  market  in West  Germany  as  well if 
common  carriage were  introduced.  In practice,  however,  the  ownership of 
the  regional  transmission companies  makes  this  rather unlikely.  Most  were 
originally set up  in order  to  develop  regional markets  by  local 
municipalities,  Laender  governments  and  gas  distributors.  Ruhrgas  now  also 
has  a  stake  in several  of  the~,  following  financial  difficulties  and  a  need 
for  new  equity injections.  Bayerngas,  for  example,  is currently owned  by 
the  Bavarian Government,  Munich,  Augsburg  and  other Bavarian municipalities 
- although it is now  understood  to  be  inviting new  shareholders  (including 
Ruhrgas  and power  company  Bayernwerk)  to participate.  In such 
circumstances,  a  concerted move  by  "national"  transmission and local 
distribution companies  to by-pass  regional  transmission companies  is rather 
improbable;  this  assessment  is currently reinforced by  the bilateral 
Demarcation Contracts  between  transmission companies  (both national and 
regional).  Finally,  it is  conceivable  that  transmission companies  could 
seek to  "pick off"  and  supply direct via common  carriage  those  industrial 
customers  currently supplied by  the  local distributors.  This  would 
currently fall  foul  of  the  local  Concession Contracts held by  the 
distributors with  the municipality.  Leaving  these  on  one  side,  it is 
unclear whether  the  industrial user  would have  much  to  gain  from  deserting 
the  distribution company,  since  the  market-related industrial gas  pricing 
policies pursued by  West  German  distributors  and  transmission companies  are 
generally very similar if not  the  same. 
6.37  To  take  another  example,  we  can also consider  the position in 
Denmark.  This  is unusual  in that  Dangas  currently has  just 7  customers  -
one  power  station,  the  Copenhagen municipality and  5  regional  distribution 
companies  - while all final  consumers  except  the  power  sector are  supplied 
by  the  distributors.  There  is  therefore  the possibility that,  with  common 
carriage,  the  distributors  could seek  to  deal direct with producers  (either 
DUG  or perhaps  the  Norwegians)  while  Dangas  could seek  to sell direct to 
large  industrial  consumers.  Currently,  Dangas  and  the  distributors  share 
the profit margin  in each  market,  but  the  industrial market  is barely 
• ?rofitable,  so  that  Dangas  might  see  little advantage  in direct sale  for  as 
long  as  this situation prevails.  As  far  as  distributors'  direct purchases 
from  producers  are  concerned,  it would  perhaps  be  surprising if they  could 
individually negotiate  such  a  favourable  deal  as  Dangas  could,  given the 
smaller volumes  involved.  Moreover,  it would probably need  a  single  large 
purchaser  to justify the  construction by  the  Norwegians  of an export 
pipeline  link. 
6.38  It is clearly important  to  look carefully at  the  particular situation 
in different Member  States  in order  to  make  a  realistic assessment  of the 
impact  on distribution companies.  Having  considered  a  number  of examples, 
our view  is that very  few  local distributors are  l~kely to be both willing 
to  try to  purchase direct and also  in a  strong,negotiating position to  do 
so.  We  therefore  take  the  view  that  the vast majority would be  likely to 
continue  to  purchase  from  their existing transmission company  supplier. 
6.39  As  discussed earlier in this  section,  there  is  the possibility that 
transmission companies  faced with  a  loss  of large  industrial consumers  to 
competition  from  direct marketing might  seek to  recover  a  larger proportion 
of their fixed  transmission,  storage  and  take-or-pay costs  (if any)  from 
distributors who  would be  in a  weaker  position to buy direct.  In some 
Member  States,  the  interests of distributors might be  protected to  some 
extent by  the  attentions of national authorities  such as  the  Italian 
Inter-ministerial Pricing Committee,  the  Belgian Comite  de  Controle or  the 
West  German  Kartelamt.  Nevertheless,  some  disadvantage  to distributors 
could probably still arise if common  carriage really put  a  squeeze  on  the 
transmission companies'  current profit margins  and  they  sought  to pass  some 
of the  squeeze  on  to  their local distribution customers. 
Transmission  Companies 
6.40  From  the  axiom  that  common  carriage will  only  develop if both 
producer  and  end-consumer  see benefits  in direct marketing arrangements,  it 
follows  that common  carriage would normally work  to  the  disadvantage  of the 
transmission companies  in the  middle  and  this  is reflected in the  arguments 
against a  common  carriage  system which  some  of them  have  raised,  either 
l4S publicly or  in material  presented  to  DG  XVII.  The  adverse  impact  of common 
carriage  on  transmission  companies  could  include:-
(a)  simple  loss  of  revenue,  if large  industrial users  or power  plants  opt 
to  purchase direct  from  producers  and not  from  them; 
(b)  resulting take-or-pay penalties under  the  terms  of their gas  purchase 
contracts;  and 
(c)  a  possible  increase  in unit fixed  non-gas  costs  in the  remainder of 
their market,  which  they may  not be  able  to pass  on  to  consumers. 
Each  of  these  factors  is considered  in turn below. 
6.41  Especially for  "pure"  transmission companies,  a  profit is normally 
earned  through  ensuring high utilisation of equipment  (pipelines  and 
storage)  in order  to  keep  unit costs  low,  coupled with  a  small unit trading 
margin  on  a  high volume  of throughput.  Given  the  importance  of fixed costs 
in the  industry  (non-gas  capacity costs  plus  gas  purchase contract 
take-or-pay commitments),  the  costs  saved when  any  given load is lost are 
often minor  - particularly in the  short  run.  Consequently,  revenue 
foregone  from  a  loss  of customers  to direct marketing  could rapidly eat 
into  the profit margin  on  the  transmission companies'  remaining business. 
6.42  Take-or-pay  commitments  are  a  particular example  of the  fixed cost 
point.  Although  most  gas  purchase  contracts  allow offtake flexibility 
around  the  annual  contract quantity  (ACQ),  several  transmission companies 
are currently taking  gas  at or near  minimum  bill levels  only  and  this  means 
that any  further  reduction in offtakes would  push  them  into  take-or-pay 
penalties.  Those  transmission companies  taking volumes  nearer  to  the  full 
ACQ  under  their contracts  (such  as  the  West  German  importers  or British 
Gas,  for  example)  would have  more  flexibility to  absorb  a  loss of load 
without  incurring  take-or-pay penalties.  The  impact  of  going  into 
take-or-pay would  be  to  incur  a  cost which  cannot  easily be  recovered  in 
the  market.  Transmission companies  could try to  spread  the  cost over  their 
remaining customers,  but  inter-fuel competition might  make  it difficult for 
them  to  do  so  without  risking further  loss  of load  - this  time  to  competing 
fuels  rather  than  to  direct sales. 
' 6.43  While  take-or-pay penalties  are  tantamount  to  an  increase  in unit  gas 
costs,  it is also  conceivable  that  common  carriage could lead to  an 
increase  in transmission  companies'  unit non-gas  costs  in their remaining 
market.  This  would  be  the  case,  especially,  if transmission companies  were 
obliged  to  provide  firm  carriage at marginal cost only  (see  Section V), 
rather  than full  average  costs  including fixed costs.  Even if full cost 
charges  are accepted,  there  is still a  possibility that  the  transmission 
and  storage  system might be  less effectively used.  For  example,  a  large 
firm  gas  consumer  might  decide  to purchase direct  from  a  different source 
than that  from  which  he  is currently supplied by  the  transmission company. 
He  would  then have  to  compensate  the  transmission company  for  any extra 
compression or loop  lines  required to provide  for  gas  carriage along  the 
new  route,  but would  leave  unused pipeline capacity on  the  old supply 
route.  The  consumer  might  also be  prepared to  take  more  of a  supply risk 
than the  transmission company,  perhaps  because he  can  invest to make  an 
alternative fuel  available  in the  event of interruption.  Thus  it may  well 
be  that  transmission and storage capacity set aside by  the  transmission 
company  to  meet  the  customer's  requirements  are  no  longer fully utilised. 
This will not  always  be  the  case  and  sometimes  the  transmission company  may 
be  able  to  use  the  capacity released in such facilities  to  meet  the  growing 
demands  of other customers  for  whom  new  capacity would  otherwise be 
required.  Nevertheless,  it is generally true  (especially in slowly  growing 
markets)  that common  carriage make  it more  difficult for  transmission 
companies  to plan and  operate  their  systems  in such  a  way  as  to  achieve 
high utilisation and  low  unit costs. 
6.44  The  ability of utilities to  absorb  such  adverse  developments  is very 
varied.  While  Ruhrgas  and British Gas  are healthy,  profitable businesses, 
for  example,  other  transmission companies  such  as  Distrigaz have  only been 
marginally profitable  in recent years  and  the  financial  position of Gaz  de 
France  remains  precarious.  Much  may  also  depend  on  the  extent of 
competition  from  direct sales  and  the  way  in which  the  transmission 
companies  are  able  to  react  and  adapt  to  the  new  circumstances.  The  view 
we  have  reached  in this  study  is  that,  over  the  short  to  medium  term  (which 
in the  gas  industry means  the period  to  around  the  turn of the  century), 
the  use  of common  carriage  by  existing customers  of  the  transmission 
companies  (as  opposed  to  new  power  plants,  for  example)  is  generally unlikely  to  be  all that great.  It nevertheless  remains  true  that,  in some 
instances,  the  loss  (or  even partial  loss)  of only  one  or  two  very large 
loads  could have  a  serious  impact  on  individual  transmission companies' 
total gas  sales.  This  is particularly true of large  gas-consuming power 
companies  such  as  ENEL  in Italy or  SEP  in the  Netherlands,  who  each  account 
for  around one-fifth of total  gas  sales  in the  country concerned.  ICI 
alone  takes  some  S-6%  of British Gas'  total sales at its various 
manufacturing sites and  there  are  several other large  consumers  around 
Europe  who  account  for  significant (if smaller)  proportions  of total demand 
in  "mature"  gas  markets.  The  problem  is  even more  acute  in smaller,  "new" 
gas  markets  (Denmark,  Ireland,  Spain and,  in future,  Greece  and Portugal) 
where  demand  is likely to be  dominated by  a  relatively small  number  of 
large users  for  some  time  to  come.  In Luxembourg,  the steel industry 
participates in  SOTEG  and  accounts  for  a  large proportion of its gas  sales. 
These  smaller  gas  markets  present special problems  in relation to  common 
carriage which  we  return to below.  As  for  the  "mature"  gas  markets,  the 
short  to  medium  term  impact  of  common  carriage  should not be  exaggerated, 
but  is at least potentially significant in some  particular Member  States. 
6.45  The  ways  in which  transmission companies  might  react and  adopt 
themselves  to  the  threat of direct sales competition include:-
(a)  a  reduction of  their own  selling prices  to meet  any  lower prices 
available direct  from  producers.  This  would be  particularly 
problematic  for  transmission companies  who  sell on  a 
non-discriminatory  tariff basis,  since  a  competitive  threat to  one 
large  customer  could only be  met  at the  expense  of across-the-board 
reductions  to  other  industrial users; 
(b)  a  renegotiation of purchase  contract prices  in order reflect the 
lower value  of gas  in an  environment  of  (limited)  gas-to-gas 
competition,  in order  to  avoid  take-or-pay problems.  This  strategy 
is most effective only if the  renegotiation takes  place before 
·consumers  are actually lost to  direct sales competition; 
(c)  more  cautious  policies  in terms  of investing in capacity and 
concluding  gas  purchase  contacts  in advance  of need.  A number  of 
transmission companies  on  the  continent have  already contracted 
supplies  to  cover  demand  through  to  2000  or beyond  and  in future  they 
\4!i might  decide  not  to  commit  themselves  so  far  ahead,  in case part of 
the  market  is  lost  to  direct sales  competition.  This  could,  in turn, 
have  adverse  implications  for  gas  supply security  through  an  impact 
on  large  new  gas  production projects with  a  long gestation period and 
we  consider  these  implications  below; 
(d)  a  change  in business  outlook  to  one  which  seeks  to  earn a  profit from 
carriage for  third parties,  as well  as  from  traditional  gas  trading 
activities.  This  has  certainly proved  the  case  for  some  US  pipeline 
companies,  who  have  found  that transportation may  require  lower 
overheads  than merchanting.  In  the  Community,  revenue  earned  from 
providing  "unbundled"  transportation,  storage,  back-up  or quality 
adjustment  services  could also help  to offset any  sales  revenue lost 
to  competition  from  direct sales. 
6.46  We  therefore consider  that transmission companies,  who  will remain 
major  suppliers of natural  gas  and who  have  many  years  of commercial  gas 
industry experience behind  them  as  well  as  a  powerful market position,  will 
generally find ways  in which  to mitigate  the  adverse  impact upon  them.  The 
major  danger  for  them  remains  the  loss  of sufficient load to  force  them 
into  take-or-pay under  their gas  purchase  contracts,  since  the magnitude  of 
the  resulting financial burden would often be  too  large  to mitigate  to  any 
great extent,  especially in the  short  term.  If,  as  we  expect,  the  actual 
"take  up"  of common  carriage opportunities  remains  modest,  then the  impact 
would probably be  manageable  for  most  large  transmission companies  in the 
"mature"  gas  markets.  Nevertheless,  the  possibility of  the  "flood gates 
opening"  as  far  as  the  transmission companies  are  concerned may  raise 
questions  regarding  the  "management"  of  transition from  the present 
position to  a  more  open  internal  gas  market. 
Community  gas  producers 
6.47  As  outlined in section II,  the  most  important  indigenous  Community 
gas  producing countries  by  some  considerable way  are  the  UK  and  the 
Netherlands.  Their  respective positions  are very different,  however,  in 
that the  Netherlands  has  long been  a  gas  exporter,  while  the  UK  Government 
has  in the past prevented gas  exports  and  there  is still no  pipeline  link 
to  the  continent.  There  are  also  smaller  gas  producers  to be  considered, such  as  Italy,  West  Germany,  France,  Spain,  Denmark  and  Ireland.  Four 
Member  States  (Belgium,  Greece,  Luxembourg  and  Portugal)  have  no 
significant gas  production of their own. 
6.48  The  Netherlands  is  in  the  unusual position of having an  excess  of 
productive potential over current sales,  but no  interest in expanding its 
gas  exports.  Significantly,  however,  there  appears  to be  no  unsatisfied 
"queue"  of  indigenous  fields waiting  to  find  a  place  in the market.  New 
offshore  and  smaller onshore  fields  are  generally accommodated  when  ready 
by  reducing Groningen  output  and  some  Groningen  gas  is  thus  reserved for 
the  longer  term needs  of export  customers  and  the  domestic  market.  Even  if 
Gasunie  ceased  to  have  right of first refusal  over buying new  indigenous 
gas  fields,  it would be  surprising if producers  could find  a  better sales 
deal  elsewhere.  Groningen  gas  would  continue  to be  under  contract  to 
Gasunie  and  this constitutes  the bulk of remaining  Dutch  gas  reserves.  It 
therefore  seems  most  unlikely that  the  Dutch  fields would be  marketed 
directly through  common  carriage,  even if such  a  system were  established. 
Relatively  low production costs  also  mean  that  the  incentive  for  Dutch  gas 
exploration and production would be  reasonably secure,  even if common 
carriage were  to bring about  some  general  long  term  reduction in bulk gas 
purchase prices. 
6.49  Although  the  UK  does  not have  a  very high proven gas 
reserves/production ratio by  international standards  (currently under  15 
years),  probable  reserves  could double  that figure  and  projected productive 
potential  in the  1990s  appears  to  exceed projected UK  gas  demand.  Even at 
today's  relatively  low  oil and  gas  price  levels,  there  is  an  informal 
"queue"  of UK  fields waiting for  a  place  in the  gas  market.  Some  UK 
producers  might  therefore  be  interested to  explore  the  opportunities  for 
gas  exports  to  the  continent,  especially as  gaps  between potential 
purchasers'  projected gas  demand  and  their currently contracted supplies 
being  to  open  up  in the  longer  term.  As  things  stand,  this would  require 
the  UK  Government  to  waive  the  "landing requirement"  for  gas  (referred to 
in section IV),  though  the  Commission  may  consider  that this  requirement  is 
incompatible with  an  open  internal  Community  gas  market.  The  opportunities 
for  gas  exports  from  the  UK  - which  would  require  some  sort of 
cross-channel pipeline  link for  the  first  time  - might  well be  considerably 
greater if a  common  carriage  regime  existed in continental Member  States of  the  Community.  For  example,  the  continental  transmission  companies 
might have  misgivings  (which  large  continental  consumers  do  not share) 
about  entering into competition with British Gas  for  supplies  from  the 
UKCS.  Apart  from  a  full pipeline  link direct across  the  channel,  there  are 
lower cost options  which  could be  economic  on  the basis  of smaller  gas 
export volumes.  These  include  a  link from  a  UK  Southern Basin field to  the 
Dutch  sector of  the  North  Sea  or  perhaps  a  short pipeline connection to  the 
Norwegian  Zeepipe,  which will carry  gas  from  the Troll/Sleipner area to 
Zeebrugge  from  the  mid  1990s.  This  raises  important questions  of 
reciprocity  - if Norwegian  gas  were  entitled to  make  use  of common  carriage 
through  onshore  gas  pipelines  in the  Community,  then it seems  reasonable 
that  gas  produced within the  Community  should not be  refused access  on 
comparable  terms  to offshore  lines within  the  Norwegian sector of the  North 
Sea.  As  regards  the direct sale of gas  from  UKCS  fields  to  UK  consumers, 
there  is already  a  common  carriage  regime  in place  (as  discussed in section 
IV)  and  Community-wide  initiatives would  therefore have  relatively little 
additional  impact  in this respect. 
6.50  Turning  to  other  Community  gas  producers,  there  is likely to be 
little impact  on French  indigenous  gas,  since Lacq has  low costs  and a 
secure outlet and it is  now  considered unlikely that further significant 
reserves will be  identified,  either onshore  or offshore.  In West  Germany, 
all the  indigenous  gas  that is produced can readily find  a  place  in the 
market,  without  common  carriage.  However,  the  small size of fields  and  the 
prevalence of sour  gas  which  needs  processing before delivery mean  that 
returns  to  producers  are  typically  low  and  the  Provincial  Government  of 
Lower  Saxony has  recently  (October  1988)  recognised  this  by abolishing all 
royalties  on production,  leaving only standard corporation tax to be 
levied.  A significant fall  in gas  import prices  due  to  gas-to-gas 
competition through  common  carriage could therefore  damage  incentives  for 
further exploration,  as  could any  move  by  transmission company  purchasers 
to  offer a  lower  level of  take-or-pay  commitments.  Ultimately,  however, 
the  extra supply security of  indigenous  gas  and  the  seasonal flexibility 
afforded by  the  sweet  gas  portion of West  German  output could command  a 
premium  over  the  price of high  load factor  gas  imports  from  outside  the 
Community.  For  the  foreseeable  future,  most  Italian gas  production will 
continue  to  be  in  the  hands  of Agip  and will  therefore  continue  to  be  sold 
\  s \ to  fellow  ENI  subsidiary  SNAM,  even if a  common  carriage right  is 
established.  Some  independent producers  may,  however,  be  interested to 
sell their gas  direct  to  consumers  on  the  SNAM  grid,  as  well  as  to  those  on 
the  small,  independent  SGM  (MontedisonjElf/Petrofina)  grid as  they  do  at 
present.  This  is because  SNAM  appears  to  pay  a  rather  low price  for  the 
gas  which it currently purchases  from  them.  As  for  the  smaller  gas 
producing countries  in the  Community  - Denmark,  Ireland and  Spain  - the 
advantages  of a  secure,  national  energy  supply which  can displace  imported 
oil are  such  that  indigenous  gas  is  always  likely to  find  a  place  in the 
home  market,  even if a  common  carriage  system is established. 
6.51  It is naturally a  concern of  the  European  Commission that  the 
introduction of a  common  carriage  system for  the  transportation of natural 
gas  should not prejudice  the  future  level of  indigenous  Community  gas 
production,  through  damaging  incentives  for  exploration and field 
development.  Such  damage  might  occur if gas-to-gas  competition brings 
about  a  significant fall  in the  general  level of gas  prices or if 
transmission companies  react  to  the  threat of competition by offering less 
generous  take-or-pay and other contract  terms.  For  supply security and 
general  economic  reasons,  Member  State  governments  will normally be  keen  to 
promote  the  development  of  indigenous  reserves  and  there  is  room  for  a 
further relaxation of the  oil and  gas  tax  regime  in most  instances if this 
were  necessary  to maintain momentum  in exploration and production. 
Although it is  conceivable  that  the  impact of common  carriage might  push 
some  marginal  gas  fields  into non-viability,  we  would  not expect  the  impact 
to  be  so  severe  as  to  place  a  significant brake  on  the  general  pace  of 
indigenous  gas  development.  Unfortunately,  the  long  term prospects  for 
indigenous  production in a  number  of Member  States  (France,  West  Germany 
and perhaps  also  Italy)  are  rather poor,  regardless  of whether  a  common 
carriage is  introduced or not. 
Impact  on  the  Community  as  a  whole 
6.52  Having  examined  in some  detail  the  likely impact of gas  common 
carriage  on different classes  of  consumers  and  on  the various parts of the 
gas  industry within  the  Community,  we  turn now  to  an  assessment  of the 
impact  on  the  European  Community  as  a  whole.  This  assessment reflects  the 
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considerations  of overall  resource  cost discussed earlier in this  section 
VI  and  the  Community's  energy objectives outlined in section II.  Before 
dealing  in turn with  the  principal  advantages  and  disadvantages  of gas 
common  carriage,  it is  perhaps  worth  re-emphasising  that we  believe its 
impact  would be  rather less  than it might be  in the  electricity sector,  at 
least in the  short  to  medium  term.  Common  carriage  in electricity might 
rapidly permit  (for example)  West  German  industrial  consumers  to purchase 
electricity from  the  French nuclear capacity surplus  at significantly lower 
prices  than they currently pay  for  indigenous  power  output.  Gas  common 
carriage,  by  contrast,  is unlikely  to  provide  such  i1runediate  benefits  -
even  for  most  large  industrial users.  The  development  of a  more  open 
internal market  in the  context of  the  European gas  supply situation is 
likely to be  a  rather gradual,  long  term process.  This  may  also have 
advantages,  in terms  of managing  the  process  of transition from  today's 
market  to  a  more  open,  competitive situation,  with  a  view to maximising 
potential benefits  and mitigating potential drawbacks.  Our view,  in 
general,  is that some  protagonists  and  some  detractors of the  common 
carriage  idea have  overstated its likely impact,  as  least as  regards  the 
short  to medium  term.  Gas  supply  is  a  very long  term business  and it is 
therefore perfectly valid to  take  the  long view of common  carriage.  The 
more  extended  the  timescale  over  which  its effects  may  be  felt,  the better 
will market players  be  able  to  adjust  to  a  new  business  environment. 
Advantages 
6.53  In our view,  the  main  potential  advantages  of a  gas  common  carriage 
system  include:-
(a)  the possibility that gas-to-gas  competition in the  context of 
abundant  gas  reserves  internationally could lead to  a  reduction in 
gas  costs  for  large  industrial users  in energy-intensive sectors, 
such  as  chemicals  and steel.  Our  view is that any  such  reduction due 
to  common  carriage will probably be  modest,  given  the  oligopolistic 
structure of  the  gas  market  in  and  around  Europe.  Nevertheless,  even 
a  modest  energy cost  reduction could significantly  improve  the competitive position of European manufacturers  in international 
markets  for  certain bulk,  "commodity"  industrial products.  They 
would  also  reduce  raw  material  prices within  the  Community  for higher 
value  products  derived after further processing.  If such benefits 
can be  achieved,  then  this  could be  expected  to  feed  through  into 
somewhat better external  trade,  output  and  employment  prospects  for 
the  Community  as  a  whole.  It should perhaps  be  re-emphasised that 
the ability of  even very large  industrial users  to negotiate  lower 
gas  import  prices  than  those  currently achieved by  the  existing 
transmission companies  is unproven  and  the  extent of any benefits 
such as  those  described  above  is  thus highly uncertain; 
(b)  a  possible  reduction in gas  selling price disparities between 
comparable  industrial customers  in different Member  States.  This 
point applies particularly to  countries  (such  as  the United Kingdom 
and West  Germany)  where  high profit margin sales  may  be  made  at gas 
oil related prices  to  large  "premium"  firm  gas  consumers  using  gas 
for process  purposes  on  a  high  load factor.  Such  consumers  could 
probably reduce  their gas  costs by direct purchasing,  even if they 
are unable  to  undercut  the bulk price currently paid by  their 
transmission company  supplier,  since  the  carriage charge  could well 
be  lower  than  the  transmission company's  current  gross  margin.  This 
would  then  reduce  the disparity between their  gas  costs  and  those  of 
comparable  consumers  elsewhere  (such  as  Italy and  the  Netherlands) 
who  are  already offered firm  gas  at a  price related broadly  to  fuel 
oil prices.  Particularly in energy  intensive  sectors,  such 
developments  would  then ensure  more  even competition for  industrial 
products  within  the  Community.  Nevertheless,  certain gas  selling 
prices differences  are  likely to  remain,  for  reasons  which  common 
carriage  does  not  address,  such as  different underlying costs  (eg  for 
storage capacity); 
(c)  increased competitive pressure  on  the  gas  industry within the 
Community  to  operate efficiently,  prune  overheads  and market 
effectively in order  to  increase  gas  penetration and  reduce unit 
non-gas  costs.  For  reasons  outlined in Section III,  we  would  expect 
any  such benefits  to  be  rather modest,  since  that part of the  gas 
industry which  would  come  under  most  competitive  pressure 
(transmission company  operations)  tends  to have  low unit non-gas 
costs already.  Unless  distributors have  a  significant  industrial • 
(d) 
market of their own  (as  in Denmark  or,  to  a  lesser extent,  West 
Germany),  the  competitive pressure brought  to bear on  them by  the 
introduction of  common  carriage  is likely to  be  less  marked; 
the  opportunity  to  develop efficient,  environmentally acceptable  gas 
combined cycle  power  stations at  low cost,  in view of the  competition 
to  supply  these  attractive new  customers  which  common  carriage could 
promote.  The  power  sector now  represents  a  major marketing 
opportunity for  gas  in a  number  of Member  States  and  one  of the  great 
attractions  from  an  economic welfare viewpoint  is that,  with 
essentially cost-based pricing of electricity,  much  of any benefit 
which  common  carriage might bring in terms  of  lower cost gas  supplies 
to  the  power  sector would be  passed on  to  the  consumer.  There  is a 
widespread concern,  in this context,  that  the  1975  Council  Directive 
on  the  use  of gas  in power  stations  should not present an obstacle in 
this  regard;  and 
(e)  an increased likelihood that UK  gas  exports  might  actually find  a 
place  in the  continental market  of sufficient size  to justify some 
form  of cross-channel  link.  This  would  open  the  way  for  the 
increased integration of the  Community's  second largest producing 
country  into  the  European  gas  grid,  with consequent benefits  for  gas 
supply security  in the  Community  as  a  whole. 
Drawbacks 
6.54  To  be  set against  the  major potential advantages  of a  gas  common 
carriage  system  for  the  Community,  we  would list the  following as  the most 
important potential drawbacks: 
(a)  the  danger  that,  with  only  a  handful  of large  gas  producers  selling 
into  the  Community  and  increased competition among  an enlarged number 
of buyers,  common  carriage might  actually lead to  a  "bidding up"  of 
gas  purchase prices.  A significant "bidding up"  is perhaps unlikely 
in the present situation of a  buyer's  gas  market,  but this might 
change  in future  if the  world  returns  to  a  situation of perceived 
oil scarcity,  high oil prices  and  thus  renewed pressure  for 
significantly increased gas  supplies  to  "mature"  gas  markets  which 
are  now  growing  only  slowly; 
ISS (b)  a  possible  increase  in gas  prices  to  gas  consumers  who  are not 
themselves  in  a  position to  purchase  gas  direct.  This  point  is 
discussed at length earlier in  this  Section and  relates  to possible 
attempts  by  gas  utilities to  recover higher unit fixed costs  from 
remaining  customers  in  the  event  that significant industrial or 
existing power  station load  is lost to  competition from  direct sales 
via common  carriage.  These  might  include  costs  arising from 
transmission company  purchase  contract  take-or-pay penalties  and 
additional  non-gas  costs  arising  from  less efficient use  of the  grid; 
(c)  the possibility that,  in defending  themselves  against  the  threat of 
competition and  increased demand  uncertainty created by  direct 
marketing,  transmission companies  would be  more  reluctant  to purchase 
gas  well  in advance  of need,  offer substantial purchase  contract 
take-or-pay  commitments  or  make  major  new  additions  to  the  grid to 
cater for  projected demand  increases.  This  could then have  adverse 
consequences  for  new  gas  production projects,  both within and outside 
the  Community.  There  could  then be  a  long-term deterioration in the 
security of  gas  supplies  to  the  Community  as  a  result.  Our  view  is 
that,  on  the  likely scale of common  carriage which might  reasonably 
be  expected,  the  extent of any  such measures  is unlikely  to be  very 
great.  Moreover,  some  gas  producers  (such  as  Algeria or  the  USSR) 
could probably make  significantly more  gas  available without major 
new  investments  which  would  need  to  be  underwritten by buyer's 
long-term  take-or-pay  commitments; 
(d)  failure  on  the  part of gas utilities to  invest and purchase  gas  as 
required to  ensure  supply security,  as  a  result of adverse 
consequences  of direct marketing competition on  their financial 
position.  In practice,  such  consequences  would probably be  offset 
to  some  degree  by utilities'  earnings  from  the  provision of 
transportation and  other services  for  third parties.  Once  again,  the 
impact  would very  much  depend  on  the  scale of contract carriage and 
the  pace with  which  the  common  carriage  system began  to be  used by 
third parties;  and 
(e)  any  adverse  impact  on  the  development  of  "new"  or  "infant"  gas 
industries  in countries  such  as  Denmark,  Spain,  Greece  and Portugal. 
At  the  early stage  of  gas  industry  development,  a  high proportion of 
sales  is  typically accounted  for  by  a  few  large  users  such  as  power 
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plants  ammonia  manufacturers,  other chemicals  plants  and 
energy~intensive metals  industries.  In Greece,  for  example,  we 
estimate  that around  30%  of total  gas  sales  in the  year  2000  may  be 
accounted  for  by  just 6  customers,  with other  industrial users  taking 
a  further  40%  of  gas  supplies.  The  base  load pro··..rided  by  such  large 
industrial customers  is  then  the basis  fc!·  cake~or-pay commitments 
made  to  gas  producers,  the  initial construction of the principal 
transmission pipelines  and  the  cash  flow  required to  service  loans 
and  finance  further  grid development.  Construction of distribution 
grids  and  connection of smaller residential customers  often tends  to 
be  a  more  gradual  process  and  the  stability of  industrial sales  is 
crucial for  the  interim period.  Whatever  the merits  of gas  common 
carriage  in "mature"  gas  markets,  the  imposition of such  a  system on 
"new"  gas  industries  could place very severe obstacles  in the way  of 
their development.  New  gas utilities could not afford to  commit 
themselves  financially and contractually if there was  a  risk that 
their largest customers  would  seek to purchase  gas  direct from  the 
producers.  In some  of these countries,  the  extensive  role of the 
public  sector could make  direct buying less likely and geographical 
isolation from  the  integrated European gas  grid  (as with Greece  and 
Ireland)  is another mitigating factor.  Nevertheless,  there  is a 
crucial distinction to  be  made  here between  "mature"  gas  industries 
with established markets  and pipeline  systems  and  those  which  are 
still in the  early phases  of development. 
Implications 
6.55  Should  the  European  Commission ultimately consider that the potential 
advantages  of common  carriage  outweigh  the  potential  drawbacks,  it will be 
important  to  seek ways  of minimising  the  extent of the  drawbacks  that could 
arise.  We  take  the  view  that  two  issues  are crucial: 
(a)  "management"  of change  to  ensure  a  smooth  transition from  the present 
situation to  a  more  open,  competitive  market,  in such  a  way  that 
would minimise  uncertainty and  allow gas utilities to  continue  to 
plan,  invest  and  purchase  gas  for  the  long  term;  and (b)  careful handling of 
11new"  gas  industries  in order  to  avoid  the 
potentially adverse  affects  identified above. 
6.56  One  way  of handling  the  transition process  might  be  to  develop  a 
phased  introduction of  common  carriage  and  to  set limits  on  the  extent of 
common  carriage at each  stage.  Purely  for  illustrative purposes,  the 
Commission might  develop  a  timetable  along  the  following  lines: 
1992  - 1994 
1.1.95 
1995  - 1999 
2000  - 2009 
2010  -
dismantling of statutory exclusive  and preferential 
rights,  together with contractual  arrangements  giving 
effect  to  exclusivity; 
introduction of a  (qualified)  obligation on  gas 
utilities to  provide  common  carriage  for  other 
utilities and  end-consumers  using more  than  (say)  2 
mcmja,  where  this right does  not already exist under 
national  legislation; 
limitation of the  obligation on  any  gas utility to 
provide  common  carriage  to  a  maximum  of  (say)  5%  of 
its own  sales; 
increase  in the  common  carriage obligation to  (say) 
10%  of sales. 
further  increase,  to  be  decided in  [2002]  within  the 
range  15-25%. 
The  limits  on  common  carriage obligations would probably relate  to  carriage 
services  involving consumers  within  the utility's own  supply area,  with  a 
quantitatively unlimited  (but nevertheless  qualified)  obligation to provide 
services  for  gas  in transit to other utilities or  consumers  in other areas. 
National  governments  (in the  UK,  for  example)  should have  the  option to  set 
higher  (but not normally  lower)  limits at their option,  including the 
possibility of no  limit at all within national boundaries. 
6.57  The  aim of such  a  timetable  would be  to  create  as  much  certainty as 
possible about  the  process  of  transition and  to  preclude  from  the  outset 
the  risk that  the  mere  possibility of unlimited carriage would  interfere 
unduly with  orderly business  planning,  purchasing  and  investment  for  the 
longer  term  on  the  part of existing utilities.  Under  these  arrangements, 
I Sf 
• the  Commission  might  reserve  to  itself the  right  to  review  some  of  the  key 
parameters periodically  in  the  light of market  developments,  but within a 
specified range.  Thus,  for  example,  the  upper  limit on  the  carriage 
obligation fer  2000-2009  might  be  open  for  review  in 1997,  but within the 
range  of  (say)  8-12%.  There  are  many  variations  on  this broad schema which 
might be  considered,  but  the principle would be  to  recognise  that gas 
utilities have  already  taken key  decisions which will affect the  shape  of 
their business  through  to  2000  and well  beyond.  The  further  into  the 
future  a  very major  common  carriage obligation is placed,  the better they 
will be  able  to adjust  their business  activities accordingly.  In the 
meantime,  a  modest  common  carriage obligation in  the  1990s  would probably 
cater for  the majority  of  those  who  might  seriously wish  to  take  advantage 
of  the  new  system. 
6.58  The  Commission  might  also define  "new"  gas  industries,  perhaps  in 
terms  of those  Member  States  falling below  a  given level of gas  consumption 
per head of population.  These  might  include  Denmark,  Greece,  Ireland, 
Portugal  and  Spain.  The  national  governments  of these Member  States could 
then be  given the  option of  a  much  more  gradual  timetable  for  the 
introduction of common  carriage  in these  instances  - probably  including a 
complete  moratorium  for  a  period in order  to allow  the  gas  industry to 
become  properly established. 
6.59  These  implementation  issues clearly require more  discussion and  the 
above  should be  regarded as  tentative suggestions  only at this stage.  Our 
view  is nevertheless  that,  if the  Commission did decide  to  introduce  gas 
common  carriage,  the  manner  of its introduction is of  the  utmost 
importance.  Whether  or  not  there  would ultimately be  net advantages  in 
common  carriage  transportation for  natural  gas,  it will  not be  in the 
interests of  the  Community  as  a  whole  to  create  the kind of uncertainty 
which has  characterised recent U.S.  experience of open access 
transportation.  The  U.S.,  with  a  very  different gas  supply situation,  can 
arguably  take  the  risk of operating largely on  a  short  term basis with many 
of the  "rules of  the  game
11  as  yet undecided;  the  European  Community,  with 
its much  greater dependence  on  a  very  few  external  gas  supply  sources,  most 
assuredly can not. ~~- -----~  -- ,,0 
APPENDICES \Co\ 
APPENDIX  A 
COMMON  CARRIAGE  IN  THE  USA 
Al  Structure of the  United States Natural  Gas  Industry 
A2  Legislative  and Regulatory  Framework 
A3  Development  of Common  Carriage 
A4  Current Situation 
AS  Future  Prospects STRUCTURE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  NATURAL  GAS  INDUSTRY 
Or~anisation 
Al.l  Prior  to  the  widespread  introduction of natural  gas  in the  post World 
War  II  (WWII)  era,  the  gas  industry  in the United States was  vertically 
integrated.  Low  BTU  gas  was  manufactured  and distributed by  local 
distributing companies  (LDCs). 
Al.2  As  the  gas  industry  metamorphosed  into  the  "natural  gas"  industry, 
vertical integration  (while  not  disappearing)  was  no  longer  the  general 
rule.  A number  of different structures emerged  from  this  change  and 
currently exist.  A non-exhaustive  compendium  follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
1  LDCs  with  a  merchant pipeline  as  the  sole  source  of supply; 
LDCs  with multiple merchant  pipeline suppliers; 
Either of the  above  with  the  LDC  supplying its own  peak  shaving 
and/or storage capability; 
(4)  Either  (2)  or  (3)  above  with  the  LDC  having  a  local source  of natural 
gas  production; 
(5)  Merchant pipelines with  LDC  subsidiaries  and/or affiliates; 
(6)  Merchant pipelines buying  their supplies  from  producers. 
(7)  Merchant pipelines with exploration and production subsidiaries 
and/or affiliates;  and, 
(8)  Merchant pipelines  offering transportation services. 2 
1/  Typical pipeline tariffs for  small  LDCs  and  for  "full requirements" 
LDCs  (i.e.,  no  contract  demand)  have,  at least until now,  not 
permitted  the  customer  to  take  gas  from  another  source. 
2/  Although until now  reluctant  to  or  refusing  to  transport  gas  other 
than their own  supplies. 
1~1 (9)  Brokers  are  a  relatively recent  addition  to  the  industry structure. 
Their  function  is  to  assemble  supply  packages  and  to bring producers 
to  the  end user market. 
Al.3  With  regard  to  gas  exploration and production.  oiJ.  companies  were  the 
original players  along with  independent producers.  For  sometime  now, 
pipelines  and  LDCs  have  also  been  involved in exploration and production. 
Natural  Gas  Supplies 
Al.4  The  most  important  gas  producing area  in the  U.S.  is  the  Gulf of 
Mexico,  which  according  to  the  American  Gas  Association  (AGA)  holds  23  per 
cent of  the  reserves  and  accounts  for  28  per cent of  the  production in the 
lower  48  states3.  Gas  supplies  have  been  found  in thirty-one  (31)  of the 
lower  (48)  states  and  in Alaska.  An  indication of the  degree  to which  gas 
supply is dispersed in  the  lower  48  states can be  found  in an  AGA  report of 
natural  gas  findings  during  19874 .  Findings  have  been reported in the 
following eighteen  (18)  states: 
ALABAMA  (ON  & OFFSHORE)  NORTH  DAKOTA 
OHIO 
CALIFORNIA  (ON  & OFFSHORE)  OKLAHOMA 
COLARADO  OREGON 
KANSAS  PENNSYLVANIA 
LOUISIANA  (ON  & OFFSHORE)  TEXAS  (ON  & OFFSHORE) 
MICHIGAN  WASHINGTON 
MISSISSIPPI  (ON  & OFFSHORE)  WEST  VIRGINIA 
NEW  MEXICO  WYOMING 
3/  From  the  AGA  Publication Exploration  1987. 
4/  Ibid Al.5  Natural  gas  is  found both  on  and  offshore  and  in a  variety of 
geological  formations.  Wells  vary  from  shallow water,  shallow depth 
drilling in the  Gulf of Mexico  up  to  17,000  feet5  or greater  in onshore 
areas.  It should be  noted that all gas  found  in the  federal  offshore 
domain  must  be  dedicated to  interstate commerce. 
Transportation Network 
Al.6  There  are  a  total of 253,656  miles  of interstate pipeline  in the  gas 
transportation network,  which  serves  the  lower  48  states.  Of  this total, 
184,634 miles  are  transmission pipe.  The  remainder consists of 64,468 
miles  of production field pipe  and  4,554 miles  of storage pipe. 
Al.7  In addition,  there  are many  intrasate natural  gas  pipelines.  While 
the  network cannot directly accommodate  all possible  transportation 
transactions,  many  indirect deliveries  can be  accommodated  through 
displacement.  The  extent of the  interstate network is displayed overleaf 
on  the  FERC  map  entitled,  "Major  Natural Gas  Pipelines  -October 31,  1985". 
Al.8  The  United States has  extensive  underground storage capacity for 
natural gas.  As  of March  1986,  there were  nearly 400  active underground 
storage  reservoirs  across  26  states,  with  a  combined capacity of just over 
8  trillion cubic  feet  (tcf).  Of  this capacity,  about  80%  is in depleted 
gas  fields  and  the  remaining  20%  in natural acquifer pools.  The  working 
volume  in gas  storage  is about  4  tcf,  currently equivalent to  over  25%  of 
total annual  gas  consumption. 
Market  Structure 
Al.9  The  major players  in the marketing of natural  gas  in the U.S.  are  the 
LDCs  who  in 1987  accounted  for  some  86  per cent of the  total gas  sales made 
by  the major interstate pipelines.  Additionally,  a  very large percentage 
6  of the  gas  transported in 1987  was  transported for  the  account  of LDCs. 
Some  part of this latter includes  transportation by  LDCs  for  their large 
industrial customers.  The  LDCs  market  directly to  residential,  commercial 
5/  Ibid 
6/  At  this writing,  the  actual statistics are  unavailable. .
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-and  industrial  end users  in  their service  territories.  Currently,  the 
acquisition of  gas  for  use  in  the  generation of electricity is split 
between pipelines  and  LDCs. 
Al.lO  The  large  industrial  customers  of both pipelines  and  LDCs  who  can 
switch between natural  gas  and  alternative fuels  have  been,  as  will be  seen 
in a  later section of this  overview,  a  major  force  in the  move  towards  open 
transportation of third party gas. 
Al.ll As  of  1985,  the  pattern of natural  gas  consumption  in the United 
States was  as  follows:-
Market  sector 
Residential 
Commercial 
Industrial 
Power utilities 
Number  of 
customers 
55  million 
3.8  million 
189,000 
1,800 
% of  gas 
consumption 
28% 
15% 
37% 
19% 
Consumption 
(t.c.f.) 
5.5 
2.4 
5.9 
3.0 
Gas  share 
of market 
48% 
35% 
12% 
In  the  U.S.  oil has  a  relatively  low  (17%)  share  of residential  and 
commercial  energy  consumption.  Many  industrial  gas  consumers  can readily 
switch  to using oil,  as  can a  considerable  number  of gas-using power 
plants.  The  most  important  fuel  for  U.S.  power  generation,  however, 
remains  coal with  a  55%  share of  the  market. 
Al.l2  Currently,  around  60%  of U.S.  gas  supplies  come  from  indigenous 
production by  the  oil company  majors,  with  a  further  35%  supplied by 
independent U.S.  producers  and  5%  from  imports  (almost all  from  Canada). 
Some  two-thirds  of  this  gas  is  sold  into  intersate market  and  the  other 
third is marketed  locally through  intrastate pipeline  networks. 
Al.l3  As  of autumn  1986,  the  Energy  Information Administration reports  the 
cost and price structure  of  th U.S.  gas  market  to have  been as  follows:-
c Average  wellhead  price 
(Typical  Texas  & Gulf  Coast  spot  market  price) 
Average  transmission cost plus  return 
Average  City Gate  price 
Average  Residential  Price 
Average  Commercial  Price 
Average  Industrial Price 
Average  Electric Utility Price 
(*  denotes  1000  cubic  feet) 
S/mcf* 
1.54 
(1.39) 
1.48 
3.02 
6.26 
4. 84 
2.81 
2.1? 
Al.l4 The  low  gas  prices  for  industrial users  and  (especially)  power plants 
reflect both  the  low  level of fuel oil prices at the  time  and also  the use 
of spot purchases  and  gas  transportation to  achieve  delivered gas  prices 
significantly below  the  average  city gate price for  sales  from  pipelines  to· 
LDCs. -
LEGISLATIVE  AND  REGULATORY  FBAMEWORK 
A2.1  What  follows  is  an  overview of  the  legislative and  regulatory 
framework  within which  the  U.S.  natural  gas  industry operates.  It is a 
non-exhaustive  overview and  touches  only  the  principal features. 
A2.2  The  natural  gas  industry  in the United States is subject  to 
legislation and  regulation at the national,  state and local levels.  All 
aspects  of the  industry deemed  to be  interstate in nature  are  governed at 
the  federal  level.  The  two  major  legislative mandates  are  the National  Gas 
Act  (NGA)  of the  1930s  and  the  National  Gas  Policy Act  (NGPA)  of 1978. 
A2.3  Regulation of the  industry at the  federal  level is the  responsibility 
of the  Federal  Energy Regulatory Commission  (FERC,  or  the  Commission), 
formerly  known  as  the  Federal  Power  Commission  (FPC).  In addition to its 
responsibilities with regard  to  interstate commerce,  the  FERC  is also 
charged with  the  establishment  and  enforcement  of national  energy policies 
that may  limit the  freedom of the  individual states  in the  regulatory 
arena.  A good  example  of  this latter federal  power  was  the  establishment 
of a  nationwide  system of priorities,  with regard  to  the  attachment of new 
natural  gas  customers,  because  of scarcity of supply.  The  use  of natural 
gas  for boiler fuel  was  severely curtailed and even  forbidden. 
A2.4  Turning now  to  the  state level,  we  find at least  two  different modes 
of regulation.  Almost  invariably,  investor-owned utilities  (IOUs)  are 
regulated by  a  state commission.  There  are,  however,  some  exceptions,  such 
as  New  Orleans  Public  Service,  Inc.  (NOPSI),  which  is regulated by  the 
city.  Municipal  systems  may  or may  not be  state-regulated;  if not,  it is 
usually the city council  that provides  regulation. 
A2.5  Federal  regulation takes  many  forms:  accounting regulation takes  the 
form  of the  required use  of the  FERC's  Uniform  System of Accounts; 
construction is regulated through hearings  to  determine whether  or not  to 
certify a  project,  i.e.,  issue  a  Certificate of Public  Convenience  and 
Necessity so  that work  can proceed;  tariffs are  regulated through rate 
hearings  in which  specific exhibits  must  be  prepared and  in which  public 
intervention is permitted;  and  the  FERC  must  see  that  the  requirements  of other federal  agencies,  such  as  the  Department  of Transportation  (DOT)  and 
the  Environmental  Protection Agency  (EPA)  are  met. 
A2.6  State  regulation has,  in  the  past,  tended  to  focus  on tariff 
regulation,  costs  and  consumer  protection.  There  is currently a  movement 
among  state regulatory bodies  to  require  least cost planning  on  a 
jurisdictional basis,  even  if a  utility is trying to  optimise  its system 
over  more  than  one  jurisdiction;  and  some  states with local natural  gas 
production are  urging utilities to  buy  from  sources  within the  state.  It 
is likely that state commissions  will act  to  limit the  amount  of take-or-
pay  obligations  that  LDCs  can pass  on  to  consumers.  The  states will also 
intervene  in cases at  the  FERC. 
A2.7  The  findings  of both  the  FERC  and  state regulators  are  subject to 
review by  the  courts.  Both  regulators  are  treated as  first level courts 
and  appeals  are  taken  to  the  next judicial level.  In the  case  of the  FERC, 
appeals  are  taken  to  the  United States Circuit Court  of Appeals. DEVELOPMENT  OF  COMMON  CARRIAGE 
How  The  U.S.  Got  Where  It Is  Now 
A3.1  Early  in the  1980s,  FERC  embarked  on  a  regulatory  agenda  that  is 
described by  some  as  a  "non-regulatory"  agenda  to  encourage  freemarket 
competition in the  natural  gas  supply market.  This  theme  was  initiated by 
passage  of  the  Natural  Gas  Policy Act  (NGPA)  in 1978,  first promoted at the 
FERC  in a  series  of notes  of proposed  rulemaking  (NOPR)  by  then Chairman 
Raymond  O'Connor,  that led to  the  issuance  of Order  No.  436.  The 
freemarket  theme  was  further  accelerated,  modified  and  interpreted in a 
series of  FERC  orders  issued under  the  initiatives of current  Chairwoman 
Martha Hesse. 
A3.2  Despite  the  fact  that  this  "freemarket"  concept  is  ten years  old,  the 
natural  gas  industry  finds  itself in a  market where  the  rules have  not 
stood still since  the  issuance  of Order  No.436  in 1985.  Every  order of  the 
Commission  issued to date  remains  subject  to court review or  to  an 
application for  rehearing before  the  FERC.  It is with  this backdrop  of 
orders,  subsequently revised orders,  and  inordinately  long delays  in 
gaining regulatory approvals  or  interpretations  that producers,  pipelines 
and  local distribution companies  (LDCs)  have  had  to  attempt  to  conduct 
business.  This  has  been especially difficult for  LDCs  because  of the 
penchant of some  state regulatory  agencies  to  use  retrospective  prudency 
reviews  of their gas  supply  decisions  during  this fluid market  situation. 
A3.3  A brief review  of  the  significant actions  that have  shaped  the 
natural  gas  industry environment  that exists  today  in the  U.S.  should help 
establish a  perspective  on  the  current natural  gas  market  situation. 
A3.4  For most  of  the  post  WW  II period,  the  price of natural  gas  at the 
wellhead was  controlled by  FERC  at a  level below freemarket  prices,  thus 
discouraging adequate  exploration.  Motivated by  the  natural  gas  shortages 
of  1976  to  1978  and brought  about  by  a  below-freemarket price of gas  at the 
burner  tip,  Congress  passed  the  NGPA  in 1978;  also  a  companion bill,  the 
Power  Plant  and  Industrial  Fuel  Use  Act  of 1978,  to  provide  stimuli  to  a 
\lo '•\ 
'\ 
\ 
natural  gas  market  that  was  assumed  by  most  to  be  in  the  throes  of  an 
inevitable,  long-term  shortage. 
A3.5  The  NGPA  provided  for  an  almost  immediate  deregulation of  "new"  gas 
at  the  wellhead,  but  did not provide  for  the  deregulation of "old"  gas. 
The  Act  did,  however,  provide  for  price escalation of "old"  gas  to  reflect 
general price  inflation and  authorised  the  FERC  to raise  the  former  ceiling 
prices  to higher  "just and  reasonable"  levels.  (The  FERC  finally did this 
in  1986  in order  No.  451.) 
A3.6  As  a  result of  those  two  laws: 
Only  the  price  of  "old"  gas  was  controlled at existing levels; 
"New"  gas  was  allowed  to  be  priced at a  much  higher,  "current" 
cost basis; 
The  burning of gas  was  prohibited in new  industrial and  power 
plant boilers;  and 
The  finding  costs of gas  soared. 
It was  in this next period,  with exploration increasing,  gas  prices  now 
rising and  demand still growing,  that pipelines  signed take-or-pay 
contracts.  This  would  ultimately prove  to  be very costly,  especially when 
the  FERC  issued Order  No.  451  eliminating the ceiling price  on old gas. 
A3.7  The  response  of  the  market  to  the  deregulated natural  gas  price was 
greater than anticipated.  Supplies  increased as  did  the  price at the 
burner  tip.  Simultaneously,  the  price  of oil began  to  drop  and oil became 
very competitive.  The  resulting fuel  switching  (coupled with  an  economic 
downturn,  especially in  the  large  manufacturing  sector of the  U.S.  "rust 
belt"1)  caused significant losses  of gas  load.  These  losses,  ·added  to  the 
growing  gas  supply,  created  the  so-called gas  "bubble".  There  are  those  in 
the  natural  gas  industry who  would  prefer  to call this  excess  supply  the 
gas  "sausage"  due  to  its  longer-than-anticipated life. 
1/  The  "rust belt"  refers  to  areas  of  the  U.S.  where basic heavy 
industries  (i.e.,  steel  production)  have  experienced heavy  recession. 
~~-··l ......  .._... ..  '·-~·-··-- "'.  -----~,.····  ·"·'- ·-
lt\ A3.8  During  this  period,  the  FERC  authorised limited period transportation 
service,  under  Section  311  of  the  NGPA,  in order  to  enable  pipelines  to 
transport  lower  cost gas.  (Order  500  provided that all NGPA  311 
arrangements  would  end  in October  1987.) 
A3.9  A further significant move  in response  to  the  above-market price of 
pipeline companies'  term contracts with  LDCs  was  FERC  Order  380  of May 
1984.  This  relieved the  LDCs  of  the variable cost related portion of their 
take-or-pay  commitments  to  the  pipelines  and  this  paved  the  way  for  them  to 
make  increasing use  of  third party  open  access  transportation to  meet  their 
gas  requirements. 
A3.10  The  pipelines'  response  to  the  problem of lost sales  to oil was  to 
propose  special marketing programs  (SMPs).  These  programs  offered low cost 
natural  gas  to directly served end users  who  were  especially price 
sensitive.  The  FERC  decided  to  allow  the  SMP  programs. 
A3.11  This  decision was  appealed  to  the United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals  for  the  District of Columbia  by  the Maryland People's  Counsel  in 
1985.  The  court ruled that  the  pipelines  must  offer  SMPs  to  LDCs  as  well 
as  to  end-users,  a  course  of action the  pipelines  could not  afford.  As  a 
result of this  finding,  coupled with  the  market  situation earlier-on 
described,  the  pipelines were  forced  to  refuse  to  take high priced gas 
under  take-or-pay contracts  and  instead purchased gas  at  lower  cost on  the 
spot market  in order  to  remain  competitive with oil at the burner  tip. 
A3.12  It is against this background  that the  FERC  began  to  envisage  a 
complete  restructuring of  the  natural  gas  industry. 
Order  No.  436 
A3.13  The  essence  of Order  No.  436  is  a  separation or unbundling of the 
pipelines'  traditional merchant  function  from  that of  transporters  of third 
party gas.  Briefly put,  the  Commission's  support  for  Order  No.  436  is as 
follows: Despite  growth  of a  competitive wellhead market,  the  pipelines 
retained market  power  in gas  transportation; 
Pipelines  generally declined  to  transport  gas  in competition 
with  their  own  sales; 
Pipelines  discrimination in transportation has  denied access 
to  gas  at the  lowest  reasonable  rates. 
It is apparently  FERC's  view  that  the  separation of the  two  roles of 
pipelines would  allow competition  from  many  sellers  to  give  consumers  the 
benefits  of deregulation at the wellhead. 
A3.14  Again,  briefly put,  Order  No.  436  provides  for  the  following: 
Pipelines  may  take  advantage  of  "blanket certification" of 
transportation services  if they  commit  themselves  to be  an 
"open-access"  pipeline  (i.e.,  provide  transportation service 
on  a  non-discriminatory basis); 
For  open-access  transportation,  available capacity will be 
allocated on  a  "first-come,  first-served"  basis; 
Rate  regulation for  open-access  transportation will  take  the 
form  of ceilings  and  floor prices with  the pipeline able  to 
set prices within that band; 
Open-access  pipelines  must  agree  to  allow their  LDC  customers 
to  convert  their contract  demand  from  an obligation to 
purchase  gas  to  an  obligation to  use  transportation service, 
or  to  reduce  their contract demand;  and 
The  FERC  will  issue expenditure certificates for  new 
facilities where  the  pipeline undertakes  the  entire economic 
risk of  the  project. 
A3.15  Virtually every sector  of  the  industry challenged the  Order  No.  436 
before  the  FERC  and  any  court  that would hear  them,  asserting a  complete 
array of errors  and omissions.  The  foregoing not withstanding, 
transportation was  begun  in earnest. 
Order  No  451 
A3.16  On  June  6,  1986,  the  FERC  issued Order  No.  451  as  the  next  step  in 
reordering  the  natural  gas  markets.  The  objectives of this order were  to promote  increased production of  "flowing,  old  gas"  (gas  that was  subject  to 
the  ceiling prices  set by  the  NGPA  and,  therefore,  lower  priced);  to 
discourage  premature  abandonment  of existing old gas  wells;  and  to  lower 
the  overall price of natural  gas  to  consumers  by placing  flowing,  old gas 
in competition with  "new  gas"  supplies. 
A3.17  To  achieve  these  objectives,  the  FERC  put  into place  four  major 
regulatory changes,  namely: 
The  elimination of vintaging,  and  the  establishment of a 
single  incentive-based ceiling price  for all old gas; 
The  establishment of a  good  faith negotiation procedure 
whereby  producers  could  get  the  new  ceiling price  for  gas  they 
commit  to  the  interstate market; 
The  creation of an automatic  abandonment  mechanism  for  the 
release of producers'  interstate sales'  obligations where  the 
good  faith negotiations  did not yield an  agreement; 
The  establishment of blanket sales  and  transportation 
certificates  to  move  the  released gas  if the  negotiations 
fail. 
A3.18  Again,  these  regulatory changes  were  challenged at  the  FERC  and  in 
the  courts by  every  segment  of  the  gas  industry.  The  court challenges 
remain pending  in the  courts  today. 
Order  No.  500 
A3.19  After  the  U.S.  Circuit Court of Appeals  for  the District of Columbia 
(the  Court),  in Associated Gas  Distributors vs.  FERC,  remanded  Order  No.436 
to  the  Commission  because  of the  Contract  Demand  (CD)  reduction provisions 
of  that order,  the  FERC  was  unable  to  make  the  findings  required by  the 
Court  to  make  subject provisions  acceptable  to  the  Court.  Instead,  the 
Commission elected to  issue  Order  No.  500,  which preserves  the  open  and 
non-discriminatory  transportation requirements  of Order  No.  436.  This 
order also attempts  to  deal  with  the  take-or-pay problems  of pipelines  that 
must  transport  gas  in an  increasingly competitive  market. AJ.JO  Briefly put,  Order  No.  500  provides  for  the  following  with  respect  to 
existing take-or-pay obligations: 
Pipelines will  be  allowed  to  recover between  25%  and  50%  of 
their buyout/down  payments  through  a  fixed  charge  to  their 
customers  as  long  as  the  pipeline  agrees  co  absorb  a  like 
percentage  of  these  costs. 
Pipelines  may  also  recover  up  to  50%  of their remaining costs 
through  a  commodity  charge,  a  volumetric  surcharge  or  some  mix 
of both. 
The  recovery  spreads  the  charges  over  a  large  customer base, 
including interruptible sales,  new  transportation and  small 
volume  customers. 
Pipelines  are  permitted to  file tariff rates  for holding gas 
supplies  for  their customers  to  avoid future  take-or-pay 
problems. 
li-S CURRENT  SITUATION 
General 
A4.1  Common  carriage  is alive  and well,  despite  the  fact  that the  final 
rules  under  which  the  ultimate  cost of transportation and related issues 
will  emerge  are  not yet  in place,  and  no  one  knows  who  will be  the winners 
and  losers  in the  economic  game  being played.  The  statistics for  1987  show 
that the major  interstate natural  gas  pipelines  transported 13.6  TCF  for 
others,  while  making  sales  gas  deliveries  of 6.0 TCF. 
A4.2  This  large shift  from  sales  service  to  transportation service has 
begun  to  make  some  impact  on  spot  gas  prices.  Buyers  are  find  a  hardening 
of  the  market  and  a  growing  reluctance  on  the  part of producers  to  discount 
prices.  This  has  caused  some  electric generators  to shift to oil.  The 
cost of gas  to  end-users  so  far has  tended  to  drop  as  lower  gas  costs have 
been passed on  through purchased gas  adjustment  mechanisms. 
A4.3  The  structure of  the  natural  gas  industry,  as  outlined earlier in 
this Appendix,  has  not  changed markedly.  There has,  however,  been  some 
fine  tuning,  as  exemplified by  the  establishment of marketing affiliates/ 
subsidiaries  to  market  gas  to  reduce  take-or-pay obligations. 
A4.4  Discounting has  caused  some  to  accept  lower  margins.  However,  the 
greatest potential  impact  on  financial  performance  (take-or-pay 
obligations)  is still waiting  in the  wings. 
A4.5  Currently most,  if not all,  major  interstate  nat~ral gas  pipelines 
have  either proposed or  instituted Order  No.  436  transportation programs, 
which  include both  firm  and  interruptible  transportation.  Certificates  for 
transportation under  Section  311  of the  NGPA  are  no  longer being  issued. 
However,  four  out of  the  twenty-three  major  US  pipelines have  been 
permitted to  continue  to  transport  gas  under  Section 311  while  their Order 
No.  436  proposals  are  pending.  In May  of  this year  the  Commission  approved 
the  first gas  inventory proposal  under  Order  500. A4.6  As  a  part of its ongoing effort  to  get all the  rules  in place,  the 
FERC,  in June  of this  year,  issued Order  No.  497.  This  order established 
standards  of conduct  and  reporting  requirements  int~nil.:.:;  to  prevent 
preferential treatment  of  an affiliated marketer by  an  ~~,~erstate pipeline 
in the  provision of transportation service. 
Structure  and  Level  of Carriage  Charges 
A4.7  Interstate pipelines  must  use volumetric  (per unit of gas  moved) 
rates  that reflect "material differences",  in mileage  or  seasonal costs. 
However,  in at least one  case,  the  Commission has  accepted  "postage  stamp" 
rates.  Rates  for  firm  transportation should cover  the  fully allocated cost 
of firm  transportation,  while  rates  for  interruptible transportation should 
recover  the  short-term variable costs of interruptible service.  Selective 
discounting is permitted. 
A4.8  At  this writing,  very  few  of the  major natural  gas  pipelines have 
filed Order  No.  436  rates,  even  though  providing transportation service 
under  that order.  So  it is not yet clear what  the  level of transportation 
rates will be.  If the  Commission  enforces  its mileage-related concept, 
there will be  considerable variances  in the  level of rates. 
A4.9  One  proposed  form  of transportation rates by  a  major pipeline is  to 
charge  a  premium  based  on  an  index  of spot prices with modifications based 
on  gas  takes. 
Priorities 
A4.10  The  FERC  has  not yet sorted out  the  question of priorities as  between 
pipeline customers  and  shippers. 
Pipeline Capacity and Obligation  to  Serve 
A4.11  The  FERC  has  not  made  a  definitive statement  on  this subject.  It is 
an  issue of great  importance  to  LDCs  because of their obligation to  serve. 
However,  the  Commission  has  said that  interruptible  transportation must  be 
carried out  on  a  best efforts basis. Importance  of Traders 
A4.12  As  the  use  of  transportation service has  increased,  it has  become 
quite clear that  the  role of  the broker  seems,  at this writing,  to vary 
with  the  size of  the  entity wishing  to  transport.  Large  LDCs  (gas  and/or 
electric)  and  large  industrial consumers  have  established natural  gas 
purchasing units  and  do  not  make  use  of  a  broker.  Small  and  medium  size 
transporters  depend upon brokers  to  arrange  their spot purchases  of gas. 
It is also  likely that Cogenerators  and  Independent  Power  Producers will 
use  brokers  to  purchase  natural  gas.  The  future  role of the broker will 
most  likely vary  in  importance  with  the  degree  of  imbalance  between supply 
and  demand. 
Imports 
A4.13  With  the  exception of Canadian  gas,  imports  do  not play  an  important 
role  in gas  supplies.  The  Commission has  approved  imports  from  Canada 
after examining  Canadian prices  compared  to U.S.  prices  and  gas 
availability.  There  are  currently several proposals before  the  Commission 
for  the  construction of pipeline capacity  to bring Canadian  gas  into  the 
Northeastern U.S.  The  Commission has  been very  slow  in determining which 
proposal  to certificate.  All  indications  are  that proposals  to  import 
Canadian gas  will  be  given  favourable  treatment. F1JTURE  PROSPECTS 
AS .1  Future  prospects  for  common  carriage will  depend  l.l~on  the  speed with 
which  the  freemarket  created by  the  FERC  reacts  to  c:.:.L.ging  conditions. 
The  year  1987  continued  the  trend of  reduced drilling activity from  the 
record setting levels of the  early 1980s,  which  means  ,~·rlat  reserves  are  not 
being adequately replaced.  The  AGA  is  now  predicting that the  gas  bubble 
will  disappear  in 1990  or  1991.  If the  market  place  O.c~~s  not  react 
quickly,  demand  could outstrip supply  and prices will rist.  On  the  other 
hand,  with  the  price of oil falling  to  some  $12  per barrel,  industry and 
electric generators will burn oil instead of gas,  which will reduce  gas 
demand. 
A5.2  If future  FERC  Commissioners  continue  the  current  Commission 
philosophy,  common  carriage  is here  to  stay.  This position will be 
supported by  large users  capable  of fuel  switching.  The  extent of future 
common  carriage  is problematical.  As  long  as  LDCs  remain  the  largest 
component  of the  major  interstate pipelines'  throughput,  the  actions of 
state regulators  could  influence  the  extent of common  carriage.  This is 
because  of the  LDCs'  obligation to  serve.  As  supply  and  demand  approach 
equilibrium and  the  spot market  dries  up,  state regulators  could begin  to 
urge  LDCs  to  return to  gas  purchasing  on  a  long  term  firm  contract basis  to 
protect  the  interest of their firm  customers.  In any  event,  the  LDCs  will 
most  likely maintain a  degree  of firm  sales  gas  or  firm  gas  purchased in 
the  field and  transported for  them. 
A5.3  The  issue  of bypass  (i.e.,  end-users  dropping off LDC  systems  and 
taking service directly  from  a  pipeline)  would  also have  an effect on  the 
extent of common  carriage. 
A5.4  In the  future,  the  FERC  expects  to  introduce  the  concept of capacity 
brokering,  the  subject  of  a  Notice  of Proposed Rulemaking.  The  Commission 
proposes  to begin experimenting with  capacity brokering on  a 
pipeline-by-pipeline basis.  Another  potential  development would be  to 
induce  pipelines  sized for  sales  loads,  which  might  not have  sufficient 
capacity for  transportation,  to  invest  in increased capacity.  This,  it has been  (informally)  proposed,  would  contribute  to  the  overall efficiency of 
the  natural  gas  industry. 
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APPENDIX  B 
GLOSSARY  OF  TERMS Annual  Contract 
Quantity  (ACQ) 
Auto-generation 
Back-up 
Calorific Value  (CV) 
Capacity charge 
Combined  cycle 
power  plant 
Combined  Heat  and 
Power  (CHP) 
Commercial  energy 
market 
Commodity  charge 
GLOSSARY  OF  TERMS 
The  target annual  volume  which  a  gas  buyer  and 
seller agree  should be  bought  and  sold under  a  gas 
purchase  contract. 
Generation of electricity by  an  industrial concern 
on its own  premises,  using  a  purchased supply of 
another  fuel  such as  gas,  coal or  HFO. 
An  undertaking  to  make  supplementary gas  supplies 
available  to  a  third party,  in the  event  that  the 
primary  source  fails  to deliver. 
The  amount  of energy produced by  combustion at 
specified conditions,  per unit of gas  volume  (eg 
Kcal/m3).  CV  can be  quoted either net or gross  and 
the  gas  industry normally uses  the  gross  CV. 
A charge  relating to  the  maximum  use  which  is made 
of a  facility,  such as  maximum  pipeline  throughput 
or  gas  offtake  in m3(hour or m3/day. 
Typically  a  gas-fired power  station which  combines  a 
gas  turbine with  a  steam  turbine  and boiler heated 
by  the  turbine  exhaust  gases,  thus  allowing 
electricity to be  generated  from  two  sources within 
the  same  plant. 
Use  of fuel  to  produce heat  and,  at the  same  time, 
to  generate electricity. 
Comprises  (inter alia)  schools,  hospitals,  public 
buildings,  offices,  shops,  hotels,  etc. 
A charge  for  each unit of gas  (volume  or energy) 
which  is  consumed or  transported. Common  carriage 
Compressor  station 
Contract sales 
Direct firing 
Direct sales/ 
direct marketing 
Distribution 
system 
District Heating 
Dual  firing 
capability 
Feedstock 
FERC 
Firm  gas  supply 
A legal obligation on pipeline  owners  to  provide 
transportation and related services  for  third 
parties. 
A plant comprising  gas  turbines  which  are  used  to 
boost  the  operating pressure of a  gas  pipeline  and 
thus  increase  throughput. 
Gas  supplied under  the  terms  of an  individual 
contract between  a  gas  utility and  the  customer at 
an  individually-negotiated price. 
Process  use  of fuel,  involving direct contact 
between the  gas  and  the product. 
Sales of gas  direct  from  a  producer  to  an  end-
consumer,  usually via common  carriage. 
Relatively small-diameter,  low pressure pipelines 
used  to  carry gas  from  the  transmission system to 
the  consumer. 
Distribution of piped heat,  usually in densely 
populated areas  and often on  the basis of  CHP  plants 
and/or  local heating stations. 
The  ability of a  consumer  to burn  two  fuels  in a 
particular plant  (eg natural  gas  or fuel oil)  and  to 
switch between one  and  the  other. 
Raw  material  for  manufacturing:  used  to  describe  the 
non-energy uses  of natural  gas  for  making  ammonia 
and methanol. 
The  US  Federal  Energy Regulatory  Commission. 
A supply of gas  which  the seller is not permitted to 
interrupt. "F"  tariff 
Gas  oil 
Gas  swaps 
Heavy  fuel 
oil  (HFO) 
"H  gas" 
Industrial energy 
market 
Interruptible gas 
supply 
"L  gas" 
The  lowest  of  the  Dutch  gas  sales  tariffs.  This 
relates  to  feedstock use  of gas  by  ammonia  and 
methanol  producers  in the  Netherlands  and,  like 
other Dutch  industrial gas  tariffs,  is  linked to  the 
Rotterdam spot market price of  low  sulphur  fuel  oil. 
A middle  distillate product of crude  oil refining. 
Relatively  low  in impurities  and consistent in 
quality,  it is  an alternative  to  gas  for  domestic 
heating and  for  "premiwn"  industrial applications, 
but not  for  feedstock  uses  such  as  ammonia 
manufacture. 
Usually bilateral agreements  between  gas utilities, 
whereby  each party agrees  to  take physical  delivery 
of gas  contractually purchased by  the  other,  often 
in order  to minimise  transmission costs. 
A residual  "black oil" product of crude  oil 
refining.  Often contains  impurities  and  is variable 
in quality,  as  for  example  between  low  (less  than 
1%)  sulphur  fuel oil  (LSFO)  and high  sulphur  (often 
over  3%)  sulphur fuel  oil  (HSFO).  It is  a  low  grade 
fuel  and  competes  with  gas  in  "non-premiwn" 
industrial applications  such  as  steam raising under 
boilers. 
Higher calorific value  gas  of North  Sea quality. 
Comprises  manufacturing,  construction industries, 
mineral extraction and other  industrial enterprises. 
A supply of gas  which  the seller may  interrupt on 
terms  agreed  in the  contract. 
Low  calorific value  gas  of Groningen quality. 
1?'1 Liquefied Natural 
Gas  (LNG) 
Liquefied 
Petroleum Gases 
(LPG) 
Load  factor 
Looping 
Make-up 
Market-related 
pricing 
Minimum  payment/ 
minimum  bill 
Natural  gas 
Natural  gas  kept  in liquefied form  at very  low 
temperatures.  Sometimes  used  for  long-distance 
transportation or  for  storage,  because  of the 
substantial reduction in volume  when  the  gas  is 
liquefied. 
Light petroleum products  (propane  and butane), 
mainly obtained  from  refining crude  oil,  although 
they are  also present  in small quantities  in natural 
gas. 
Average  consumption over  a  period expressed as  a 
percentage  of peak consumption during that period 
(typically,  average  daily consumption over a  year as 
a  percentage of  the  peak daily consumption in that 
year). 
The  construction of a  parallel pipeline for part of 
an existing pipeline's  length  in order  to  increase 
transmission capacity. 
The  right,  following  the  payment  of a  take-or-pay 
penalty,  to  take  an equivalent amount  of gas  free  of 
charge  (or  receive  a  cash  reimbursement,  in some 
cases)  under  specified conditions  in subsequent 
contract years. 
A pricing policy which  links  gas  prices  to  those  of 
customers'  alternative  fuels.  Strict thermal 
equivalent prices  may  be  adjusted for  the  relative 
advantages  of using  gas  and  the alternative fuel  in 
the  equipment  concerned  (e.g.  environmental 
cleanliness,  in the  case  of gas  vs  HFO) 
See  "take-or-pay". 
A gaseous  mixture  of hydrocarbons  consisting 
primarily of methane. Netback 
Non-premium 
Open  access 
transportation 
Peak  shaving 
Price  transparency 
Premium 
Process  use 
Right of first 
refusal 
Selling price  less  transport  and other non-gas 
supply costs.  In the  gas  industry,  the  netback at 
the border  is  frequently  used  to  assess  how  much  it 
is worth  paying  for  additional  gas  supplies. 
Low-grade,  low-value  fuels  such  as  heavy  fuel  oil or 
coal;  used  to  describe  the market  in which  gas 
competes  against  such  fuels. 
Voluntary  transportation of gas  for  third parties  on 
a  non-discriminatory basis by  US  pipeline  companies 
under  FERC  Orders  436  and  500. 
Facilities  (such as  LNG  storage)  designed  to 
supplement  gas  supplies at times  of peak  demand 
only. 
Usually used  to refer to  gas  pricing systems  which 
are based on clearly-defined rules  (such  as 
published tariffs or  a  published tariff formula) 
which  allow consumers  to  identify  the basis  of 
pricing. 
High-grade,  high-value  fuels  such as  gas  oil or 
electricity;  used  to  describe  the market  in which 
gas  competes  against  such  fuels. 
Direct or  indirect use  of  a  fuel  in industrial 
production processes,  rather  than  for  space  or water 
heating. 
An  obligation on  gas  producers  to offer their gas 
for  sale  to  a  specified buyer  (gas utility).  Only 
if the utility refuses  to  purchase  at a  reasonable 
price may  the  gas  then be  offered elsewhere  and  the 
seller may  not  accept  a  price  from  others  which  is 
lower  than  that which  the utility is prepared  to 
pay. Ship-or-pay 
Shipper 
Stand-by  fuel 
Steam  raising 
Swing  factor 
Take-or-pay 
Tariff sales 
Third party gas 
transportation 
Transmission 
system 
Wobbe  number 
An  undertaking  to  pay  for  (at  least)  the 
transporation of  a  specified volume  of gas, 
regardless  of  the  actual  volume  shipped. 
Person seeking  to have  gas  transported by  a  pipeline 
owner 
A stock of alternative  fuel  (usually  HFO)  retained 
by  a  non-premium  gas  customer  for  use  in the  event 
of  interruption. 
Production of steam  in boilers  for  indirect process 
heat or  space  heating. 
The  inverse  of the  load factor,  ie peak daily supply 
over  annual  average  daily supply. 
A contractual undertaking  to  pay  for  a  specified 
quantity of gas,  irrespective of whether  that amount 
is  consumed  or not;  sometimes  referred to  as  a 
"minimum  payment". 
Sales  of gas  made  on  the basis  of  a  uniform tariff 
price,  which  is usually published. 
The  transportation of gas  by pipeline  owners  for 
third party shippers  who  retain title to  the  gas. 
Large-diameter,  high pressure  pipelines  used  to 
carry  large  volwnes  of gas  over  long distances. 
A measure  of  the  burning characteristics of a  gas. 
For  safety reasons,  the  Wobbe  number  must  be  within 
a  certain range,  especially where  the  gas  is used  in 
domestic  appliances. li1 
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APPENDIX  D 
TERMS  OF  REFERENCE 
.... CC>t.I.41SSION 
OF  THE 
EUROPEAN  C~UNITIES 
Directorate-General  for  EnGrgy  Brua&els,  2  ~ay  19S8 
XVII·C-3 
LB/ab 
Study on  ths adVat'ltii(JeS  and  drawt:Jeck~  fa,0he 
European  Co••unlty ol the  Introduction of a  ay.ttea of 
·COtW.c;>n  earr ler  •  for  the  1~ ran$  port of flat  ural gu 
1.  The  1.1m  of  the  contract  Is  tc>  decide  the  economic,  legal  and 
POlitical  Implications  of  a  modification  In  tne  condition• of 
natural  ga•  transpert  In  the  EEC  through  the  poaslble 
Introduction  of  an  obltgatlor.·  to  transport  for  third  parties 
on  non- dl~crtmlnatory  eonaltlons  (•common  carrier•),  The 
stuay  snouJd  take  aeeount  of  the  ei'taracterlstlc~  of  natu,.al 
gas  su~cly  In  the  Euro~an Co~munlty  •~ well  •~  the  Community 
energy  ob}tJctlve~  adopt~  b)i  the  Council  In  Septe111ber  1PS~ 
(O.J.c.c.  n·  c  247,  2~.P.S6).  Tne8e  refer  In  particular  to  the 
necessity  of  greater  Integration  of  the  Internal  energy 
market.  fr~ ~rom all  barriers,  with  a  view  to  reducing  co~ts 
and  fm~rov!ng  economle  comp!tltlvenes3,  whlllt  maintaining 
s~curlty of  !u~ply. 
2.  With  regtJ.ra  to  ·common  carrier·,  the  stuay  ~houla  establish 
the  existence  of  different  14tglslatlve  ana  regulatory  lltua-
tlons  ~swell as  different  administrative  ~ract/ces  a~d their 
conseqr..uJnces  (In  the country  ctn<i  l:>etween  countrIes). : 
In  the United  Kingdom 
1  n  other  llem~er St  atet  c>f  t net  E. C. 
Tne  stuay  snoula  al~o astermlne  under  what  con<tltlons  and  to 
what  extent  a  third-party  transport  obligation  on  non-
dl$crtmln~tory eondltlons  cou1d  oe  lntroaueea at  E.C.  level  In 
r"e  area  of  natural  gas  tran$f)Ort.  The  actvtJ.ntar;es  ana  draw-
backs  of such  a  system 1hould oe  spelled out: 
~or  tne eon$umers 
for  the  gas  Industry 
for  the  Community,  In  reJ~tlon  to  general  economic 
consIder at I on$  (Inc  I ua I r~g  com pet 1  t 1  on)  and  energy  PO 1  1  cy 
------------.. ---------------.--------------··--···-------------------------.-... -·------·----
~ro't'itfonol  eddrtta:  (fer  1'11011)  Jt~o~t  Cit  lo  L.tl  200,  l-104t  lfwtttlt,  ltl~lwl'll.  Of11tt  tfGfUI: 
Avtn~•  Ct  ltrv~r•~  226/2lt,  1-11$0  lrwtttlt.  Ttlt,~O"•  (twl\th•oo~d):  2~1  11  ,,, 
Ttlt•  COWtU  I  2~177.  Ttlt~rop~ro IC4rttt  COW!U~  8r~tltlt.  Ttltfax:  02/2~5  01  10 
( • 
, 
l 
3. 
- z -
The  contractor  should  work  c'n  the  04,/!  of  ~rf!gulatlon~  In 
force  in  the  E.C.  a.s  regtJras  the  tran$oorr  of  natural  ga.s.  A 
summary  of  Member  Stat~!'  legislation  In  thla  flsld  1~ 
av_l!~ble  from  the  Gas  Olvlston  In  three  languages  (French, 
English,  German) . 
/"' 
r.~  contr4ctor  snould  tak~  tJccount  of  ~he  ftJct  that  the 
·common  carrl~r·  system  which  Is  a~clled  in  the  u.s.  for  the 
transport  of  ntJtural  gas  Is  51/tuatea  wtthln  every  dlf~erent 
economic  framework  than  the  one  existing  In  the  European 
Community.  Indeed,  contrary  t~  the  u.s.  where  tho  gaa  market 
ts  operated  by  many  actors.  the  situation  In  the  EEC  1~ 
chtJractertz~ notably  by  the  ctxlstenee of  a  limited  number  of 
sucpller!  end  buyers. 
The  GtJs  Olvl$/on  can,  In  that  re$Pf!Ct,  also  provide  related 
tnformtJtlon,  notably  as  regarcts  ti"HH  ttructure of  the  EuroDOan 
gas  Industry,  the natural  gas  supply outlook  and  the  Co•~unlty 
energy obJectives. 
/loreover,  the  pc.sltlon  of  COJ.1ETEC-GAZ,  the  Europe•n  •••ocla-
tlon  for  natural  gas  tr"'.ti>O•"t  and  dlstrlbut/01'1,  on  •commo" 
eerrl~r· should be  tra,lmltteo shortly to  the I.e.  Commlatlon. 
Thl.s  document  will  ~  available  to  the  contractor  once  It  Ia 
to htJnd. 
Finally,  the contractor will  examine with  the Ga•  Dlv/~lon the 
eontects  to  be  made  with  certain  key  o~er•tora  In  the aector 
(two  or  t IV H). 
4.  Tl"'e  $tuay  snould  be  In  the  French  or  English  1angu4ge  and 
sheula  contain  a  aummary  of  conclusion~.  The  final  repert 
snouta  be  s~bmlttea to  the  Ga~ Division  for  acceptance.  Twei'Jty 
five  (2S)  coates  should  be  msde  tJVtJIIable.  The  time  allowed 
for  eomcletlon  Is  two  and  a  h!lf month.t  following  ~lgneture of 
the  contrect. 
5.  The  off~r should  lndteate  the  proposed  work  method  as  well  aa 
the $ltuatlon of  the  lt~dy. 
... 